Abstract: Although margin requirements would arise naturally in the context of
unregulated trading of clearinghouse-guaranteed derivative contracts,
the margin requirements on U.S. exchange-traded derivative products
are subject to government regulatory oversight. At present, two
alternative methodologies are used for margining exchange-traded
derivative contracts. Customer positions in securities and securities
options are margined using a strategy-based approach. Futures,
futures-options, and securities-option clearinghouse margins are set
using a portfolio margining system. This study evaluates the relative
efficiency of these alternative margining techniques using data on
S&P500 futures-option contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange. The results indicate that the portfolio margining approach
is a much more efficient system for collateralizing the one-day risk
exposures of equity derivative portfolios. Given the overwhelming
efficiency advantage of the portfolio approach, the simultaneous
existence of these alternative margining methods is somewhat puzzling.
It is argued that the co-existence of these systems can in part be
explained in the context of Kane's (1984) model of regulatory
competition. The efficiency comparison also provides insight into
other industry and regulatory issues including the design of bilateral
collateralization agreements and the efficiency of alternative schemes
that have been proposed for setting regulatory capital requirements
for market risk in banks and other financial institutions.
Keywords: Margin requirements, regulatory competition
Full paper (294 KB PDF)
| Full paper (246 KB Postscript)
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