The Risk of Returning to the Effective Lower Bound: An Implication for Inflation Dynamics after Lift-Off, Accessible Data
Accessible version of figures
Figure 1: Unconditional Distribution of Inflation
Note: Authors' calculation as described in Hills, Nakata, and Schmidt (2016)
This histogram shows the unconditional distribution of inflation from the empirical model described in Hills, Nakata, and Schmidt (2016). The dashed black vertical line marks the central bank's inflation target (2 percent); the solid black vertical line marks the risky steady state inflation (1.71 percent); the solid red vertical line marks the average inflation (1.66 percent). The histogram shows that the center of the distribution (the risky steady state inflation) is below the target rate of inflation and that the average inflation is below the center of the distribution.
Figure 2: The Effect of the ELB Risk on Projections
Note: Authors' calculation as described in Hills, Nakata, and Schmidt (2016)
Policy Rate | Inflation | Output Gap | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Quarter | With ELB Risk | Without ELB Risk | With ELB Risk | Without ELB Risk | With ELB Risk | Without ELB Risk |
1 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.50 | 0.50 | -7.00 | -7.00 |
2 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.54 | 0.54 | -8.31 | -7.48 |
3 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.62 | 0.63 | -7.81 | -6.44 |
4 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.72 | 0.75 | -6.59 | -4.89 |
5 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.83 | 0.87 | -5.17 | -3.33 |
6 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.94 | 0.98 | -3.80 | -1.95 |
7 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 1.04 | 1.08 | -2.59 | -0.83 |
8 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 1.13 | 1.17 | -1.57 | 0.01 |
9 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 1.20 | 1.26 | -0.75 | 0.61 |
10 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 1.28 | 1.33 | -0.12 | 1.03 |
11 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 1.33 | 1.40 | 0.34 | 1.25 |
12 | 0.13 | 0.65 | 1.39 | 1.46 | 0.65 | 1.28 |
13 | 0.13 | 1.17 | 1.43 | 1.51 | 0.83 | 1.21 |
14 | 0.56 | 1.60 | 1.47 | 1.56 | 0.87 | 1.12 |
15 | 1.01 | 1.96 | 1.50 | 1.61 | 0.82 | 1.02 |
16 | 1.38 | 2.25 | 1.53 | 1.64 | 0.76 | 0.92 |
17 | 1.67 | 2.49 | 1.55 | 1.68 | 0.69 | 0.83 |
18 | 1.91 | 2.69 | 1.57 | 1.71 | 0.63 | 0.76 |
19 | 2.10 | 2.86 | 1.58 | 1.74 | 0.58 | 0.69 |
20 | 2.26 | 3.00 | 1.60 | 1.77 | 0.54 | 0.63 |
21 | 2.38 | 3.11 | 1.61 | 1.79 | 0.51 | 0.57 |
22 | 2.49 | 3.21 | 1.62 | 1.81 | 0.48 | 0.52 |
23 | 2.58 | 3.30 | 1.63 | 1.83 | 0.46 | 0.48 |
24 | 2.65 | 3.37 | 1.64 | 1.85 | 0.44 | 0.43 |
25 | 2.71 | 3.43 | 1.65 | 1.86 | 0.43 | 0.40 |
26 | 2.76 | 3.48 | 1.66 | 1.88 | 0.42 | 0.36 |
27 | 2.80 | 3.52 | 1.66 | 1.89 | 0.41 | 0.33 |
28 | 2.84 | 3.55 | 1.67 | 1.90 | 0.40 | 0.30 |
29 | 2.87 | 3.59 | 1.67 | 1.91 | 0.39 | 0.27 |
30 | 2.89 | 3.61 | 1.68 | 1.92 | 0.39 | 0.25 |
31 | 2.92 | 3.63 | 1.68 | 1.93 | 0.38 | 0.22 |
32 | 2.94 | 3.65 | 1.68 | 1.94 | 0.37 | 0.20 |
33 | 2.95 | 3.67 | 1.69 | 1.94 | 0.37 | 0.18 |
34 | 2.96 | 3.68 | 1.69 | 1.95 | 0.36 | 0.17 |
35 | 2.98 | 3.69 | 1.69 | 1.95 | 0.36 | 0.15 |
36 | 2.99 | 3.70 | 1.69 | 1.96 | 0.36 | 0.13 |
37 | 2.99 | 3.71 | 1.69 | 1.96 | 0.35 | 0.12 |
38 | 3.00 | 3.72 | 1.69 | 1.97 | 0.35 | 0.11 |
39 | 3.01 | 3.72 | 1.70 | 1.97 | 0.35 | 0.10 |
40 | 3.01 | 3.73 | 1.70 | 1.97 | 0.34 | 0.09 |
Figure 3: Long-Run Policy Rate and Deflationary Bias
Note: Authors' calculation as described in Hills, Nakata, and Schmidt (2016)
DSS Policy Rate | Probability of being at the ELB | RSS Inflation With ELB Constraint | RSS Inflation Without ELB Constraint | RSS Output Gap With ELB Constraint | RSS Output Gap Without ELB Constraint | RSS Policy Rate With ELB Constraint | RSS Policy Rate Without ELB Constraint |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
3.3500 | 28.43 | 1.46 | 1.88 | 0.69 | 0.04 | 2.14 | 2.97 |
3.3750 | 26.93 | 1.50 | 1.88 | 0.63 | 0.04 | 2.24 | 2.99 |
3.5000 | 21.87 | 1.60 | 1.88 | 0.48 | 0.04 | 2.58 | 3.12 |
3.6250 | 18.51 | 1.66 | 1.88 | 0.39 | 0.04 | 2.83 | 3.24 |
3.7500 | 15.86 | 1.71 | 1.88 | 0.32 | 0.04 | 3.04 | 3.37 |
3.8750 | 13.70 | 1.74 | 1.88 | 0.27 | 0.04 | 3.23 | 3.49 |
4.0000 | 11.94 | 1.76 | 1.88 | 0.23 | 0.04 | 3.40 | 3.62 |
4.1250 | 10.40 | 1.78 | 1.88 | 0.20 | 0.04 | 3.56 | 3.75 |
4.2500 | 9.06 | 1.80 | 1.88 | 0.18 | 0.04 | 3.72 | 3.87 |