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OF THE
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CLASS II FOMC

TO: Federal Open Market Committee

FROM: Arthur L. Broida AB

Attached is a memorandum from the Subcommittee on the Directive dated today and entitled "Weighting of M-1 and M-2 for 2-month operating ranges." It is contemplated that this memorandum will be discussed at next week's FOMC meeting, under agenda item 6.

Attachment

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The FOMC moved in this direction at its September meeting when it established a 5 percentage point range for M-1 and a 4 point range for M-2. We do not believe that an appreciably wider range for M-1 is required at this point, though in periods of substantial uncertainty (such as after tax rebates or around year-end) a wider range might be desirable. At the same time, we should point out that M-2 may also have a large unpredictable or transitory component at certain times. This is most likely to be the case when market rates are approaching Regulation Q ceilings, either from above or below, and hence when large one-time movements of funds between time and savings deposits and market instruments may take place.

For such reasons the subcommittee believes that changes in the width of ranges and/or in the weights attached to M-1 and M-2 may be appropriate from time to time. However, if such changes are made too frequently or without compelling reason, there is the risk that the public will come to believe that the FOMC is capricious in its decision-making.

In assessing the weights to be assigned M-1 and M-2 in the short-run--and also the width of the short-run operating ranges--the subcommittee took the view that such judgments would not necessarily affect, or be affected by, weights assigned longer-run ranges for the aggregates adopted by the FOMC, so long as the importance of both aggregates over the longer-run to the FOMC did not differ by a very wide margin. Of course, if the FOMC were to decide that one of the

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aggregates is of only minimal importance, then it would not seem reasonable to place much weight on that aggregate in short-run operations.

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Under present procedures, the FOMC employs the two-month tolerance ranges to provide flexibility for the Desk to adjust the Federal funds rate between meetings to levels different from the "mid-point" initially established by the FOMC. Incoming data on the aggregates over the short-run thus serve as signals to adjust the funds rate--with the objective of contributing to a satisfactory economic performance and of encouraging longer-run growth in the family of aggregates within the FOMC's longer-run ranges. In that context, weights assigned M-1 and M-2 tolerance ranges should involve the relative ability of the two aggregates to give reasonably accurate signals, within a short period, of longer-run tendencies in the economy and the aggregates themselves. Short-run weights would depend in part, therefore, on such factors as the unpredictability, or extent of random movement, of the two series and the degree to which deviations in the aggregates from expectations convey information as to future economic performance.

In our discussions, a number of arguments for increasing the weight of M-2, and/or for widening the short-run operating range for M-1, were considered.

First, changing institutional practices--for example, NOW accounts, telephonic transfers between demand and savings deposits,

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business savings accounts--in recent years appear to have increased the transactional balances held in time and savings deposits, which are a component of M-2 but not of M-1. The increased ease of transfer between demand and savings accounts may have diminished the significance of short-run variations in M-1 relative to M-2.

Second, M-1 is in any event more volatile in the short-run than M-2. The mean absolute deviation of weekly M-1 growth about its average over the past 18 years was 9.8 percentage points and of monthly M-1 3.1 percentage points. For M-2, the weekly and monthly average deviations were 6.3 and 2.9 percentage points, at an annual rate, respectively. However, M-1 has been more volatile both absolutely and relative to M-2 in the past several years; since 1972 the average absolute monthly deviation in M-1 was 3.5 percentage points and in M-2 2.7 percentage points.

Third, M-1 appears to be less predictable than M-2 in the short run. From 1974 to date, the average absolute error (without regard to sign) in the staff's forecast of two-month growth rates for M-1 was one percentage point more than for M-2--averaging 2.8 percentage points at an annual rate as compared with 1.8 percentage points for M-2. The difference was more marked in 1977; thus far this year the average absolute error for M-1 has been 3.3 percentage points and for M-2 1.7 percentage points.

Fourth, deviations in M-1 growth over the short-run bear more than 50 per cent weight under the present FOMC procedures that give M-1 and M-2 approximately equal weight. This is because M-1 is also a

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component of M-2--about 40 per cent of it--so that deviations in M-1 growth affect deviations in M-2 growth. Taking account of effects on both M-1 and M-2, deviations in M-1 growth presently have about a 70 per cent weight in affecting the Manager's operations.

Some of the arguments for increasing the weight assigned to M-2 relative to M-1 in the short-run do not appear very strong, at least from our analysis to date. Both M-1 and M-2 exhibit considerable month-to-month variability, although, as noted above, the variability of M-1 has been somewhat higher, especially in recent years. The average variability of M-2 has been increased, of course, by large movements of funds into and out of time deposits when market interest rates move into the area of Regulation Q ceiling rates. But a month-to-month variability in M-2 that is not far different from M-1 also is consistent with the view that the high variability of M-1 does not reflect to any significant extent erratic, short-run shifts of funds between demand and time and savings deposits^{1/}--though of course there has been a longer-run structural shift of funds from demand to savings accounts in recent years.

Prediction errors were significantly larger for M-1 than for M-2 over 2-month periods, but these can be interpreted in two different ways. They may suggest that M-1 is a less reliable series than M-2.

^{1/} On a quarterly basis, for example, there was no evidence that forecast errors in M-1 in our quarterly econometric model were associated with forecast errors in the opposite direction in the time and savings deposit component of M-2 (after correcting the M-1 forecasting equation for the downward shift in the demand for M-1 since 1975).

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On the other hand, these prediction errors may themselves convey important information. For instance, highly tentative staff research suggests that M-1 forecast errors bear a significant relation to GNP forecast errors. Based on preliminary tests with the quarterly econometric model--and after making allowance for the downward shift in the demand for M-1 since early 1975--it appears that the model's forecast errors of M-1 in a quarter were a reasonably good predictor of the model's forecast errors in nominal GNP for that quarter, or for one quarter ahead, and that inclusion of broader aggregates added little further information.

These tests are no more than suggestive at this stage. They, of course, were not run on the monthly and bi-monthly money supply projections that affect inter-meeting Federal funds rate adjustments and therefore do not apply directly to the problem being addressed by the subcommittee. Nor were they based on the actual staff quarterly GNP and interest rate forecasts. Moreover, they have to be assessed in light of the findings over the years that M-1, M-2, and the broader monetary aggregates as well, all bear fairly close relationships to nominal GNP--though with variable lags and with varying degrees of closeness depending on the time frame.

The subcommittee has requested the staff to continue research in this area. Meanwhile, we believe that the wisest course for the FOMC at this time is, as noted earlier, to widen the short-run tolerance range for M-1 relative to M-2.