Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)
Public Hearing
June 14, 2007
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Martin Building, Terrace Level
20th and C Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C.
| Transcript | Line | Page |
|---|---|---|
| regulation would cut off access to credit. | 1 | 51 |
| The subprime industry has created a | 2 | 51 |
| completely irrational marketplace, at least for | 3 | 51 |
| consumers. In place of an efficient market that | 4 | 51 |
| provides real consumer choice and rewards consumers | 5 | 51 |
| for smart credit decisions and rational aspirations, | 6 | 51 |
| we have a subprime mortgage market that has recklessly | 7 | 51 |
| created and sold ridiculously risky mortgage products | 8 | 51 |
| that have excessively benefitted all of the market | 9 | 51 |
| players at the expense of middle class and low income | 10 | 51 |
| homeowners and their communities. | 11 | 51 |
| While I fear that for many American | 12 | 51 |
| homeowners, any regulatory action is too late, I am | 13 | 51 |
| glad to see that the Federal Reserve is beginning to | 14 | 51 |
| ask the right questions, and I hope that this will | 15 | 51 |
| serve as the first step in taking corrective actions | 16 | 51 |
| to protect future homeowners. | 17 | 51 |
| While I hope during the course of this | 18 | 51 |
| hearing to expand on these thoughts and | 19 | 51 |
| recommendations, here are some of my initial thoughts | 20 | 51 |
| on what the Federal Reserve can and must do under the | 21 | 51 |
| authority granted to it by Congress under HOEPA. | 22 | 51 |
| First, require common sense underwriting. | 23 | 51 |
| One of the greatest absurdities in the current out of | 24 | 51 |
| control subprime mortgage marketplace is a consumer's | 25 | 51 |
| true ability to repay the mortgage is often not | 1 | 52 |
| considered. | 2 | 52 |
| It is absolutely essential that the Federal | 3 | 52 |
| Reserve create regulations that force all mortgage | 4 | 52 |
| lenders and underwriters to make certain that a | 5 | 52 |
| borrower's repayment ability truly reflect the loan's | 6 | 52 |
| long-term affordability. | 7 | 52 |
| The Fed must also prohibit subprime mortgage | 8 | 52 |
| lenders from offering no document or stated income | 9 | 52 |
| forms. These loans are not only a license for a | 10 | 52 |
| mortgage originator to lie about a borrower's ability | 11 | 52 |
| to repay, but also allows them to charge a higher | 12 | 52 |
| interest rate than the borrower would otherwise have | 13 | 52 |
| to pay. | 14 | 52 |
| Prohibit deceptive practices that disguise | 15 | 52 |
| the real cost of a loan. In all of my experience | 16 | 52 |
| representing mortgage borrowers, I have never heard a | 17 | 52 |
| rational reason that benefits the consumer, for a | 18 | 52 |
| subprime refinance loan to not include taxes and | 19 | 52 |
| insurance in the borrower's mortgage payment. | 20 | 52 |
| I have, on the other hand, spoke with | 21 | 52 |
| countless borrowers, who were led to believe that | 22 | 52 |
| their new mortgage payment would be lower than their | 23 | 52 |
| existing mortgage, only to discover, often too late, | 24 | 52 |
| that the only reason the payment was lower is because | 25 | 52 |
| taxes and insurance were not included. | 1 | 53 |
| The Fed must require taxes and insurance to | 2 | 53 |
| be included and disclosed as part of their future | 3 | 53 |
| monthly payment, in all of the prime loan documents. | 4 | 53 |
| Finally, establish effective consumer | 5 | 53 |
| remedies for unfair practices. The fundamental | 6 | 53 |
| failure of the subprime marketplace to act rationally | 7 | 53 |
| towards consumers is caused by the complete lack of | 8 | 53 |
| accountability between the myriad of actors in today's | 9 | 53 |
| mortgage industry. | 10 | 53 |
| I'll expand on that later, as we get to the | 11 | 53 |
| question and answer session. | 12 | 53 |
| GOVERNOR KROSZNER: Thank you very much. | 13 | 53 |
| Now we're going to hear from Janis Bowdler, from the | 14 | 53 |
| National Council of La Raza. | 15 | 53 |
| MS. BOWDLER: Thank you. Am I on? Hello? | 16 | 53 |
| Can you hear me? Is that better? Okay. Good | 17 | 53 |
| morning. My name is Janis Bowdler. I'm a senior | 18 | 53 |
| housing policy analyst for the National Council of La | 19 | 53 |
| Raza. | 20 | 53 |
| In my time there, I've published on fair | 21 | 53 |
| housing issues and predatory lending issues as they | 22 | 53 |
| affect the Latino community. I've also testified | 23 | 53 |
| before the House and Senate and participated in last | 24 | 53 |
| year's hearing before the Fed in Philadelphia. So I | 25 | 53 |
| want to thank you for this invitation. | 1 | 54 |
| The number of Hispanic families entering the | 2 | 54 |
| mortgage market is going up every year. Hispanic home | 3 | 54 |
| ownership is at an all-time high, but unfortunately, | 4 | 54 |
| so is foreclosure. | 5 | 54 |
| For many of us that are here at the table, | 6 | 54 |
| though, this really isn't new news. This didn't come | 7 | 54 |
| as a surprise. NCLR has been warning for years that | 8 | 54 |
| lots of our Latino families were getting bad loans. | 9 | 54 |
| We think it's time to call it what it is. | 10 | 54 |
| The market is broken. Many Latino borrowers have | 11 | 54 |
| unique profiles. Thin credit files, multiple wage | 12 | 54 |
| earners per household, and these are characteristics | 13 | 54 |
| that prime lenders that thrive on automation don't | 14 | 54 |
| find very attractive. | 15 | 54 |
| Where prime lenders have neglected our | 16 | 54 |
| communities, subprime lenders have been quick to fill | 17 | 54 |
| the gap. Now, as you heard Martin say, 40 percent of | 18 | 54 |
| Latino loans are subprime. | 19 | 54 |
| Prime lending to minority families is in | 20 | 54 |
| disarray, and it's high time the Federal Reserve and | 21 | 54 |
| other regulatory agencies affirm that commitment that | 22 | 54 |
| fair lending and equal access to credit laws and | 23 | 54 |
| principles. All families should have access to | 24 | 54 |
| fairly-priced credit that is appropriate for their | 25 | 54 |
| risk level. | 1 | 55 |
| It's sad to say, but I don't think that | 2 | 55 |
| that's where we're at now, and I think the Fed has an | 3 | 55 |
| opportunity to restore some balance to the | 4 | 55 |
| marketplace. In the interest of time, I'm going to | 5 | 55 |
| narrow my remarks to just a couple of areas, and then | 6 | 55 |
| expand it in question and answer. | 7 | 55 |
| So I'd like to talk about borrower's ability | 8 | 55 |
| to repay, some deceptive acts at pre- and post- | 9 | 55 |
| origination, and the fair advertising and minority | 10 | 55 |
| language publications. | 11 | 55 |
| I won't go into too much detail, since | 12 | 55 |
| ability to repay has already been covered. But I do | 13 | 55 |
| want to say that I think this is one of the most | 14 | 55 |
| important issues facing us now. Without an ability to | 15 | 55 |
| repay standard, underserved communities cannot rely on | 16 | 55 |
| home ownership to build wealth, which is the whole | 17 | 55 |
| reason that we promote home ownership in the first | 18 | 55 |
| place. | 19 | 55 |
| What our home ownership counselors tell us | 20 | 55 |
| is that over and over, the foreclosure clients that | 21 | 55 |
| they see have loans that they were never going to be | 22 | 55 |
| able to repay. | 23 | 55 |
| Now a large part of figuring out a | 24 | 55 |
| borrower's ability to repay is how you document their | 25 | 55 |
| income. This is an issue that is very sensitive in | 1 | 56 |
| the Latino community. Thirty-five percent of Latinos | 2 | 56 |
| born in the U.S. do not have basic banking accounts. | 3 | 56 |
| That number goes up to 45 percent when you look at | 4 | 56 |
| immigrant communities, and many rely on cash income. | 5 | 56 |
| Our community is still struggling to connect | 6 | 56 |
| to products that are flexible and accommodating of | 7 | 56 |
| these unique characteristics. But at the same time, | 8 | 56 |
| stated income and low doc loans have been used to take | 9 | 56 |
| advantage of our families. | 10 | 56 |
| We need flexibility, but we also need | 11 | 56 |
| accountability. So we recommend that the Federal | 12 | 56 |
| Reserve require originators to use the best and most | 13 | 56 |
| appropriate document available when verifying income. | 14 | 56 |
| NCLR is also concerned about deceptive ads | 15 | 56 |
| targeting Latinos, and escrow was already talked about | 16 | 56 |
| a little bit. So I'm not going to go into that, but | 17 | 56 |
| I'd be happy to talk about that in Q and A. | 18 | 56 |
| What I do want to do is take some time to | 19 | 56 |
| pick up on something that Sandy actually talked about, | 20 | 56 |
| and I was really glad that they mentioned this, and | 21 | 56 |
| that is what we're seeing as an uptick in foreclosure | 22 | 56 |
| rescue scams. | 23 | 56 |
| Since I'm a big fan of visual aids, I have a | 24 | 56 |
| stack of solicitations here that are sent to Latinos | 25 | 56 |
| in financial crisis at the time of foreclose that I'd | 1 | 57 |
| be happy to share with you. | 2 | 57 |
| As you heard described, so-called | 3 | 57 |
| foreclosure consultants call. Families think that | 4 | 57 |
| they're getting refinanced, and actually they've been | 5 | 57 |
| tricked into handing over the deed to their house. | 6 | 57 |
| Which means they lose the opportunity to do | 7 | 57 |
| mitigation, and they lose the opportunity to sell | 8 | 57 |
| their home. | 9 | 57 |
| We think that one way to get at this would | 10 | 57 |
| be to call this what it is, which is an extension of | 11 | 57 |
| credit under TILA and HOEPA, and that might get at | 12 | 57 |
| some of these issues. | 13 | 57 |
| One last issue that I want to bring your | 14 | 57 |
| attention to is we are concerned that little attention | 15 | 57 |
| is being paid to mortgage advertisements in Spanish | 16 | 57 |
| language press. Latinos and other immigrants and | 17 | 57 |
| language minorities turn to ethnic press to find | 18 | 57 |
| practitioners that speak their language, and who they | 19 | 57 |
| believe will be more understanding of their credit | 20 | 57 |
| needs, the unique borrower profiles that I described | 21 | 57 |
| earlier. | 22 | 57 |
| I also have a stack of newspapers here from | 23 | 57 |
| this weekend, I come prepared. In looking through the | 24 | 57 |
| papers, I couldn't find one broker advertised loan in | 25 | 57 |
| the English paper. In the Spanish paper, I couldn't | 1 | 58 |
| find one traditional product, and I couldn't find one | 2 | 58 |
| TILA disclosure available on that. | 3 | 58 |
| While we don't think that disclosures are by | 4 | 58 |
| any means the answer to what we have going on here, | 5 | 58 |
| fairness in advertising is an important part of | 6 | 58 |
| ensuring equal access to credit available to all | 7 | 58 |
| borrowers. | 8 | 58 |
| We know that where you enter the mortgage | 9 | 58 |
| market does predict reasonably what kind of product | 10 | 58 |
| you're going to end up with. So we'd like to | 11 | 58 |
| recommend that this should be investigated by | 12 | 58 |
| oversight agencies, as high as DOJ and the Fed, and | 13 | 58 |
| we'd also like to see that the Board declare | 14 | 58 |
| misleading advertisements by third parties as a | 15 | 58 |
| deceptive act and practice. | 16 | 58 |
| With that, I will wrap up, and I will be | 17 | 58 |
| happy to answer or expand on anything in Q and A. | 18 | 58 |
| GOVERNOR KROSZNER: Thank you very much. | 19 | 58 |
| Finally, we're going to hear from Alys Cohen from the | 20 | 58 |
| National Consumer Law center. | 21 | 58 |
| MS. COHEN: Thank you. Can people hear me? | 22 | 58 |
| Thank you for having the National Consumer Law Center | 23 | 58 |
| here today. My name is Alys Cohen. I'm a staff | 24 | 58 |
| attorney at NCLC. I've been working on predatory | 25 | 58 |
| lending issues for more than ten years. | 1 | 59 |
| I'm sorry to say that from day one, | 2 | 59 |
| consumers have been calling me about the loans they | 3 | 59 |
| can't afford, and they continue to call me today. | 4 | 59 |
| Lawyers who work with Ira and others call up and send | 5 | 59 |
| us the loan documents. | 6 | 59 |
| The only thing that has changed really is | 7 | 59 |
| the details. But basically, this has been going on | 8 | 59 |
| for a long time, and for a long time, government | 9 | 59 |
| officials have been hearing about it. We hope that | 10 | 59 |
| finally, serious action can be taken, because nibbling | 11 | 59 |
| around the edges is not going to solve this problem. | 12 | 59 |
| This is about wealth-building, and the cost | 13 | 59 |
| of not acting is a lot bigger than the cost of acting. | 14 | 59 |
| What we've seen to date is rhetoric about access to | 15 | 59 |
| credit when what we really see is access to borrowers | 16 | 59 |
| by predatory lenders. | 17 | 59 |
| We want access to credit too. We want | 18 | 59 |
| access to good and fair credit for everybody. What | 19 | 59 |
| we're seeing is an epidemic of damaging loans, | 20 | 59 |
| primarily refinancings in the subprime market, and | 21 | 59 |
| there's been a lot of focus on the resets that we're | 22 | 59 |
| seeing for hybrid ARMs. | 23 | 59 |
| But I'd like to also focus you on another | 24 | 59 |
| problem. Some preliminary data from the Mortgage | 25 | 59 |
| Project, which is an analysis of bankruptcy data for | 1 | 60 |
| homeowners by Catherine Porter and Tara Tummey, and | 2 | 60 |
| they wanted me to tell you it's preliminary data, | 3 | 60 |
| shows that 60 percent of ARMs that fail are pre-reset, | 4 | 60 |
| and that over half of the pool of failed loans are | 5 | 60 |
| fixed rate loans. | 6 | 60 |
| So we have a reset problem, but we have a | 7 | 60 |
| very broad problem that we really need to take a look | 8 | 60 |
| at. Moreover, the cost to real people here is very | 9 | 60 |
| serious. There's the cost of losing your home if it's | 10 | 60 |
| the only wealth you have, and in most communities of | 11 | 60 |
| color that's all there is. | 12 | 60 |
| Then there's the question of when you get | 13 | 60 |
| back into your home. When can you get this wealth | 14 | 60 |
| again? For white homeowners, it's over ten years, and | 15 | 60 |
| for African-American and Latino homeowners, it's 30 to | 16 | 60 |
| 40 percent longer than that. | 17 | 60 |
| So the costs we're talking about are very | 18 | 60 |
| high, and we'd like to take the risk that's solely on | 19 | 60 |
| the backs of these folks and distribute it more | 20 | 60 |
| equitably between industry and borrowers instead. | 21 | 60 |
| The National Consumer Law Center would like | 22 | 60 |
| to make several recommendations. I'll be brief and | 23 | 60 |
| then we can go into it more in discussion. Did you | 24 | 60 |
| just ring a bell? | 25 | 60 |
| GOVERNOR KROSZNER: No. | 1 | 61 |
| (Laughter.) | 2 | 61 |
| MS. COHEN: Thank you, Leonard. As you've | 3 | 61 |
| heard before, the biggest problem is people can't | 4 | 61 |
| afford their loans. So we believe it's incumbent upon | 5 | 61 |
| the Federal Reserve to act and to prohibit loans that | 6 | 61 |
| are unaffordable by requiring an analysis of ability | 7 | 61 |
| to repay. | 8 | 61 |
| For us, this doesn't only include a debt to | 9 | 61 |
| income ratio consideration; it also includes looking | 10 | 61 |
| at residual income, because poor people need enough | 11 | 61 |
| money. They don't just need a percentage. | 12 | 61 |
| It also means including taxes and insurance | 13 | 61 |
| in the analysis, whether or not it's escrowed, | 14 | 61 |
| although we believe it should be escrowed and that | 15 | 61 |
| should be mandatory. | 16 | 61 |
| The question is whether fully-indexed rate | 17 | 61 |
| is the right analysis of ability to repay. We believe | 18 | 61 |
| that goes a long way. We believe it doesn't go far | 19 | 61 |
| enough. There are people whose initial rates are | 20 | 61 |
| higher than the fully indexed rate, and many people | 21 | 61 |
| who never pay the fully-indexed rate. They pay a lot | 22 | 61 |
| more. | 23 | 61 |
| The question is, are we going to leave those | 24 | 61 |
| people out in the cold? You need to make loans | 25 | 61 |
| affordable not just when they're made, but throughout | 1 | 62 |
| the life of a loan. That means forced placed | 2 | 62 |
| insurance that's provided by services should be | 3 | 62 |
| illegal unless the homeowner has been denied insurance | 4 | 62 |
| for a reason other than non-payment. | 5 | 62 |
| If the servicer can provide forced placed | 6 | 62 |
| insurance, they can provide affordable homeowners | 7 | 62 |
| insurance to their borrowers. | 8 | 62 |
| Loss mitigation is also necessary to keep a | 9 | 62 |
| loan affordable, and to keep someone in their home. | 10 | 62 |
| Right now, servicers may or may not provide full | 11 | 62 |
| access to loss mitigation, and it's really a coin toss | 12 | 62 |
| for the borrower. | 13 | 62 |
| We believe loss mitigation should be | 14 | 62 |
| required before foreclosure is pursued. When the | 15 | 62 |
| loans are made, the best and most appropriate form of | 16 | 62 |
| documentation should be provided. I want to be clear: | 17 | 62 |
| self-employed people should not be excepted from | 18 | 62 |
| this. I see loans regularly for self-employed people. | 19 | 62 |
| They are some of the biggest victims of abuse. | 20 | 62 |
| If you can find an alternative means of | 21 | 62 |
| credit scoring people, you can find an alternative | 22 | 62 |
| means of actually evaluating the ability to repay for | 23 | 62 |
| people who are self-employed. | 24 | 62 |
| Two last ones. One is we believe the | 25 | 62 |
| Federal Reserve Board should adopt a general | 1 | 63 |
| unfairness and deception standard that can apply | 2 | 63 |
| across America, to homeowners who are facing | 3 | 63 |
| foreclosure. | 4 | 63 |
| Right now, we rely on government officials, | 5 | 63 |
| and the truth is, they can't be everywhere and they're | 6 | 63 |
| not everywhere. In addition, there are state laws, | 7 | 63 |
| but they don't apply in every state. In Virginia, if | 8 | 63 |
| you are going to lose your house, and the bankers | 9 | 63 |
| haven't stepped in and the bank regulators haven't | 10 | 63 |
| stepped in, you cannot protect yourself with a state | 11 | 63 |
| unfairness or deception standard. We think we need to | 12 | 63 |
| have a federal one. | 13 | 63 |
| Finally, there are certain terms that need | 14 | 63 |
| to be limited. Prepayment penalties and also discount | 15 | 63 |
| points. Discount points are only appropriate when you | 16 | 63 |
| get a discount. I've never seen a discount point in | 17 | 63 |
| the subprime market that was associated with a | 18 | 63 |
| discount in the rate. I'd like to see that. | 19 | 63 |
| In addition to discount points, we believe, | 20 | 63 |
| should not be charged when there's a yield spread | 21 | 63 |
| premium. We can talk about that more in comments. | 22 | 63 |
| Finally, I just want to say communities across | 23 | 63 |
| American are bleeding. They may not be your next door | 24 | 63 |
| neighbors, but it's happening. If we don't fix it, | 25 | 63 |
| we're never going to be able to. Thank you. | 1 | 64 |
| GOVERNOR KROSZNER: Well, thank you very | 2 | 64 |
| much. I thank all the panelists for excellent | 3 | 64 |
| presentations and also presentations that kept within | 4 | 64 |
| the time limit, because now we get to the particularly | 5 | 64 |
| interesting part, when we get to the posed questions. | 6 | 64 |
| I'm very pleased that the panel has touched | 7 | 64 |
| on the four key issues that I had wanted to discuss, | 8 | 64 |
| plus a number of others. So why don't we start with | 9 | 64 |
| one of the issues that quite a few of you raised, | 10 | 64 |
| about escrow for taxes and insurance. | 11 | 64 |
| So I've heard discussions on both sides | 12 | 64 |
| about the importance of including that, and whether a | 13 | 64 |
| rule could be fashioned that would be helpful to | 14 | 64 |
| provide that. So I want to hear from different | 15 | 64 |
| panelists about what they think about the importance | 16 | 64 |
| of taxes and insurance, having the escrow for that | 17 | 64 |
| included, or having a provision for that included. | 18 | 64 |
| If we were to consider a rule in that area, | 19 | 64 |
| how, if at all possible, to craft one that would allow | 20 | 64 |
| for that, but not somehow exclude responsible subprime | 21 | 64 |
| borrowing. Whoever wants to start with that? | 22 | 64 |
| MR. RHEINGOLD: I'm happy to start. I think | 23 | 64 |
| that any rule -- I mean my personal view is that you | 24 | 64 |
| have to require taxes and insurance. I think it has | 25 | 64 |
| to be required for all subprime loans. | 1 | 65 |
| I think one of the things -- and talking to | 2 | 65 |
| economists, we all understand that when people shop, | 3 | 65 |
| the most important fact for people is what is their | 4 | 65 |
| monthly payment going to be? | 5 | 65 |
| In my view, the lack of inclusion of taxes | 6 | 65 |
| and insurance on that payment has everything to do | 7 | 65 |
| with telling people that your next payment, your | 8 | 65 |
| refinance loan is going to be lower than your existing | 9 | 65 |
| payment. It's all about hiding what the real payment | 10 | 65 |
| of that loan is. | 11 | 65 |
| I think that it leads to all sorts of | 12 | 65 |
| problems. We're talking about the subprime market. | 13 | 65 |
| We're talking about people with less liquidity, with | 14 | 65 |
| more credit problems, with less financial savvy. I | 15 | 65 |
| think making sure that taxes and insurance are | 16 | 65 |
| included will one, prevent sort of that shock; will | 17 | 65 |
| stop, will prevent hiding the real cost of that loan; | 18 | 65 |
| and also sort of go a long way to preventing some of | 19 | 65 |
| the other problems that exist along the way because of | 20 | 65 |
| non-payment of taxes, where I've seen people lose | 21 | 65 |
| their houses because of non-payment of taxes, or the | 22 | 65 |
| forced place insurance that Alys talked about, that | 23 | 65 |
| it's just sort of an incredibly costly thing that has | 24 | 65 |
| hurt a lot of homeowners as well. | 25 | 65 |
| GOVERNOR KROSZNER: Yes, Faith. | 1 | 66 |
| MS. SCHWARTZ: We actually -- we agree, in | 2 | 66 |
| the sense that we believe a loan with escrow is a much | 3 | 66 |
| better loan than a loan without escrow. We've worked | 4 | 66 |
| very hard to get them on the front end of the market, | 5 | 66 |
| but as Ira noted, you know, marketing in a market, to | 6 | 66 |
| try to transform it one lender at a time, it's pretty | 7 | 66 |
| difficult to do, although escrows have improved in | 8 | 66 |
| percentage considerably since over the last five to | 9 | 66 |
| eight years. | 10 | 66 |
| Our performance clearly shows it's better to | 11 | 66 |
| have an escrow loan. So we think there are ways the | 12 | 66 |
| Fed can influence the market, to guidance, to offer an | 13 | 66 |
| opt-out of escrows, not an opt-in. Almost that it is | 14 | 66 |
| a package of you should require escrowing. | 15 | 66 |
| I know what we do on the back end. We've | 16 | 66 |
| worked with the National Fair Housing Alliance for | 17 | 66 |
| years on this. We have an innovative pilot on the | 18 | 66 |
| back end to put them on as soon as those loans got | 19 | 66 |
| loaded into servicing. We have a website, we have | 20 | 66 |
| outbound calls to escrow mortgages and it has improved | 21 | 66 |
| our percentage of escrowing. | 22 | 66 |
| But at the end of the day, there are reasons | 23 | 66 |
| some people don't want to escrow. I don't know why | 24 | 66 |
| others wouldn't, but not everyone is always a cash- | 25 | 66 |
| strapped borrower. In fact, it's a mix of borrowers | 1 | 67 |
| in the broad business. | 2 | 67 |
| So I think there probably are people who | 3 | 67 |
| don't escrow for some reason. So I guess the key is | 4 | 67 |
| if they have to opt-out, you'll get a much higher | 5 | 67 |
| influence, and the Board should probably recommend | 6 | 67 |
| escrowing in the subprime market. | 7 | 67 |
| You'd see more consistency, better loan | 8 | 67 |
| performance and I don't know many lenders -- I can't | 9 | 67 |
| speak for the lenders and I don't. But we would be | 10 | 67 |
| pleased to have escrows on our loans, at a higher | 11 | 67 |
| percentage than we do see. | 12 | 67 |
| MS. BRAUNSTEIN: But would you be pleased if | 13 | 67 |
| it was required for subprime loans? | 14 | 67 |
| MS. SCHWARTZ: Well, I believe in guidance. | 15 | 67 |
| Again, I think there's some choice that has to be | 16 | 67 |
| there. I don't know that you should tell everyone | 17 | 67 |
| they have to escrow. I wouldn't want to be told to | 18 | 67 |
| escrow if I don't want to escrow. | 19 | 67 |
| How do you know I'm not a subprime borrower? | 20 | 67 |
| There you go. I think we should encourage and | 21 | 67 |
| influence and improve the market performance. | 22 | 67 |
| GOVERNOR KROSZNER: So let me hear from one | 23 | 67 |
| of the lenders. You said let's hear from one of the | 24 | 67 |
| lenders. | 25 | 67 |
| MR. SANCHEZ: What I would say is we | 1 | 68 |
| absolutely have to require the taxes and insurance to | 2 | 68 |
| be calculated in the monthly payment. In fact, we | 3 | 68 |
| believe that escrow should be offered 100 percent of | 4 | 68 |
| the time to the non-prime borrowers. | 5 | 68 |
| But requiring it, making it mandatory only | 6 | 68 |
| for that first time home buyer, that hasn't had the | 7 | 68 |
| experience of having taxes and insurance and escrow. | 8 | 68 |
| So we think it's absolutely the right thing to | 9 | 68 |
| pinpoint it at the first time home buyer, to make sure | 10 | 68 |
| that we take care of it. | 11 | 68 |
| I think one of the challenges in the whole | 12 | 68 |
| escrow, today we do it in the prime space all of the | 13 | 68 |
| time. But we also have many times have a cash- | 14 | 68 |
| strapped borrower, who in order to start the | 15 | 68 |
| traditional escrow they don't have the funds to do | 16 | 68 |
| that. | 17 | 68 |
| So we've been talking about is there a way | 18 | 68 |
| that we can help to fund for that escrow in the | 19 | 68 |
| beginning, because it's great to say "Well, you have | 20 | 68 |
| to escrow, and you know have to bring $800 to the | 21 | 68 |
| closing table in order to start your escrow." Many of | 22 | 68 |
| those folks don't have it. | 23 | 68 |
| So requiring it, I think, for everyone, | 24 | 68 |
| really puts a limit on who has the ability to do that. | 25 | 68 |
| MS. BRAUNSTEIN: Someone else? | 1 | 69 |
| MS. BOWDLER: Yes. I would just like to say | 2 | 69 |
| that, you know, we're kind of talking about what | 3 | 69 |
| happens when people have the choice of escrow and they | 4 | 69 |
| don't take it, or maybe they weren't offered escrow. | 5 | 69 |
| But we've seen, especially in Southern | 6 | 69 |
| California and a few other places, where this is | 7 | 69 |
| actually an outright fraud, not just to be more | 8 | 69 |
| competitive in artificially lower payments. | 9 | 69 |
| But if you can get somebody to take a loan | 10 | 69 |
| that doesn't have taxes and insurance and you know | 11 | 69 |
| that they're going to be shocked in a few months with, | 12 | 69 |
| you know, a couple of thousand dollar tax bill, then | 13 | 69 |
| who does it come back to? They come back to whoever | 14 | 69 |
| their originator was, looking for some help, and now | 15 | 69 |
| they're in a refinance cycle. | 16 | 69 |
| So we've actually seen it as a tool for | 17 | 69 |
| bringing business back to an originator, and stripping | 18 | 69 |
| out more equity with fees. So we are in favor of | 19 | 69 |
| requiring escrow to -- and tying it to something very | 20 | 69 |
| specific, subprime, high LTVs or otherwise cash- | 21 | 69 |
| strapped borrowers. | 22 | 69 |
| MR. CHANIN: Let me follow up on just the | 23 | 69 |
| lenders. In terms of escrowing, what your practice is | 24 | 69 |
| for Alt-A as well as prime loans; that is, what in | 25 | 69 |
| terms of the data and the number and percentage of | 1 | 70 |
| people that escrow? Do you require it for those? Do | 2 | 70 |
| you strongly encourage it and so forth? Is there a | 3 | 70 |
| difference between your practices for subprime and | 4 | 70 |
| non-subprime? Maybe Susan, if you have any thoughts | 5 | 70 |
| on that. | 6 | 70 |
| MS. DAVIS: No. No difference between prime | 7 | 70 |
| and non-prime. | 8 | 70 |
| GOVERNOR KROSZNER: I'm not sure people can | 9 | 70 |
| hear you. | 10 | 70 |
| MS. DAVIS: Can you hear me? Hello? Okay. | 11 | 70 |
| No, not in terms of what the policy is in terms of | 12 | 70 |
| escrows are offered, as opposed to a choice. | 13 | 70 |
| The one thing I just want to draw a | 14 | 70 |
| correlation here is as I'm listening to everybody | 15 | 70 |
| speak, it's dawned on me that there's a very strong | 16 | 70 |
| correlation about ability to pay and the escrow issue. | 17 | 70 |
| So to me, it's absolutely critical that that | 18 | 70 |
| is included in the underwriting calculation of | 19 | 70 |
| principal, interest and taxes and insurance, that | 20 | 70 |
| you're actually looking at all of that. | 21 | 70 |
| I think that may solve some of it. I am | 22 | 70 |
| also doing a small test here to see should we look at | 23 | 70 |
| requiring it at certain LTVs for higher risk loans, | 24 | 70 |
| etcetera. | 25 | 70 |
| My results are preliminary data that I have | 1 | 71 |
| actually been looking at before we launched this. | 2 | 71 |
| We're working towards it. Did not reflect the gain, | 3 | 71 |
| which then told me that a lot of the benefit is really | 4 | 71 |
| looking at the ability to pay. | 5 | 71 |
| If you can pay the taxes, that's critical. | 6 | 71 |
| So I actually put more emphasis on the ability to pay | 7 | 71 |
| and linking principal and interest, taxes and | 8 | 71 |
| insurance in your underwriting, as opposed to a | 9 | 71 |
| separate escrow, although as I said, I am working on | 10 | 71 |
| looking for some modeling there. | 11 | 71 |
| GOVERNOR KROSZNER: Yes, Harry? | 12 | 71 |
| MR. DINHAM: Well, you know, I've been in | 13 | 71 |
| this business almost 40 years, and as long as I've | 14 | 71 |
| known Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have always required | 15 | 71 |
| escrow on loans that are over 80 percent LTV. I think | 16 | 71 |
| that's a good place to start. | 17 | 71 |
| Another way to look at this would be, you | 18 | 71 |
| know, some people have compared FHA loans to subprime | 19 | 71 |
| loans, and no matter what your LTV is on that, you | 20 | 71 |
| have to have escrows. | 21 | 71 |
| I think that we need to really look at the | 22 | 71 |
| fact that these people don't have the ability to pay | 23 | 71 |
| their bills on time, and for us to think that we can | 24 | 71 |
| put them out there in this home and maybe look at a | 25 | 71 |
| two or three thousand dollar tax bill at the end of | 1 | 72 |
| the day, is a good thing. I don't think that's a good | 2 | 72 |
| thing. | 3 | 72 |
| I think we need to do some type of guidance | 4 | 72 |
| that's going to help us get it at least to the -- if | 5 | 72 |
| they're making loans over 80 percent LTV, loan to | 6 | 72 |
| value, that they need to have the ability to have | 7 | 72 |
| escrow accounts. So I think that's where we need to | 8 | 72 |
| go. | 9 | 72 |
| MS. DAVIS: Can I just make one other -- oh | 10 | 72 |
| Martin, if you want to comment. | 11 | 72 |
| MR. EAKES: Yes. I want to just add two | 12 | 72 |
| things. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require escrows on | 13 | 72 |
| any loan above 80 percent, because that's a measure of | 14 | 72 |
| risk. I would posit that every single subprime loan | 15 | 72 |
| has a higher level of risk than an 81 percent LTV | 16 | 72 |
| prime loan. | 17 | 72 |
| The second thing I would say is guidance | 18 | 72 |
| will not work here, and voluntary will not work here. | 19 | 72 |
| You can't have it both ways. Guidance is most | 20 | 72 |
| effective when you are a bank regulator that has | 21 | 72 |
| supervision over the entities. | 22 | 72 |
| If you want it to apply to all lenders, | 23 | 72 |
| which it must, if it doesn't apply to all lenders, | 24 | 72 |
| then the lenders who can offer non-escrow will win in | 25 | 72 |
| the marketplace, because it is deceptive and borrowers | 1 | 73 |
| will be told you have a monthly payment that's 20 | 2 | 73 |
| percent lower than the responsible lender next door. | 3 | 73 |
| This is one of those ones where you have to | 4 | 73 |
| go ahead and just have a simple required rule, bright | 5 | 73 |
| line across the board for everyone. I have had the | 6 | 73 |
| majority of subprime lenders that I have talked to, | 7 | 73 |
| who have told me we would like to have that as a | 8 | 73 |
| bright line requirement. We just can't be the first | 9 | 73 |
| actor and act unilaterally, or we will have zero | 10 | 73 |
| volume in the next year. | 11 | 73 |
| MS. BRAUNSTEIN: Would increased and better | 12 | 73 |
| disclosures help with escrows? | 13 | 73 |
| MR. EAKES: Disclosures are roughly five | 14 | 73 |
| percent of the solution to the problem. When you have | 15 | 73 |
| 50 percent of the population, as reported by GAO, that | 16 | 73 |
| read at the 8th grade level of less, and 23 percent of | 17 | 73 |
| adult Americans who are illiterate, you cannot through | 18 | 73 |
| disclosure solve this problem. | 19 | 73 |
| You need to have as little intrusive across- | 20 | 73 |
| the-board rules as you can. But you know, we can't | 21 | 73 |
| solve this problem with Disclosure. | 22 | 73 |
| MS. BRAUNSTEIN: Well, one of the issues | 23 | 73 |
| that we're facing in trying to look at all of these | 24 | 73 |
| issues and structure rules, is that there are some | 25 | 73 |
| well-established precedents for what the | 1 | 74 |
| characteristics are of unfair and deceptive acts and | 2 | 74 |
| practices, even though it's well-established in the | 3 | 74 |
| FTC Act. | 4 | 74 |
| So trying to associate some of these | 5 | 74 |
| practices with those criteria is not an easy task. So | 6 | 74 |
| I was wondering if you have any guidance for us, in | 7 | 74 |
| terms of in particular we'll want to talk about this | 8 | 74 |
| with all the practices, like for escrows. | 9 | 74 |
| MR. RHEINGOLD: I think that lack -- I think | 10 | 74 |
| that was my initial point. It's fundamentally unfair | 11 | 74 |
| not to include escrow, because that -- because the | 12 | 74 |
| lack of escrow has been used as a deceptive practice | 13 | 74 |
| to hide the real cost of mortgages for a lot of people | 14 | 74 |
| in the subprime mortgage market. | 15 | 74 |
| MR. EAKES: I mean the FTC definition of | 16 | 74 |
| deceptive, if we use that prong -- | 17 | 74 |
| MS. BRAUNSTEIN: Right. | 18 | 74 |
| MR. EAKES: Remember, the standard here is | 19 | 74 |
| unfair or deceptive. It doesn't have to be both, but | 20 | 74 |
| either/or. So for deceptive, a practice is deceptive | 21 | 74 |
| if it is likely to mislead reasonable consumers, and | 22 | 74 |
| the misleading representation is material. | 23 | 74 |
| Well, I think we see the entire market | 24 | 74 |
| failure here, because of responsible lenders not being | 25 | 74 |
| able to compete, and borrowers don't understand that | 1 | 75 |
| this is the cost, or they wouldn't fall into the trap | 2 | 75 |
| of saying this is really a 20 percent less expensive | 3 | 75 |
| loan when it really is not. | 4 | 75 |
| So it's squarely within the deceptive | 5 | 75 |
| language, even of precedent. I would argue that you | 6 | 75 |
| have more mandate than that, that the FTC Section 5 | 7 | 75 |
| was in place from '75 on. | 8 | 75 |
| Congress saw fit in 1994. So in 1994, we | 9 | 75 |
| still had this problem of predatory mortgage lending, | 10 | 75 |
| and they went further. They didn't say -- because you | 11 | 75 |
| already had the authority to prohibit unfair or | 12 | 75 |
| deceptive under the FTC. | 13 | 75 |
| But they went further, saying we need | 14 | 75 |
| something more than that, and we empower the Fed to | 15 | 75 |
| have independent mandate and authority for mortgage | 16 | 75 |
| loans in particular, to prohibit abuses and unfair or | 17 | 75 |
| deceptive. | 18 | 75 |
| I would suggest that that takes you and | 19 | 75 |
| gives you strength and authority beyond what the FTC | 20 | 75 |
| standards are if you needed that. | 21 | 75 |
| MS. BRAUNSTEIN: One of the main things that | 22 | 75 |
| gave us was the ability to affect rules for all | 23 | 75 |
| mortgage transactions, whereas you know, with the FTC | 24 | 75 |
| Act, you know, we have the ability to affect rules for | 25 | 75 |
NEAL R. GROSS
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701
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www.nealrgross.com
