| THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD PRIVATE |
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| HOME OWNERSHIP AND EQUITY PROTECTION ACT (HOEPA) |
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| PUBLIC HEARING |
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| Thursday |
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| June 14, 2007 |
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| The public hearing came to order at 8:43 a.m. |
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| in the Terrace Level Dining Room of the Martin |
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| Building, 20th and C Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C., |
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| Federal Reserve Board Governor Randall S. Kroszner, |
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| presiding. |
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| PRESENT FROM THE FEDERAL RESERVE: |
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| Randall S. Kroszner Governor, Board of Governors |
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| of the Federal Reserve System |
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| Sandra F. Braunstein Director, Division of |
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| Consumer and Community Action |
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| Leonard Chanin Associate Director, Division |
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| of Consumer and Community |
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| Affairs |
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| MORNING PANEL: |
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| Janis Bowdler Senior Housing Policy |
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| Analyst, National Council of |
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| La Raza |
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| William H. Brewster Director of Anti-Fraud |
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| Initiatives, Fannie Mae |
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| Alys Cohen Staff Attorney, National |
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| Consumer Law Center |
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| Susan A. Davis Executive Vice President, |
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| National Consumer Lending, |
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| Wells Fargo Home Mortgage |
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| Harry Dinham President, National |
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| Association of Mortgage |
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| Brokers |
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| Martin Eakes Chief Executive Officer, |
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| Center for Responsible |
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| Lending/Self-Help |
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| Ira Rheingold General Counsel, National |
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| Association of Consumer |
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| Advocates |
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| Pablo Sanchez National Mortgage Production |
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| Specialist, JP Morgan Chase |
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| Faith Schwartz Senior Vice President, |
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| Enterprise Risk Management |
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| and Public Affairs, Option |
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| One Mortgage Corporation |
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| AFTERNOON PANEL: |
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| Steve Antonakes Commissioner of Banks, |
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| Massachusetts |
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| Michael Decker Senior Managing Director, |
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| Research and Public Policy, |
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| Securities Industry and |
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| Financial Markets Association |
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| Ren Essene Research Analyst, Harvard |
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| University |
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| Joseph R. Mason LeBow College of Business, |
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| Drexel University |
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| Tom Miller Attorney General, Iowa |
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| Mark Pearce Deputy Commissioner of Banks, |
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| North Carolina |
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| Lori Swanson Attorney General, Minnesota |
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| I N D E X |
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| Welcome and Opening Remarks 5 |
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| MORNING PANEL: |
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| Faith Schwartz, Senior Vice President, 19 |
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| Enterprise Risk Management and |
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| Public Affairs, Option One Mortgage |
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| Corporation |
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| William H. Brewster, Director of 28 |
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| Anti-Fraud Initiatives, Fannie Mae |
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| Susan A. Davis, Executive Vice President, 33 |
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| National Consumer Lending, |
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| Wells Fargo Home Mortgage |
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| Harry Dinham, President, National 37 |
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| Association of Mortgage Brokers |
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| Martin Eakes, Chief Executive Officer, 42 |
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| Center for Responsible Lending/Self-Help |
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| Ira Rheingold, General Counsel, 48 |
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| National Association of |
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| Consumer Advocates |
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| Janis Bowdler, Senior Housing Policy 54 |
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| Analyst, National Council of La Raza |
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| Alys Cohen, Staff Attorney, 59 |
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| National Consumer Law Center |
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| Pablo Sanchez, National Mortgage 68 |
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| Production Specialist, JP Morgan Chase |
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| AFTERNOON PANEL: |
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| Tom Miller, Attorney General, Iowa 168 |
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| Mark Pearce, Deputy Commissioner 173 |
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| of Banks, North Carolina |
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| Ren Essene,Research Analyst 177 |
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| Harvard University |
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| Joseph R. Mason, LeBow College of 182 |
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| Business, Drexel University |
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| Michael Decker, Senior Managing 187 |
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| Director, Research and |
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| Public Policy, Securities |
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| Industry and Financial |
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| Markets Association |
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| Steve Antonakes, Commissioner of Banks, 192 |
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| Massachusetts |
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| Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 199 |
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| Minnesota |
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| Open Microphone 265 |
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| Adjourn |
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| P R O C E E D I N G S |
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| 8:43 a.m. |
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| GOVERNOR KROSZNER: All right, good. |
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| Hopefully we won't be getting any feedback. But we do |
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| want feedback from you guys, and that's exactly why |
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| we're having this hearing today. |
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| I really want to welcome everyone for |
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| coming, and hopefully we won't be getting too much |
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| feedback from the audio problems, but we'll be getting |
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| feedback from you. |
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| This is an incredibly important topic, and |
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| I'm really delighted to see the interest that people |
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| have with a full house here. We have a lot of |
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| important discussions throughout the day, a lot of |
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| good back and forth. |
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| We have some superb panelists. We also |
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| have an opportunity for the open mike at the end, for |
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| people who have not formally participated in the |
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| panels, to come forward. I'll talk about that a |
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| little bit more in just a moment. |
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| Also, I'm Governor Kroszner, and I chair |
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| the Consumer and Community Affairs Committee, as well |
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| as the Supervision and Regulation Committee. Sandra |
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| Braunstein is the head of our Consumer and Community |
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| Affairs Division, and Leonard Chanin is her key deputy |
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| on these issues. |
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| So we're very pleased that they could come |
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| here today to participate in this event. |
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| Well, as I said, I'm really happy to be |
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| able to chair the Federal Reserve Board's public |
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| hearing under the Home Ownership Equity Protection |
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| Act, so-called HOEPA. The hearing will focus |
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| specifically on how the Board might use its rule- |
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| making authority under HOEPA to address concerns about |
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| home mortgage lending practices. |
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| During the course of this hearing, we'll |
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| hear from key players in the home mortgage market, |
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| lenders, brokers, secondary market participants, |
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| consumer advocacy groups and community development |
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| organizations, academics, researchers and state |
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| regulators. |
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| Although they all play very different |
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| roles, they share a common goal, I believe, in |
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| encouraging responsible mortgage lending for the |
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| benefit of individual consumers and the American |
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| economy as a whole. |
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| The Congress enacted HOEPA in 1994 in |
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| response to concerns about abusive lending in the home |
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| equity market. The Federal Reserve Board was given |
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| broad authority to implement its provisions, and to |
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| adopt regulations to implement its provisions, when |
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| the Board finds it to be necessary and proper to |
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| effectuate its purposes. |
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| In addition, the Board has the |
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| responsibility to prohibit acts or practices it finds |
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| unfair or deceptive, or otherwise designed to evade |
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| HOEPA. The Board understands is rule-making |
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| responsibility under HOEPA, but is not alone in facing |
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| the important task of preventing unfair or deceptive |
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| practices. |
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| Other regulators share a responsibility to |
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| ensure responsible mortgage lending through |
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| enforcement powers. The states have extensive |
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| regulatory authority and responsibility under their |
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| own anti-predatory lending statutes and various other |
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| legal authorities, and especially their mortgage |
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| industry licensing acts, which give them considerable |
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| control over the activities of mortgage brokers and |
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| lenders. |
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| Many of the states, including notably |
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| those that are represented on this afternoon's panel, |
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| have been very active, very, very active in reining in |
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| bad actors in the mortgage markets. The FTC also |
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| shares our enforcement responsibility under HOEPA and |
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| other federal laws. |
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| Finally, the federal financial regulatory |
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| agencies each have a duty to enforce federal consumer |
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| protection laws, including HOEPA, with respect to |
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| depository institutions under their respective |
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| regulatory ambits. |
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| In light of the sheer magnitude of the |
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| task, we're very pleased that these regulators all |
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| contribute to the goal of ensuring a healthy, |
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| competitive and responsible mortgage market. |
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| We are committed to working closely with |
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| the other federal and state regulators, to ensure that |
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| the laws that protect consumers are enforced. |
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| HOEPA also directs the Board to hold |
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| hearings, such as the one we're holding today, to |
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| assess the effectiveness of regulations and laws in |
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| protecting consumers. Hearings provide us with very |
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| valuable information. |
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| In our most recent prior hearings held |
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| last summer in four cities around the country, our |
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| goals included assessing the effectiveness of our 2001 |
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| amendments to the HOEPA rules, in curbing abusive |
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| lending practices while preserving access to credit. |
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| We also wanted to gather information on |
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| the effectiveness of the mortgage disclosures required |
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| by our Regulation Z, pursuant to the Truth in Lending |
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| Act, to inform a review of those disclosures, which is |
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| now actively underway. |
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| Rising foreclosures in the subprime market |
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| over the past year have led the Board to consider |
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| whether and how it should use its rulemaking authority |
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| to address these concerns. In doing so, however, we |
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| must walk a fine line. |
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| We must determine how we can help to weed |
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| out abuses, while also preserving incentives to |
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| responsible lending. A robust and responsible |
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| subprime market benefits consumers, by allowing |
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| borrowers with limited credit histories to become |
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| homeowners, to access equity in their homes, or have |
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| the flexibility to refinance their loans as needed. |
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| In this task, we have several tools at our |
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| disposal. These include required disclosures by |
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| lenders, rules that prohibit abusive practices, |
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| principle-based guidance with supervisory oversight, |
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| plus formal efforts to work with industry participants |
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| to promote best practices, and consumer education |
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| materials. |
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| The Federal Reserve currently is |
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| conducting a thorough review of its policies with |
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| respect to each of these tools. Last year, together |
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| with the other federal banking regulators, we issued |
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| guidance on so-called non-traditional mortgages. |
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| We also have issued proposed supervisory |
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| guidance concerning underwriting standards to |
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| disclosures for subprime mortgages. The agencies are |
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| finishing their review of these comments and the |
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| comments we've received, and expect to issue a final |
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| version fairly soon. |
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| The Federal Reserve produces a range of |
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| consumer education materials, including information to |
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| help potential borrowers under adjustable rate and |
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| other alternative mortgage products. We actively |
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| promote financial education by partnering with outside |
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| organizations, as well as doing a number of activities |
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| on our own that I've been very heavily involved with, |
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| having been an educator for many years. I think it's |
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| very important to make sure to get the ideas out |
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| there. |
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| Two tools that we'll focus on today, |
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| however, are lending disclosure to consumers and rules |
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| that prohibit or restrict lending practices. |
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| Disclosures provide information that is critical to |
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| the effective functioning of markets. A core |
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| principle of economics is that markets are more |
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| competitive and therefore more efficient when accurate |
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| information is available to all who participate. |
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| Information helps consumers by improving |
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| the ability to compare mortgage products and then |
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| choose the ones that will help meet their best -- best |
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| meet their personal goals. |
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| We are keenly aware, however, of the |
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| substantial volume of disclosures of the documents |
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| that mortgage lending already entails, and we are |
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| sensitive to the risk that too much information, may |
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| be practically of as little value to consumers as no |
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| information at all. |
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| Accordingly, we intend to consider |
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| mortgage disclosures comprehensively, with an eye |
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| towards improving their usefulness to consumers, while |
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| remaining mindful of the total burden for the |
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| industry. |
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| Perhaps most importantly, we'll engage in |
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| extensive consumer testing of mortgage disclosures, to |
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| ensure that disclosures provide information that |
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| consumers can really use. This is one of the things |
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| that I'm very excited about, that we really use in the |
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| credit card area and we're going to be using in the |
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| mortgage area. |
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| Not just making sure that the information is |
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| there; that's necessary. But there in a way that |
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| people can understand and that people find useful. |
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| We found a lot of surprising things, things |
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| that we wouldn't have thought about without asking |
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| real people, going into shopping malls, people who are |
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| going to be using their credit cards, to find out |
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| well, what's useful? What do you want to know? What |
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| can be helpful? |
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| Then when we actually put this down on |
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| paper, going back to those consumers and saying "Do |
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| you understand this? Is this really helpful to you?" |
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| That sort of back and forth process can be very |
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| valuable in turning information overload into |
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| something that is very valuable and useful to empower |
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| consumers. |
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| We also recognize that disclosures may not |
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| always be sufficient to combat abusive practices. |
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| Because some bad lending practices may require |
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| additional measures, the Federal Reserve will |
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| seriously consider how we might use our rule-making |
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| authority to address abusive practices, without |
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| restricting consumers' access to beneficial financial |
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| options, and responsible subprime credit. |
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| In addition to improved disclosures, |
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| regulations that restrict or prohibit practices that |
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| are "unfair and deceptive" may also be necessary. We |
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| have heard concerns about consumers being steered |
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| toward products that they can't afford, and have |
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| repeated refinancings involving closing costs that |
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| strip away a borrower's home equity. |
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| Today, we'll gather information on how we |
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| might craft rules to stop such abusive practices. We |
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| also will seek information from state officials |
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| regarding their experiences with drafting laws and |
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| rules that combat predatory lending efficiently and |
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| effectively. |
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| During today's hearing, we'll seek |
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| information from panelists on certain specific |
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| questions. I'd like to close by briefly touching on |
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| some of those questions. There are four terms or |
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| practices that have been most frequently cited as |
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| troublesome in the mortgage market, especially in the |
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| subprime home equity market. |
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| They are first, prepayment penalties. |
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| Second, failure to require escrow for taxes and |
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| insurance; third, stated income and low documentation |
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| lending; and fourth, failure to give adequate |
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| consideration to a borrower's ability to repay a loan. |
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| At least some of these practices can be |
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| beneficial at least to some consumers. For example, |
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| an informed borrower might choose a loan with a |
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| prepayment penalty in exchange for a lower interest |
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| rate or lower closing costs. |
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| On the other hand, prepayment penalties can |
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| also be used in an abusive way, such as when a |
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| borrower is unaware that an adjustable rate mortgage |
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| loan has a substantial prepayment penalty that will |
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| extend beyond the first adjustment of the loan's |
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| interest rate, making it costly or impossible for the |
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| borrower to refinance the loan to avoid higher |
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| interest payments. |
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| We hope to gather information that helps us |
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| to determine whether rules can prevent the abusive use |
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| of loan terms or practices, while preserving their use |
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| in instances where they might provide benefits to |
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| consumers. |
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| Given adequate consideration to a borrower's |
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| ability to repay a loan obviously benefits both the |
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| borrowers and the lenders. Recently, the Board and |
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| other federal regulatory agencies issued guidance |
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| reinforcing our collective belief that the principles |
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| of prudent underwriting require consideration of a |
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| borrower's repayment ability. |
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| For example, the agencies have provided that |
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| lenders should qualify borrowers for non-traditional |
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| mortgage products, such as interest-only loans and |
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| payment option adjustable mortgage products, based on |
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| the fully indexed rate and fully amortizing payment. |
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| Some have urged the Board to adopt this |
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| broad principle as a rule, while others have urged the |
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| Board to preserve flexibility to exercise judgment in |
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| determining the likelihood that a given borrower can |
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| repay a loan. |
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| Well, it seems self-evident that adequate |
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| consideration of repayment ability is necessary. Our |
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| experience in crafting guidance has taught us that |
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| this principle is far easier to articulate in general |
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| terms than it is to put in a detailed prescriptive |
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| role, saying which underwriting practice constitutes |
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| adequate consideration. |
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| This is especially true in the context of |
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| mortgage credit underwriting, which can depend on such |
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| a great number of pertinent consumer-specific |
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| considerations. Today, with your help, we intend to |
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| explore in detail these types of practices, when they |
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| can be beneficial and then they might be problematic. |
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| We will seek informed suggestions with |
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| respect to our four practices I've identified, as well |
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| as certainly any others that commenters may identify. |
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| |
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| First, we ask in general whether such |
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| practices should be prohibited, restricted or |
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| subjected to increased disclosure requirements and if |
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| so, why. |
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| Second, we ask whether any new regulatory |
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| treatment of such practices should be limited to |
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| certain types of loans or certain types of borrowers. |
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| Finally, we ask whether any state law |
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| provisions relating to such practices might serve as |
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| models for the Board to adopt at the federal level, |
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| and if so, what kind of record these have -- these |
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| state laws in curbing abuses without restricting |
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| access to responsible mortgage credit. |
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| Your participation here and the welcome |
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| pertinent information to be contributed by the |
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| panelists and others is very much appreciated and I, |
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| the other members of the panel from the Fed here and |
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| the entire Federal Reserve Board thank you very much |
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| for taking the time to participate. |
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| Now what I'd like to do is turn to the rules |
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| of procedure that will govern the hearing for today. |
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| Each of the invited panelists will have a |
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| maximum of five minutes, and because we have so many |
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| panelists and so many people who want to speak, I will |
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| have to be pretty draconian in making sure that we do |
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| enforce that five minute limit, and we have a timer |
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| who will publicly tell everyone what the time is and |
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| publicly shame someone who may go over the limit. |
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| That's not because we want to reduce debate, |
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| but because we want to have a rich debate, in which |
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| everyone has an opportunity to speak. There will be |
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| questions and answers to follow the conclusions of all |
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| of the opening statements. We want to get everyone's |
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| position out there before we have the Q and A. |
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| The first panel will go until noon, but |
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| we'll have a break at some point. So don't worry. |
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| This is not going to be a test of will, to make sure |
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| that you can make it through to noon. We'll take a |
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| break at some point. |
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| We'll have an hour long lunch break from 12 |
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| to 1, reconvene promptly at one. We'll have a second |
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| panel of experts from one o'clock to three o'clock |
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| with the same procedures of a maximum five-minute |
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| presentations, and Q and A. |
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| From three o'clock to four o'clock, we then |
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| have a so-called open mike. What this will allow us |
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| to do is have people who have not been formally |
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| invited to the panels, have an opportunity to speak at |
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| today's hearings. |
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| You must sign up in advance, though. |
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| There's a table just outside that door. David Evans |
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| is keeping the sign-up list. Each of the |
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| presentations at the mike will be limited to no more |
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| than three minutes. |
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| Once again, unfortunately I'm going to be |
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| very tough on enforcing that limit, because I know |
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| that we're going to have a lot of people who want to |
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| speak, and I want to make sure that we get through all |
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| those speakers. |
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| I have two final points that I want to |
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| mention. The panelists, the open mike participants, |
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| as well as the members of the general public, and |
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| anyone, whether they are here or not, are encouraged |
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| and we really look forward to written statements of |
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| any length being provided to us by August 15th, related |
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| to the wide variety of topics that we're talking about |
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| today. |
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| We do look forward to those written |
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| statements. So even though we're keeping the oral |
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| presentation short, the written statement they submit |
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| will be as long as you wish. A transcript of the |
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| panel discussion and the open mike statements will be |
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| part of the record, which will be made available on |
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| the Board's website. |
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| Again, thank you very much for your |
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| participation. Now I'd like to begin formally the |
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| first panel with Faith Schwartz, from Option One. |
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| MS. SCHWARTZ: Well, thank you very much, |
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| Governor Kroszner and the Fed Board staff, for |
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| inviting Option One and myself to participate today in |
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| this panel. I'll try to get through my introduction |
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| within five minutes and we'll get to any key points. |
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| But I will do my best. |
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| I am the manager of Enterprise Risk |
7 |
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| Management at Option One Mortgage and our Public |
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| Affairs, and I have been there for four years. I'm |
9 |
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| currently on the Federal Reserve's Consumer Advisory |
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| Committee. |
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| Option One Mortgage has been in business |
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| since 1992, and is a nationwide non-prime wholesale |
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| lender, who originates through a network of brokers, |
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| and the leaders that started the company are in place |
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| today. |
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| Before I get into the introductory paragraph |
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| that should get to the key points, I would like to |
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| share that I have been in the business for many, many |
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| years, over 20, and I've spent ten years in banking. |
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| I've spent five years at a GSE, Freddie Mac, where I |
21 |
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| helped them manage their subprime interest and |
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| securitization and their anti-predatory lending |
23 |
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| efforts. |
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| I've been an entrepreneur for six years as |
25 |
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| a chief operating officer. We've relied on the |
1 |
20 |
| capital markets to have nationwide funding to operate |
2 |
20 |
| in the marketplace. I share that with you because I |
3 |
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| feel I come to this discussion with a pretty informed |
4 |
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| background on some of the nuances that will be talked |
5 |
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| about today. |
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| So with that, we recommend that the Board be |
7 |
20 |
| cautious in exercising its rule-making authority under |
8 |
20 |
| HOEPA, Section 129. But we do recommend that they use |
9 |
20 |
| their authority in the following three ways. |
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20 |
| Pursuant to Section 105 of the Truth in |
11 |
20 |
| Lending Act (TILA), to strengthen and simplify |
12 |
20 |
| disclosures with respect to all four topics |
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| introduced. |
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| Secondly, we recommend pursuant to Section |
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| 129, 1 and 2 of HOEPA, to craft targeted rules with |
16 |
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| regard to truly unfair acts and practices that are |
17 |
20 |
| abusive. |
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| Three, pursuant to its supervisory |
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20 |
| authority, deal with most concerns by issuing further |
20 |
20 |
| regulatory guidance which provides more flexibility |
21 |
20 |
| than firm regulations. |
22 |
20 |
| The effectiveness of this guidance has been |
23 |
20 |
| seen in the rapid and positive transformation of the |
24 |
20 |
| mortgage market in response to federal regulatory |
25 |
20 |
| agencies' non-traditional mortgage guidance, and to |
1 |
21 |
| the parallel state-adopted, the guidance that was |
2 |
21 |
| adopted in over 30 states. Option One operates by |
3 |
21 |
| that guidance in all 50 states. |
4 |
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| The market has also reflected that guidance, |
5 |
21 |
| and you have a lot of courses and actions here which |
6 |
21 |
| shows that it can be quite effective. Such a |
7 |
21 |
| judicious mixture of targeted formal rules, together |
8 |
21 |
| with a broader application of general principles in |
9 |
21 |
| regulatory guidance and greater transparency through |
10 |
21 |
| better disclosures, is our recommended approach. |
11 |
21 |
| This path should better protect consumers, |
12 |
21 |
| create a more level playing field for lenders, and |
13 |
21 |
| promote conditions that help keep mortgage capital |
14 |
21 |
| widely available in the communities. |
15 |
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| I will touch upon briefly some of the key |
16 |
21 |
| issues you've asked about. More timely plain language |
17 |
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| disclosures. Clearly, people are not happy with the |
18 |
21 |
| current level of disclosures, and in some ways, it |
19 |
21 |
| gets discounted in the market, that they're not |
20 |
21 |
| relevant because no one's reading them. |
21 |
21 |
| So we strongly urge the Federal Reserve, |
22 |
21 |
| under TILA 105, to adopt plain language disclosures |
23 |
21 |
| across the board on all four issues. |
24 |
21 |
| We also think the Board should consider a |
25 |
21 |
| DVD video medium forum to get to borrowers who just |
1 |
22 |
| don't read a one-paragraph plain language disclosure |
2 |
22 |
| as another alternative to reach the borrowers. |
3 |
22 |
| At Option One, we have several plain |
4 |
22 |
| language disclosures. Since we are not at the point |
5 |
22 |
| of sale when the borrower is with our customer, the |
6 |
22 |
| broker, what we do is make sure if we get a loan with |
7 |
22 |
| a stated income or interest only or an ARM, we don't |
8 |
22 |
| know how that loan was shopped. |
9 |
22 |
| But what we do is we send out a very plain |
10 |
22 |
| language, 8th grade written paragraph that says exactly |
11 |
22 |
| what they've applied for and did they understand what |
12 |
22 |
| they applied for. |
13 |
22 |
| That is sent directly to the consumer. With |
14 |
22 |
| any material changes, we re-issue those disclosures |
15 |
22 |
| and at closing, we also have those disclosures. We'd |
16 |
22 |
| like to see the Board act on that further. |
17 |
22 |
| Prepayment penalties are a key issue in the |
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22 |
| market. I think there's been a lot of debate about |
19 |
22 |
| them, and we actually think the Board should go |
20 |
22 |
| through regulatory guidance on some of the issues that |
21 |
22 |
| surround the prepayment penalty. |
22 |
22 |
| As a policy matter, we don't think anyone |
23 |
22 |
| should have a prepayment penalty that doesn't want one |
24 |
22 |
| or choose one. We think that there needs to be clear |
25 |
22 |
| notice and information around prepayment penalties to |
1 |
23 |
| the borrowers, so that they can make the best |
2 |
23 |
| assessment of whether they want one. |
3 |
23 |
| Clear notice and finally, every borrower who |
4 |
23 |
| gets one should have a benefit for choosing a loan |
5 |
23 |
| with a prepayment penalty of either rate or fee, or |
6 |
23 |
| lower rate or fee. |
7 |
23 |
| We think that that can again go through |
8 |
23 |
| TILA 105, with clear disclosures on the benefits or |
9 |
23 |
| lack of benefit of a prepayment penalty. We think |
10 |
23 |
| carefully crafted, through Section 129, 1 or 2 that |
11 |
23 |
| includes substantive requirements that a consumer must |
12 |
23 |
| have a choice to choose a prepayment penalty. |
13 |
23 |
| They must limit the term of the penalty, |
14 |
23 |
| maybe to three years, but -- sorry. Should I finish |
15 |
23 |
| the sentence or? Okay. And let me jump to escrows. |
16 |
23 |
| We believe the Board should do a lot on escrows as |
17 |
23 |
| well. But really through regulation, we do think with |
18 |
23 |
| both 105 and 129, you can make a big impact on a tool |
19 |
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| that is meaningful if well-applied in the market. |
20 |
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| Okay. |
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23 |
| GOVERNOR KROSZNER: Thank you very much. |
22 |
23 |
| MS. SCHWARTZ: You're welcome. |
23 |
23 |
| GOVERNOR KROSZNER: And now let's turn to |
24 |
23 |
| Pablo Sanchez from J.P. Morgan Chase. |
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23 |
| MR. SANCHEZ: Good morning to all. Pablo |
1 |
24 |
| Sanchez, the Retail Business executive for J.P. Morgan |
2 |
24 |
| Chase, and you have an idea of my business is. |
3 |
24 |
| I think we're fairly serious about the time |
4 |
24 |
| element here. Matthew has a sign that he holds up, |
5 |
24 |