## Prefatory Note

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## MONETARY POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
By the staff Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

## MONETARY POLICY ALTERUATIVES

## Recent Developments

(1) Since the FOMC meeting on November 14, open market operations have been aimed at maintaining the reserve conditions established after the slight easing in early November. The allowance for adjustment and seasonal borrowing incorporated in the nonborrowed reserve objective remained at $\$ 200$ million until a technical adjustment to $\$ 150$ million was made in the second full maintenance period to take account of a further decline in seasonal borrowing.' Federal funds have traded mostly around 8-1/2 percent. The funds rate dropped notably below this level around Thanksgiving, however, after market participants erroneously concluded that policy had been eased again. A reserve injection just before Thanksgiving to meet a sizable seasonal need at a time when federal funds were at 8-3/8 percent triggered this perception, which was subsequently reversed by draining reserves the following Monday at an early hour. ${ }^{2}$ The necessity to drain reserves at a time when prajections pointed to a reserve shortfall contributed to a bulge in borrowing to $\$ 419$ million in the main-

[^1]tenance period ending November 29. In the second and most recent complete period, borrowing averaged $\$ 130$ million.
(2) With no change in policy and incoming economic information generally consistent with expectations of slow growth in the economy, most market interest rates are little changed on balance from the last FOMC meeting. The yield curve remains inverted at the short end, as it has since late October, suggesting the market continues to expect further declines in short-term rates.
(3) In long-term markets, the gap between the average yield on lower grade junk bonds and other market rates has widened further, as investor resistance to these securities intensified in the face of further problems among issuers. Partly in response to difficulties in the junk bond market in recent months, the pace of net equity retirements in the fourth quarter has been well below that of the third. Despite this slowdown and disappointing third-quarter corporate earnings, most major stock indexes advanced 1 to 3 percent over the intermeeting period, with the Dow Jones rising 5 percent. Indexes of thrift and bank stock prices dropped, however, in response to spreading problems in real estate markets. Nonetheless, the spread between rates on bank money market instruments and Treasury bills remained unusually narrow.
(4) The weighted average foreign exchange value of the dollar declined by almost 4 percent over the intermeeting period. The dollar fell by 6-1/2 percent against the mark, mainly reflecting events in Eastern Europe and their supposed favorable implications for the German economy, and by somewhat less against other EMS currencies. The dollar
was unchanged against the yen, and fell slightly against sterling.
the Desk sold $\$ 150$ million against the yen.
Interest differentials against major industrial countries showed little change over the period; three-month rates in both Germany and Japan eased back a bit, while long bond rates in those countries were about unchanged. Rates in some European countries drifted higher as they resisted downward pressures on their currencies relative to the DM.
(5) Growth of M2 picked up a bit further in November, to an 8$1 / 2$ percent pace, bringing the rate of increase from September to 8-1/4 percent, above the $7-1 / 2$ percent path specified by the Comittee for the September-to-December period; preliminary data through December 11 suggest continued robust expansion this month. The strength in M2 reflects earlier declines in market interest rates and has been concentrated in its 1iquid interest-bearing components, where the decreases in opportunity costs have been greatest. Noncompetitive bidders at Treasury auctions have been running down their holdings, providing corroborating evidence of substitution out of market assets. Demand deposits contracted last month, reversing almost one-half of October's surge, and M1 growth slowed to a 3$1 / 2$ perçent rate despite a continued double digit rate of expansion in other checkable deposits. ${ }^{3}$
3. The runoff in demand deposits caused total reserves to contract in November, following two months of rapid growth. Expansion of the monetary base also slowed, reflecting, in addition to the weakness in its reserves component, a continued sluggish expansion of currency.
(6) M3 expanded at a 6 percent pace in November, the fastest rate since the summer, and the average October-November pace of 5-1/4 percent was above the Committee's expected $4-1 / 2$ percent growth for the September-to-December period. Partial data through the first part of December indicate that this aggregate is continuing to expand at close to its November pace. The acceleration in November occurred as the contraction of the thrift component of managed liabilities in M3 abated. This reflected less aggressive efforts on the part of solvent but capitaldeficient thrifts to shed assets and a hiatus in activities by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). ${ }^{4}$ M3 also was boosted last month by strong growth in institution-only MMMFs, since yields on these funds tended to lag the decline in market rates.
(7) Expansion of the debt of nonfinancial sectors evidently slowed last month, apparently owing, at least in part, to shifts in financing patterns rather than reductions in borrowing to finance spending. For example, a moderation in business borrowing was accounted for largely by a reduced issuance of junk bonds and a slowing in the pace of equity retirements. In addition, while the federal deficit was about unchanged, borrowing fell as the Treasury drew down its cash balance. And, offerings of state and local securities also were cut back, but mostly in the area of advance refundings. Information on the household sector is sparse; consumer lending at banks continued brisk, probably

[^2]reflecting a further increase in their share of consumer credit. Growth of real estate loans at banks slowed slightly in November, though this may reflect more caution in commercial lending.
(8) All the monetary and debt aggregates are ending 1989 within their annual ranges, as can be seen in the table below, with growth moderating from 1988. Through November, M2 expanded at a 4-1/2 percent rate from the fourth quarter of last year, down $3 / 4$ of a percentage point from 1988. M2 growth was damped by a slowing of growth in nominal income, as

Money and Debt Growth (percent)

|  | 1988 QIV <br> to |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| M2 | $\frac{1988}{5.2}$ | $\frac{\text { Nov. } 1989}{4.6}$ | 1989 <br> ranges |
| M3 | 6.3 | 3.9 | $3-1 / 2$ to $7-1 / 2$ |
| M1 | 4.3 | 0.3 | -- |
| Nonfinancial <br> debt | 9.2 | $8.1^{1}$ | $6-1 / 2$ to $10-1 / 2$ |

1. Through October.
well as by the lagged effects of the year-long rise in interest rates and opportunity costs that came to an end in March. Within the year, M2 growth showed a pronounced pattern: through midyear higher interest rates and unusually large personal tax payments held the aggregate below its target range; subsequent rate declines and a rebuilding of liquid balances boosted M2 to just below the midpoint of its annual range. The pattern was even more pronounced for M1, given its greater interest elasticity;
this aggregate declined at around a 5 percent rate in the first half of the year before rebounding in the second. On balance M1 is about unchanged over the year, and growth of its velocity likely equalled the fastest pace in three decades. Events in the thrift industry have not had much effect on the overall level of M2, although growth was skewed heavily towards its bank deposit and money market mutual fund components. By contrast, M3 growth this year--at 4 percent, a bit above the lower bound of its $3-1 / 2$ to $7-1 / 2$ percent range--has been damped considerably by the liquidation of thrift assets and infusions of funds by the RTC. Although banks probably absorbed some of these assets, many mortgages and mortgagebacked securities apparently were acquired by other investors and thus not financed by M3 liabilities. The expansion of nonfinancial debt decelerated about in line with GNP this year, and it is expected to finish the year about 8 percent above its level in the fourth quarter of 1988 , near the midpoint of its $6-1 / 2$ to $10-1 / 2$ percent monitoring range.

MONEY, CREDIT, AND RESERVE AGGREATES
(Seasonally adjusted annual rates of growth)

|  | September | October | November | $\begin{gathered} \text { September } \\ \text { to pe } \\ \text { November } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { QIV'88 } \\ \text { to pe } \\ \text { November } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Money and Credit Aggregates |  |  |  |  |  |
| M1 | 5.7 | 10.1 | 3.5 | 6.8 | 0.3 |
| M2 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 8.4 | 8.2 | 4.6 |
| M3 | 1.0 | 4.5 | 6.0 | 5.2 | 3.9 |
|  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |
| Domestic nonfinancial debt | 7.1 | 8.3 | n.a. | 8.3 | 8.1 |
| Bank credit | 6.2 | 15.2 | 4.0 | 9.6 | 7.5 |
| Reserve measures |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nonborrowed reserves | 8.9 | 11.0 | 3.0 | 7.0 | -1.8 |
| Total reserves | 9.6 | 8.1 | -1.1 | 3.5 | -2.0 |
| Monetary base | 7.5 | 2.8 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 3.1 |
| Memo: (Millions of dollars) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Adjustment plus seasonal borrowing | 671 | 534 | 328 | -- | -- |
| Excess reserves | 938 | 1,020 | 940 | -- | -- |
| n.a. - not available. <br> pe - preliminary estimate. |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1. Through October. |  |  |  |  |  |
| NOTE: Monthly reserve meaurea, including excess reserves and borrowing, are calculated by prorating averagea for two-week reserve maintenance periods that overlap monthe . |  |  |  |  |  |

## Policy Alternatives

(9) Three policy alternatives are presented below for Committee consideration. The specifications of alternative $B$ involve federal funds continuing to trade in the $8-1 / 2$ percent area in association with adjustment plus seasonal borrowing of $\$ 150$ million. Under alternative $A$, the federal funds rate would decline to the 8 percent area accompanying a decline in adjustment plus seasonal borrowing to $\$ 100 \mathrm{million}$. Federal funds would return to the 9 percent area under alternative $C_{\text {, }}$ associated with adjustment plus seasonal borrowing of $\$ 200$ million. The differences in the borrowing levels among the three alternatives, $\$ 50$ million, is only half that contained in recent bluebooks. The low level to which seasonal borrowing has fallen, together with the continued close proximity of adjustment borrowing to frictional levels, implies that borrowing probably has become even more unresponsive to the spread between the funds rate and the discount rate. ${ }^{5}$ Uncertainties in the relationship between the funds rate and borrowing, even more of a problem at such low levels of borrowing, continue to call for flexibility in the Desk's approach to the borrowing objective.
(10) Money growth paths from November to March associated with each alternative are shown in the table below. (More detailed data appear in the table and charts on the following pages.) Boosted by earlier declines in interest rates, M2 growth under all the alternatives would continue fairly strong, running through the first quarter at or above the upper end of its tentative 3 to 7 percent target cone for 1990 , though

[^3]within the associated parallel band. The outlook for M3 continues to be clouded by considerable uncertainties about thrifts. One source of uncertainty pertains to the rate at which solvent but capital-deficient institutions pare assets in order to meet new FIRREA capital requirements. Another is the near-term activity of the RTC; absent provision for working capital early next year, $\mathrm{RTC}^{\prime}$ s scope for completing deals and replacing high-cost funds in the first quarter may be limited. As noted above, both RTC activity and S\&L asset runoffs appear to have diminished substantially, but we expect these factors to become more important in the months ahead, retarding M3, though not to the degree of late summer and early fall. ${ }^{6}$ As a consequence, M3 growth is projected to continue below that of M2, leaving this aggregate in March in the middle portion of its tentative range.
Alt. A Alt. B Alt. C

| Growth from November <br> to March |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| M2 | 9 |  |  |
| M3 | 6 | 8 | 7 |
| M1 | $7-1 / 2$ | 6 | 5 |
|  |  |  | $4-1 / 2$ |
| Implied growth from |  |  |  |
| Q4 89 to March |  |  |  |
| M2 | 9 | 8 | 7 |
| M3 | 6 | $5-1 / 2$ | 5 |
| M1 | $7-1 / 4$ | $5-3 / 4$ | $4-1 / 4$ |
|  |  |  |  |
| Associated federal |  |  |  |
| funds rate range | 6 to 10 | 7 to 11 | 7 to 11 |

6. RTC is in the process of resolving several thrifts before year-end.

## Alternative Levels and Growth Rates for Key Monetary Aggregates

|  | M2 |  |  | M3 |  |  | M1 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Alt. A | Alt. B | Alt. C | Alt. A | Alt. B | Alt. C | Alt. A | Alt. B | Alt. C |
| Levels in billions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1989 October | 3176.8 | 3176.8 | 3176.8 | 4027.4 | 4027.4 | 4027.4 | 787.7 | 787.7 | 787.7 |
| November | 3199.1 | 3199.1 | 3199.1 | 4047.5 | 4047.5 | 4047.5 | 790.0 | 790.0 | 790.0 |
| December | 3221.2 | 3220.7 | 3220.2 | 4068.5 | 4068.2 | 4067.9 | 794.2 | 794.0 | 793.8 |
| 1990 January | 3245.2 | 3242.2 | 3239.2 | 4087.8 | 4086.5 | 4085.2 | 799.3 | 798.3 | 797.3 |
| February | 3268.9 | 3262.7 | 3256.5 | 4107.3 | 4103.9 | 4100.5 | 804.3 | 802.1 | 799.9 |
| March | 3293.9 | 3283.3 | 3272.7 | 4127.2 | 4120.4 | 4113.6 | 809.7 | 805.8 | 801.9 |
| Monthly Growth Rates |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1989 October | 7.8 | 7.8 | 7.8 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 10.1 | 10.1 | 10.1 |
| November | 8.4 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| December | 8.3 | 8.1 | 7.9 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 5.8 |
| 1990 January | 8.9 | 8.0 | 7.1 | 5.7 | 5.4 | 5.1 | 7.7 | 6.5 | $5.3 \frac{1}{6}$ |
| February | 8.8 | 7.6 | 6.4 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 4.5 | 7.4 | 5.6 | 3.8 i |
| March | 9.2 | 7.6 | 6.0 | 5.8 | 4.8 | 3.8 | 8.1 | 5.5 | 3.0 |
| Quarterly Ave. Growth Rates |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1989 Q1 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.4 |
| Q2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | -5.6 | -5.6 | -5.6 |
| Q3 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Q4 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.1 |
| 1990 Q1 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 7.2 | 5.9 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 7.0 | 5.8 | 4.7 |
| Sept 89 to Dec. 89 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.1 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.5 |
| Nov. 89 to Mar. 90 | 8.9 | 7.9 | 6.9 | 5.9 | 5.4 | 4.9 | 7.5 | 6.0 | 4.5 |
| Dec. 89 to Mar. 90 | 9.0 | 7.8 | 6.5 | 5.8 | 5.1 | 4.5 | 7.8 | 5.9 | 4.0 |
| Q4 88 to Q4 89 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| Q4 89 to Q1 90 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 7.2 | 5.9 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 7.0 | 5.8 | 4.6 |
| Q4 89 to Jan. 90 | 8.7 | 8.1 | 7.6 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 5.6 | 6.6 | 5.9 | 5.2 |
| Q4 89 to Feb. 90 | 8.7 | 8.0 | 7.2 | 5.9 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 6.9 | 5.8 | 4.7 |
| Q4 89 to Mar. 90 | 8.9 | 7.9 | 6.9 | 5.9 | 5.4 | 4.9 | 7.2 | 5.8 | 4.3 |
| 1989 Target Ranges: |  | 3.0 to 7.0 |  | 3.5 to 7.5 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1990 Ranges (Tentativ | ve): | 3.0 to 7.0 |  | 3.5 to 7.5 |  |  |  |  |  |

Chart 1
ACTUAL AND TARGETED M2
Billions of dollars


ACTUAL AND TARGETED M3
Billions of dollars



(11) The markets have built in some additional easing of policy in the near term, and as federal funds continue to trade around 8-1/2 percent under alternative $B$, money market rates might firm a little. ${ }^{7}$ Any tendency for rates to rise is likely to be tempered if incoming information points to sluggish economic growth, consistent with the staff forecast, so that markets retain but push back their expectations of the next easing step. Bond yields are likely to stay around current levels under these circumstances. Bond prices could rally should more definite prospects for substantial deficit reduction emerge from the upcoming Administration budget as well as the implications of developments overseas for future defense expenditures. With policy unchanged, the dollar might show little further depreciation, unless key foreign central banks tighten policies further.
(12) Under alternative B, M2 would expand at an 8 percent annual rate over the November-to-March period, near the pace of recent months. ${ }^{8}$ Growth would continue to be buoyed by previous declines in market interest rates, causing a further reduction in the velocity of this aggregate at a 1-3/4 percent annual rate in the first quarter. Expansion would remain concentrated in its more liquid components, whose opportunity costs have narrowed the most. Small time deposits could strengthen a little now that RTC no longer is providing additional funds to replace high-cost deposits.

[^4]In these circumstances, intervened thrifts may continue to bid more aggressively to retain or replace maturing brokered deposits, as they have in recent weeks, prompting other depository institutions to raise their offering rates. While most of the small time deposits would come from other M2 sources, some might be diverted from outside M2, given the more favorable deposit rates. Growth in the M1 component would be expected to be around 6 percent over the November-to-March period, sustained by inflows to OCDs and some augmenting of demand deposits around year-end to meet compensating balance requirements. By March, M2 would have grown 8 percent at an annual rate from its fourth-quarter base; but absent any significant changes in the funds rate, M2 subsequently would be expected to moderate to within its tentative annual target cone in the third quarter.
(13) M3 is expected to grow at a 5-1/2 percent annual rate under alternative $B$, in line with its faster pace of October and November. Growth of this aggregate may decelerate over the quarter, damped by runoffs of assets at capital-deficient thrifts as well as by a resumption of RTC activity at insolvent institutions. Credit growth at banks should remain close to the pace of recent months; these institutions will continue to fill some of the void in residential and consumer installment lending and acquisitions of mortgage securities caused by the withdrawal of the thrift industry.
(14) Debt of private nonfinancial sectors is expected to continue to grow around the slower pace that has come to prevail in the latter part of 1989. To some extent this may result from a more cautious attitude of
lenders facing not only mounting problems in junk bond and real estate markets but also the possibility of greater credit difficulties by household and business borrowers more generally as income growth slows. Residential mortgage borrowing should continue to expand around its recent pace, buoyed by the modest recovery in housing activity in response to reduced mortgage rates. Elsewhere in the household sector, consumer credit growth is expected to strengthen a bit, reflecting a near-term recovery in spending on durables. With the financing gap unchanged and restructuring activity damped, business borrowing should remain around the reduced pace of recent months. The federal government will continue to be a heavy user of credit to finance a still-large federal deficit in the first quarter. Over the November-to-March period, growth of domestic nonfinancial debt is expected to be around 7 percent, placing the debt aggregate in the lower portion of its tentative 6-1/2 to 10-1/2 percent monitoring range for 1990.
(15) The easing of policy under alternative $A$ would be a little more than now seems to be anticipated by market participants over coming weeks. In response to a drop in the federal funds rate to the 8 percent area, money market interest rates would decrease about $3 / 8$ percentage point, with the three-month bill trading around $7-1 / 4$ percent. Bond rates should move lower, especially if market participants viewed the economy as being fairly weak so that such a measure would not appreciably raise the risk of higher inflation, though judging from the tepid response of bond markets to the putative easing around Thanksgiving, any declines might be small. The dollar could weaken significantly further.
(16) With the further drop in interest rates, growth in M2 would strengthen under alternative $A$ to a 9 percent annual rate over the Novem-ber-to-March period, placing this aggregate noticeably above the upper end of its tentative growth cone. In the absence of a subsequent tightening of policy, expansion of $M 2$ would be likely to remain quite strong for some time, especially if the lower interest rates fed through to greater spending and demand for money than in the staff forecast. Under alternative $A$, growth in M3 would firm to a 6 percent rate over the November-to-March period, a bit above the midpoint of its tentative 1990 range. A decline in market rates might not boost $M 3$ in line with previous experience, since higher prices on mortgages and mortgage-backed securities could encourage the sale of assets by thrifts.
(17) Alternative $C$ would restrain M2 growth to around the upper bound of its 1990 growth cone by March, putting it on a track toward the middle of its tentative range; such a move would seem to increase the odds on more noticeable progress toward price stability, with assistance from a stronger dollar, albeit with greater risk of an economic downturn. The accompanying slowdown in M3--to an expected 5 percent annual rate over the November-to-March period--would cause this aggregate to drift downward in the lower half of its tentative 1990 growth range. A tightening of policy would come as a surprise to market participants, and short-term interest rates would rise by more than the 50 basis point increase in the federal funds rate. Bond rates initially would rise, though this increase might be retraced if markets came to see the move as part of a longer-term strategy to restrain spending and prices. An aspect of this restraint

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would be a transition period that involved a weaker outlook for profits,
downward pressure on various asset prices, and an intensification of
strains in certain vulnerable areas of the financial system, with
implications for intermediaries and other lenders.
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## Directive Language

（18）Draft language for the operational paragraph，including the standard options and updating，is shown below．

## OPERATIONAL PARAGRAPH

In the implementation of policy for the immediate future，the Committee seeks to DECREASE SOMEWHAT／maintain／ INCREASE SOMEWHAT the existing degree of pressure on reserve positions．Taking account of progress toward price stability，the strength of the business expansion，the behavior of the monetary aggregates，and developments in foreign exchange and domestic financial markets，slightly （SOMEWHAT）greater reserve restraint might（WOULD）or slightly（SOMEWHAT）lesser reserve restraint（MIGHT）would be acceptable in the intermeeting period．The contemplated reserve conditions are expected to be consistent with growth of M2 and M3 over the period from NOVEMBER THROUGH MARCH September through Becember at annual rates of about ＿＿AND＿$\quad 7-\sharp \neq 2$ and $4-¥ \nmid 2$ percent，respectively．The Chairman may call for Comittee consultation if it appears to the Manager for Domestic Operations that reserve conditions during the period before the next meeting are likely to be associated with a federal funds rate persistently outside a range of＿＿TO＿ 7 to $\ddagger ⿱ 䒑 ⿻ 二 丨 刂 灬$ percent．

SELECTED INTEREST RATES
(percent)

|  |  |  | Short-Term |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Long-Tem |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | tederal tunds | Treasury bllis secondary market |  |  | CDsseconclarymarket$3-$ month5 | $\begin{gathered} \text { comm } \\ \text { papar } \\ 1-\text { monll } \\ \hline 6 \end{gathered}$ | money <br> market <br> munual <br> fund | $\begin{gathered} \text { bank } \\ \text { prime } \\ \text {-loan } \\ \hline 8 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | US govemment constant maturity y yelds |  |  | corporate <br> A nility <br> cecenly <br> offeced <br> 12 | municlpal <br> Bond <br> Buver <br> 13 | $\begin{gathered} \text { conventic } \\ \begin{array}{c} \text { secondary } \\ \text { maiket } \\ \text { fixed calte } \end{array} \\ \hline 14 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | nal nome mongages <br> primary malke! <br> fix rate Ab |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |  |  |  |  | 8 | 10 | 11 |  |  |  | 15 | 16 |
| $88-1$ | High Low |  | $\begin{aligned} & 887 \\ & 638 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8.16 \\ & 561 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8.26 \\ & 5.81 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 840 \\ & 615 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 933 \\ & 6.58 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 941 \\ & 650 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 818 \\ & 603 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1050 \\ 850 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 916 \\ & 733 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 936 \\ & 816 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 942 \\ & 8.40 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 10.73 \\ 963 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 834 \\ & 764 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1133 \\ 998 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1081 \\ 984 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 854 \\ & 749 \end{aligned}$ |
| 89 -- | High Low |  | $\begin{aligned} & 995 \\ & 846 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 904 \\ & 754 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 9.07 \\ & 7.35 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 896 \\ & 716 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1023 \\ 8.24 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 998 \\ & 8.35 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 919 \\ & 789 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11.50 \\ & 1050 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 977 \\ & 7.60 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 946 \\ & 782 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 9.26 \\ & 7.89 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1047 \\ 9.26 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 795 \\ 719 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1173 \\ 992 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1122 \\ 968 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 941 \\ & 839 \end{aligned}$ |
| Monthly Dec | 88 |  | 8.76 | 8.07 | 8.22 | 832 | 925 | 9.31 | 800 | 1050 | 911 | 9.11 | 901 | 1008 | 788 | 1098 | 1061 | 839 |
| Jan | 89 |  | 9.12 | 8.27 | 8.36 | 8.37 | 920 | 9.03 | 833 | 1050 | 9.20 | 909 | 8.93 | 1009 | 763 | 1097 | 1073 | 855 |
| Feb | 89 |  | 9.36 | 8.53 | 855 | 8.55 | 9.51 | 9.29 | 879 | 10.93 | 932 | 917 | 9.01 | 10.25 | 772 | 1103 | 1065 | 865 |
| Mar | 89 |  | 985 | 8.82 | 8.85 | B 82 | 1009 | 9.88 | 889 | 1150 | 9.61 | 936 | 917 | 1037 | 7.85 | 1147 | 1103 | 909 |
| Apr | 89 |  | 984 | 865 | 865 | 864 | 9.94 | 9.77 | 914 | 11.50 | 940 | 918 | 903 | 1033 | 773 | 1132 | 1105 | 940 |
| May | 89 |  | 9.81 | 8.43 | 841 | 8.31 | 959 | 9.57 | 913 | 11.50 | 898 | 8.86 | 8.83 | 1009 | 751 | 1090 | 1077 | 930 |
| Jun | 89 |  | 953 | 8.15 | 7.93 | 784 | 920 | 934 | 8.96 | 11.07 | 8.37 | 8.28 | 8.27 | 965 | 735 | 1039 | 1020 | 903 |
| Jul | 89 |  | 9.24 | 7.88 | 7.61 | 7.36 | 876 | 8.95 | 872 | 10.98 | 783 | 8.02 | 8.08 | 9.54 | 7.28 | 1011 | 988 | 874 |
| Aug | 89 |  | 8.99 | 790 | 774 | 7.61 | 864 | 8.79 | 832 | 1050 | 813 | 811 | 812 | 955 | 736 | 1038 | 999 | 865 |
| Sep | 89 |  | 902 | 7.75 | 774 | 765 | 878 | 887 | 825 | 10.50 | 8.25 | 819 | 8.15 | 955 | 7.52 | 1044 | 1013 | 871 |
| Oct | 89 |  | 884 | 764 | 762 | 745 | 860 | 866 | 8.21 | 10.50 | 802 | 801 | 800 | 939 | 748 | 1019 | 995 | 862 |
| Nov | 89 |  | 855 | 7.69 | 749 | 7.25 | 839 | 847 | 800 | 10.50 | 780 | 7.87 | 7.90 | 9.28 | 7.39 | 1006 | 977 | 851 |
| Weekly Sep | 6 | 89 | 896 | 786 | 7.80 | 769 | 880 | 888 | 823 | 10.50 | 833 | 820 | 815 | 955 | 7.43 | 1043 | 1017 | 871 |
| Sep | 13 | 89 | 896 | 770 | 7.69 | 759 | 8.75 | 8.86 | 8.26 | 10.50 | 819 | 815 | 810 | 949 | 7.45 | 1030 | 1005 | 868 |
| Sep | 20 | 89 | 905 | 7.64 | 762 | 753 | 870 | 882 | 825 | 10.50 | 811 | 811 | 811 | 956 | 7.59 | 1042 | 1003 | 870 |
| Sop | 27 | 89 | 902 | 7.80 | 780 | 772 | 883 | 8.89 | 825 | 10.50 | 835 | 8.27 | 8.24 | 960 | 7.59 | 1057 | 1016 | 870 |
| Oct | 4 | 89 | 9.18 | 7.85 | 789 | 783 | 893 | 8.94 | 827 | 1050 | 842 | 8.27 | 821 | 940 | 7.50 | 1021 | 1011 | 872 |
| Oct | 11 | 89 | 8.93 | 767 | 769 | 758 | 874 | 8.79 | 8.25 | 1050 | 814 | 807 | 804 | 933 | 746 | 10.24 | 995 | 860 |
| Oct | 18 | 89 | 876 | 7.54 | 754 | 735 | 848 | 856 | 820 | 1050 | 792 | 798 | 798 | 937 | 747 | 1016 | 992 | 858 |
| Oct | 25 | 89 | 8.72 | 755 | 752 | 730 | 850 | 8.55 | 813 | 1050 | 789 | 7.92 | 793 | 939 | 747 | 1013 | 982 | 858 |
| Nov | 1 | 89 | 880 | 773 | 755 | 732 | 850 | 8.60 | 811 | 1050 | 790 | 791 | 792 | 929 | 747 | 1015 | 982 | 855 |
| Nov | 8 | 89 | 869 | 778 | 760 | 737 | 854 | 861 | 807 | 1050 | 794 | 792 | 791 | 927 | 745 | 1008 | 979 | 852 |
| Nov | 15 | 89 | 846 | 768 | 751 | 7.25 | 838 | 844 | 800 | 10.50 | 777 | 7.88 | 7.89 | 931 | 739 | 996 | 972 | 849 |
| Nov | 22 | 89 | 846 | 765 | 743 | 716 | 835 | 843 | 798 | 1050 | 772 | 784 | 790 | 926 | 7.35 | 1006 | 974 | 847 |
| Nov | 29 | 89 | 8.51 | 764 | 7.43 | 719 | 825 | 835 | 793 | 1050 | 775 | 7.85 | 791 | 926 | 731 | 1007 | 974 | 846 |
| Dec | $6$ | 89 | 852 | 757 | 735 | 719 | 824 | 851 | 794 | 10.50 | 774 | 783 | 789 | 929 | 735 | 1007 | 976 | 839 |
| Dec | 13 | 89 | 847 | 766 | 739 | 725 | 832 | 857 | 789 | 1050 | 7.78 | 784 | 790 | 933 | 7.29 | 998 | 975 | 839 |
| Dally |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dec | 8 | 89 | 846 | 761 | 733 | 722 | 828 | 854 |  | 1050 | 777 | 782 | 788 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dec | 14 | 89 | 8.51 | 762 | 739 | 721 | 841 | 865 |  | 1050 | 770 | 779 | 7.85 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dec | 15 | 89 | 854 p | 762 | 739 | 713 | 837 | 868 |  | 10.50 | 770 p | 781 p | $786 p$ |  |  |  |  |  |


 for Ilxed rale mongages(FRMS) with s0 percent loan to value ratios at m
oftering boin FRMs and ARMs with the same number of discoum points
p prelliminary dala

| Period | Bank raserves: |  |  | Moner stock measursi and liguid assets |  |  |  | Bank credit | -_-_ Domestic nontinanciel debt |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | nonborrowed | total | monetary base | M1 | M2 | M3 | L | $\begin{gathered} \text { total loans } \\ \text { and } \\ \text { inyeatmen!a } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | U.S. government ${ }^{2}$ | other' | total* |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
| LEVELS ( SBILLIONS ]: ANMUALLY [4TH GTR.) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1986 | 55,725 | 56,532 | 238,801 | 709.4 | 2788.3 | 3470.2 | 4107.9 | 2068.9 | 1783.8 | 5725.7 | 7509.5 |
| 1987 | 58,393 | 59,175 | 256,914 | 754.7 | 2905.7 | 3667.7 | 4332.0 | 2237.6 | 1943.7 | 6311.1 | 8254.9 |
| 1988 | 58,514 | 60,807 | 274,515 | 787.4 | 3057.1 | 3897.1 | 4639.0 | 2409.6 | 2098.8 | 6916.1 | 9014.9 |
| MONTHLY | 57.991 | 60,853 | 274,381 | 786.6 | 3059.5 | 3898.1 | 4635.5 | 2410.2 |  |  |  |
| 1988- | 58,990 | 60,706 | 275,503 | 790.3 | 3069.6 | 3915.4 | 4672.2 | 2417.2 | 2098.2 2113.5 | 6920.5 6968.7 | 9018.7 9082.2 |
| 1989-JAN. | 58,708 | 60,370 | 276,815 | 786.3 | 3065.9 | 3920.2 | 4676.3 | 2422.8 | 2121.8 | 7017.1 | 9138.9 |
| FEB. | 58,773 | 60,260 | 277,598 | 787.5 | 3069.4 | 3929.5 | 4689.4 | 2451.9 | 2137.8 | 7069.2 | 9207.0 |
| MAR. | 58,041 | 59,854 | 278,676 | 786.3 | 3078.5 | 3950.8 | 4724.5 | 2464.9 | 2158.7 | 7110.5 | 9269.2 |
| APR. | 57,174 | 59,463 | 278,753 | 783.2 | 3080.9 | 3958.8 | 4750.1 | 2470.9 | 2168.8 | 7158.8 | 9327.6 |
| Mar | 57,020 | 58,740 | 278,427 | 773.4 | 3072.3 | 3954.8 | 4746.1 | 2486.3 | 2176.4 | 7212.9 | 9389.3 |
| JUNE | 56,860 | 58,350 | 279,060 | 770.3 | 3088.0 | 3973.4 | 4759.0 | 2496.8 | 2184.2 | 7259.9 | 9444.1 |
| JULY | 58,004 | 58,698 | 280,014 | 777.2 | 3117.5 | 4002.5 | 4793.4 | 2518.1 | 2183.9 | 7310.6 | 9494.4 |
| ALUG. | 58,079 | 58,753 | 280,288 | 777.4 | 3136.5 | 4009.0 | 4812.9 | 2534.4 | 2199.9 | 7359.0 | 9558.9 |
| SEP. | 58,530 | 59,223 | 282,045 | 781.1 | 3156.2 | 4012.4 | 4824.9 | 2544.1 | 2220.1 | 7395.2 | 9615.3 |
| OCT. NOV. $P$ | $\begin{aligned} & 59,066 \\ & 59,216 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 59,621 \\ & 59,565 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 282,703 \\ & 283,033 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 787.7 \\ & 790.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 3176.8 \\ 3199.1 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 4027.4 \\ & 4047.5 \end{aligned}$ | 4853.4 | $\begin{aligned} & 2575.5 \\ & 2584.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2238.3 \\ & 2259.4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 7443.4 \\ & 7495.8 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 9681.7 \\ & 9755.3 \end{aligned}$ |
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1. Reserves data are in millions of dollars, and have been adjusted for discontimuities, adjacent months, and have been adjusted to remove discontinuities. p-preliminary



[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ In some cases, original copies needed to be photocopied before being scanned into electronic format. All scanned images were deskewed (to remove the effects of printer- and scanner-introduced tilting) and lightly cleaned (to remove dark spots caused by staple holes, hole punches, and other blemishes caused after initial printing).
    ${ }^{2}$ A two-step process was used. An advanced optimal character recognition computer program (OCR) first created electronic text from the document image. Where the OCR results were inconclusive, staff checked and corrected the text as necessary. Please note that the numbers and text in charts and tables were not reliably recognized by the OCR process and were not checked or corrected by staff.

[^1]:    1. Seasonal borrowing declined from $\$ 150$ million immediately after the last FOMC meeting to $\$ 90$ million in the maintenance period ended Hednesday, December 13.
    2. The reserve injection on Wednesday was in the form of a 5-day System RP over the period spanning Thanksgiving and the subsequent weekend. The market's perception of ease was reinforced by a newspaper's stories on Friday reporting confimmation by "government officials." Reserves were absorbed on Eriday, but the federal funds rate did not return to around 8-1/2 percent until the earlier than usual draining operation on Monday.
[^2]:    4. The RTC neither advanced funds nor resolved any cases in November, though insolvent thrifts continued to enter conservatorship. The pace of resolutions has been slowed by the absence of a formal strategic plan of action (one has been out for public comment) and concerns about insufficient working capital.
[^3]:    5. Seasonal borrowing may drop a little further into January, but declines should be less than over the most recent intermeeting period.
[^4]:    7. The federal funds rate may temporarily exceed this level around year-end; markets now appear to have built in funds rates in the area of 10 percent over the long New Year's weekend.
    8. The staff does not believe that the availability of foreign currency deposits in the United States beginning in January will have much impact on the monetary aggregates. Such deposits will be excluded from the aggregates, and the amount of shifting to foreign currency accounts from dollar deposits in the aggregates is expected to be small.
