Abstract: While economists generally agree that workers pay for their health
insurance costs through reduced wages, there has been little thought
devoted to the level at which these costs are passed on: Is each
employee's wage reduced by the amount of his or her own health costs,
by the average health costs of employees in the firm, or by some amount
in between? This paper analyzes one dimension of the question of how
firms pass health costs to workers. Using cross-city variation in health
costs, I test whether older workers pay for their higher
health costs in the form of lower wages. I find that in cities where
health insurance costs are high, the age/wage profile is flatter,
indicating that older workers do pay for their higher
health costs in the form of reduced wages. This finding is robust
to the inclusion of several other city-specific variables that might
also affect age/wage profiles and that could be correlated with health
insurance costs. I also find that workers who choose family health
insurance coverage pay for the added employer costs through reduced
wages.
Keywords: Health insurance, emloyee benefits, incidence
Full paper (2695 KB PDF)
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Last update: May 14, 1999
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