Abstract: Central banks pay close attention to inflation expectations.
In standard models, however, inflation expectations are tied
down by the assumption of rational expectations and should
be of little independent interest to policy makers. In this paper,
we relax the assumption of rational expectations with perfect
knowledge and reexamine the role of inflation expectations in
the economy and in the conduct of monetary policy. Agents are
assumed to have imperfect knowledge of the precise structure
of the economy and the policymakers' preferences. Expectations
are governed by a perpetual learning technology. With learning,
disturbances can give rise to endogenous inflation scares, that
is, significant and persistent deviations of inflation expectations
from those implied by rational expectations. The presence of
learning increases the sensitivity of inflation expectations and the
term structure of interest rates to economic shocks, in line with
the empirical evidence. We also explore the role of private
inflation expectations for the conduct of efficient monetary policy.
Under rational expectations, inflation expectations equal a linear
combination of macroeconomic variables and as such provide no
additional information to the policy maker. In contrast, under
learning, private inflation expectations follow a time-varying
process and provide useful information for the conduct of
monetary policy.
Keywords: Inflation forecasts, policy rules, rational expectations, learning
Full paper (207 KB PDF)
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Last update: August 15, 2003
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