Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
International Finance Discussion Papers
Number 906, November 2007 --- Screen Reader
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Abstract:
This paper uses an open economy DSGE model to explore how trade openness affects the transmission of domestic shocks. For some calibrations, closed and open economies appear dramatically different, reminiscent of the implications of Mundell-Fleming style models. However, we argue such stark differences hinge on calibrations that impose an implausibly high trade price elasticity and Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Overall, our results suggest that the main effects of openness are on the composition of expenditure, and on the wedge between consumer and domestic prices, rather than on the response of aggregate output and domestic prices.
Keywords: Open economy Phillips Curve, Variable markups, Imported intermediate inputs.
JEL classification: F41, F47, E52.
With the rapid expansion in world trade during the past two decades, policymakers have become increasingly interested in the consequences of greater trade openness for macroeconomic behavior. Considerable attention has focused on how external shocks may play a more prominent role in driving domestic fluctuations as trade linkages grow, and as developing countries such as China exert a progressively larger influence on global energy and commodity prices. Our paper examines a different aspect of globalization that has received less scrutiny in the recent literature. In particular, we investigate whether changes in trade openness are likely to have a substantial impact on the transmission of domestic shocks.
Economists have long recognized that openness could potentially affect the responses of real activity to domestic shocks, including to monetary and fiscal policy. The Mundell (1962) and Fleming (1962) framework showed that fiscal shocks could have dramatically different effects depending on whether an economy was open or closed: in contrast to the stimulative effect of a government spending rise on output in a closed economy, the same shock had no effect on output in an open economy, as real exchange rate appreciation crowded out real net exports.
A longstanding literature has also assessed the implications of openness for the effects of domestic shocks on inflation. Perhaps most obviously, economists drew attention to the potential divergence between domestic prices and consumer prices in an open economy, reflecting the sensitivity of the latter to import prices. But important contributions in the 1970s and early 1980s also analyzed how the behavior of domestic price-setting could be affected by openness. Influential work by Dornbusch (1983) linked the desired markup in a monopolistic competition framework to the real exchange rate, and showed how the markup could be expected to decline in response to real exchange rate appreciation (reflecting increased competitive pressure from abroad). In an NBER conference volume nearly a quarter century ago, Dornbusch and Fischer (1984) used this framework to argue that changes in the slope of the Phillips Curve due to increased trade openness were likely to have substantial implications for the transmission of monetary and fiscal policy. Specifically, these authors argued that monetary shocks were likely to cause domestic prices to respond more quickly due to an effective steepening of the Phillips Curve.
In this paper, we use a two country DSGE modeling framework to revisit the question of how changes in trade openness affect the economy's responses to monetary and fiscal shocks, as well as to a representative supply shock.1Our analysis is heavily influenced by several important papers that compare the characteristics of optimal policy rules in closed and open economies by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2001), Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2002), and Galí and Monacelli (2005).2 However, the main objective of these papers was to highlight conditions under which the policy problem in closed and open economies was formally similar: under such conditions, policy prescriptions from the closed economy carried over to the open economy with suitable changes in parameters. Our paper differs substantially insofar as its objective is to provide a quantitative assessment of the differences in the transmission channel as the trade openness of the economy varies.
We focus much of our analysis on a simple "workhorse" open
economy model that extends Galí and Monacelli (2005) by incorporating nominal
wage rigidities and additional shocks. Although our model allows
for spillover effects between the two countries, it can be
approximated by a system of dynamic equations that parallels the
closed economy model of Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) in the special case in which
the home country's share of world output becomes arbitrarily small.
As in the Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) model, the presence of nominal wage
rigidities confronts the policymaker with a tradeoff between
stabilizing inflation and the output (or employment) gap. The
parsimonious structure of our open economy model makes it easy to
identify the economic channels through which openness affects
aggregate demand and supply, and hence the tradeoffs confronting
policymakers. But while distinguishing these channels is useful for
heuristic purposes, the differences between the closed and open
economies can be attributed to effects on a single composite
parameter that affects the behavioral equations in the same way as
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter () in a closed economy model: i.e., by affecting the
interest elasticity of aggregate demand, and the wealth effect on
labor supply.3 Given that this parameter can be
expressed as a weighted average of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and the trade price elasticity, where the weight on
the latter varies directly with openness, it is straightforward to
assess how changes in openness affect equilibrium responses under a
wide range of calibrations.
Our analysis shows that, in principle, there could be very pronounced divergence in the effects of the domestic shocks on output and domestic inflation as trade openness increases. In particular, with both a very high trade price elasticity and Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the enhanced ability to smooth consumption in the open economy markedly alters the wealth effect of shocks on labor supply, and the slope of the household's MRS schedule (tending to flatten it). These changes can have substantial effects on aggregate supply, and through their effect on marginal costs, on domestic inflation and output. Moreover, on the aggregate demand side, higher openness increases the effective interest-elasticity of the economy, provided that the trade price elasticity is higher than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. In the extreme case in which the trade price elasticity becomes infinitely high, our workhorse model in fact implies that government spending shocks have no effect on output.
However, under more empirically plausible values of the trade price elasticity, the structural relations determining domestic inflation are not very sensitive to the parameters determining openness. The interest-sensitivity of aggregate demand, or "slope" of the New Keynesian IS curve, exhibits somewhat more variation with openness, reflecting that the trade price elasticity (of 1-1/2) is much higher than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption under our benchmark calibration (so that putting a larger weight on the former, as occurs with greater openness, increases the interest-sensitivity of the economy). Overall, although openness does exert some effect on the responses of domestic inflation, output, and real interest rates to the inflation target change, government spending, and technology shocks we consider, the size of the changes seems quite modest given the wide range of variation in the trade share examined (from 0 to 35 percent). The main implications of openness are apparent in the composition of the expenditure response, with exports playing a larger role in a highly open economy, and in the wedge between consumer and domestic prices.
We then proceed to consider several variants of our workhorse model. First, we compare incomplete markets with the complete markets setting, and again conclude that openness exerts fairly small effects unless the trade price elasticity and Frisch elasticity of labor supply are quite high. Second, we consider endogenous capital accumulation, and find that the differences between closed and open economies are even smaller than in our workhorse model, reflecting in part that endogenous capital boosts the interest-rate elasticity of domestic demand. Third, we consider a specification in which imports are used as intermediate goods; for reasonable calibrations of the import share, it seems to have small effects on our results. Fourth, we examine the implications of a framework that allows for both local currency pricing (as in Betts and Devereux (1996) and Devereux and Engel (2002) and variable desired markups in the spirit of Dornbusch. We find that these mechanisms can amplify differences in the response of domestic inflation as the degree of openness varies. For example, domestic inflation falls by less in response to a positive technology shock in a highly open economy, reflecting that the associated exchange rate depreciation reduces the price competitiveness of imports (which encourages domestic producers to boost their markups). However, large differences in trade openness appear required for these effects to show through quantitatively.
A natural question is whether the alternative specifications suggested above would affect our conclusions if they were incorporated into our model jointly rather than in isolation. We address this question by examining the responses of the SIGMA model. SIGMA is a multicountry DSGE model used at the Federal Reserve Board for policy simulations, and is well-suited to address this question insofar as it includes many of the key features of the workhorse model and the variants, as well as various real rigidities designed to improve its empirical performance (e.g., adjustment costs on imports). We consider the responses of the SIGMA model to the same underlying shocks - including to the inflation target, government spending, and technology - and essentially corroborate our main finding that the responses of domestic inflation and output are not particularly sensitive to openness.
This paper is organized as follows. We begin by presenting the simulations of the SIGMA model in Section 2. This approach proves helpful both as a way of highlighting our main results, and for pointing out some restrictive features of the heuristic models discussed in the subsequent sections against the backdrop of this more general model (e.g., the implications of abstracting from capital accumulation in the workhorse model). Section 3 describes the workhorse model, and then assesses how openness affects the equilibrium under both flexible and sticky prices. Section 4 considers several modifications of the workhorse model. Section 5 concludes.
In this section, we use a two country version of the SIGMA model to illustrate how trade openness affects the propagation of three different domestic shocks, including a reduction in the central bank's target inflation rate, a rise in government spending, and a highly persistent rise in technology. In the case of the shock to the inflation target, we compare the model's implications to historical episodes of disinflation that occurred in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom during the early 1980s and early 1990s. Readers who wish to skip ahead to Sections 3 and 4 - in which we fully describe a much simpler workhorse DSGE model and some variants to investigate the same questions - may do so without loss of continuity.
SIGMA incorporates an array of nominal and real rigidities to help the model yield plausible implications across a broad spectrum of domestic and international shocks.4 On the aggregate demand side, it allows for habit persistence in consumption, costs of changing the level of investment, and costs of adjusting trade flows.5 Final consumption and investment goods are produced using both domestically-produced goods and imports. International financial markets are incomplete, so that households are restricted to borrowing or lending internationally through the medium of a non-state contingent bond. On the supply side, prices are set in staggered Calvo-style contracts in both the home and foreign market, with exporters setting their price in local currency terms, as in Betts and Devereux (1996) Devereux and Engel (2002). SIGMA embeds demand curves with non-constant elasticities (NCES) that induce 'strategic complementarity' in price setting (as in Kimball (1995)). In the spirit of Dornbusch (1983), this feature implies that the desired markup varies in response to real exchange rate fluctuations, creating an incentive for firms to charge different prices in home and foreign markets even under fully flexible prices. As shown by Bergin and Feenstra (2001), Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2006), and Gust and Sheets (2006), it can account for low exchange rate passthrough to import prices. Wages are also set in staggered Calvo-style contracts.6
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule in which the nominal interest rate responds to the deviation of domestic inflation from the central bank's inflation target and to the output gap. Government purchases are exogenous, have no direct effect on the utility of households, and are financed by lump-sum taxes.
Figure 1 shows the effects of a one percentage point permanent reduction in the home country's inflation target under three different calibrations of trade openness. The solid line shows the effects under our benchmark calibration based on U.S. data, so that the ratio of imports to GDP is 12 percent. The dashed line shows an alternative in which we lower the import share to 1 percent (labeled "nearly closed"), while the dotted line shows a second alternative in which the import share is 35 percent ("high openness").7 The horizontal axis shows quarters that have elapsed following the shock.
The effects of the reduction in the inflation target are qualitatively similar regardless of the degree of openness. The reduction in the inflation target requires policymakers to increase interest rates, causing output to contract and the real exchange rate (not shown) to appreciate. Private absorption falls in response to the higher interest rates, and exports also decline due to the induced appreciation of the real exchange rate. Both domestic and consumer price inflation fall, and roughly converge to their new target level after two years.
Perhaps somewhat remarkably, the responses of key macro aggregates - including output, domestic price inflation, and the real interest rate - show little quantitative variation with different degrees of openness. The sacrifice ratio - which we measure as the sum of (annualized) output gaps in the twenty quarters following the start of the disinflation, divided by the change in the inflation rate of one percentage point - is about 1.1 under each calibration. Aside from the slightly larger initial output decline under the high openness calibration, the main differences in the responses are compositional. For the highly open economy, more of the output contraction is attributable to a fall in real net exports; in addition, given the larger share of imported goods in the consumption basket, there is a greater disparity between the response of consumer price inflation and domestic price inflation.
The similarity in the responses of output, domestic price inflation, and the real interest rate is mainly attributable to two factors. First, the interest-sensitivity of aggregate demand only rises slightly as trade openness increases. Although our benchmark calibration imposes a rather high long-run trade price elasticity of 1-1/2, providing a strong channel (through the uncovered interest parity condition) for real interest rates to influence exports, private absorption has a comparable interest-sensitivity due to the high responsiveness of investment. This can be garnered from the bottom panels of the figure: exports only contract a bit more sharply than private absorption in response to higher real interest rates. This helps to explain why output only shows a slightly larger contraction under a 35 percent trade share than in the case in which the trade share is only 1 percent of GDP. 8 The second factor is that desired price markups and real marginal costs do not change significantly with greater openness, so that domestic price inflation responds very similarly across the different calibrations. Overall, these results do not indicate a significant quantitative "steepening" of the Phillips Curve due to greater openness in response to this particular shock.9
Interestingly, historical episodes of disinflation in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom seem reasonably supportive of the model's implications. Figure 2 shows the evolution of inflation (measured as the annual changes in the GDP deflator) and the output gap (as measured by the OECD) for the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom for two different periods of disinflation (the early 1980s and early 1990s). As seen in the left column of Figure 2, inflation in both the United States and Canada fell from roughly 10 percent to 4 percent during the disinflations that occurred during the early 1980s, while the output gap expanded (in absolute value) by roughly 6-7 percent in each country. The sacrifice ratio in the United Kingdom was somewhat lower during that episode, as inflation fell by considerably more, while the output gap expanded by a similar amount. In the 1990s, the three experiences also were reasonably similar, with Canada perhaps having a somewhat higher sacrifice ratio than the United States, and the United Kingdom a slightly lower sacrifice ratio. Thus, while the evidence is somewhat noisy, the sacrifice ratio does not appear to vary with openness in a systematic way.10
Figure 3 shows the effects of an increase in government spending.11 From a qualitative perspective, the government spending hike has similar effects on key macroeconomic variables across the alternative calibrations. The expansion in aggregate demand initially raises output and real interest rates. Higher real interest rates and an induced appreciation of the real exchange rate eventually cause output to revert towards baseline due to a crowding out of private domestic demand and real net exports. Domestic inflation rises because of a positive output gap, and because the expansion in the level of output puts additional upward pressure on marginal cost; the latter effect reflects the interplay of diminishing returns and nominal wage rigidity, so that the real wage remains above the level that would prevail under flexible wage adjustment.12
Comparing the alternative calibrations, it is evident that higher openness mitigates the rise in output, short-term real interest rates, and inflation. Quite intuitively, a highly open economy can rely on a decline in real net exports to alleviate pressure on domestic resources: under our benchmark calibration, this effect is large enough to imply that the fiscal shock imparts less stimulus to domestic output, and boosts interest rates by less. Nevertheless, the differences in the output responses are not especially pronounced given the wide variation in trade shares examined, and even differences in the response of short-term interest rates are small after a few years (i.e., given the expectations theory holds in our log-linearized model, longer-term real interest rates show much less divergence). Thus, the more salient differences across calibrations are in the composition of the expenditure response. In a relatively closed economy, falling private absorption (especially investment) bears the burden of adjustment, while a decline in real net exports is the catalyst for adjustment in a highly open economy.
The responses of domestic price inflation exhibit fairly substantial variation with trade openness, with the peak inflation response only about half as large in the highly open economy as in the nearly closed economy. Under a Taylor rule, the output gap (not shown) is smaller in the highly open economy, reflecting the higher interest elasticity of aggregate demand. Moreover, the smaller expansion in the level of output also puts less upward pressure on marginal costs (the latter is relevant because wages are sticky). Finally, given that the fall in import prices has a larger effect on consumer prices when trade openness is high, the responses of consumer price inflation show even more divergence than those of domestic inflation.
Figure 4 shows a persistent increase in the level of technology.13 The effects are qualitatively similar across the three calibrations. In each case, output has a hump-shaped response peaking around five or six quarters after the shock, both domestic and consumer price inflation fall on impact, and the real exchange rate depreciates.
The fall in domestic price inflation occurs because wages adjust slowly to their higher post-shock level. Openness tends to mute the decline in domestic price inflation through two channels. First, it reduces the magnitude of the rise in the real wage. This is because the real exchange rate depreciation retards the expansion in consumption as the economy becomes more open, so that the wealth effect on labor supply is smaller. Second, the depreciation of the real exchange rate and consequent rise in import prices induce domestic producers to raise their markup, as they feel less competition from foreign producers. In a more open economy, the pricing decisions of foreign exporters becomes relatively more important to the price decisions of domestic firms; thus, the rise in import prices plays a more noticeable role in moderating the fall in domestic prices.
Finally, there are pronounced differences in the composition of the output response as openness increases, with real exports playing a more prominent role, as well as in the degree of divergence between consumer and domestic price inflation. Notably, given that exchange rate depreciation pushes up import prices, consumer prices show much less of a decline in the highly open economy.
Our workhorse model builds heavily on the small open economy model of Galí and Monacelli (2005), which we extend to a two country setting. Because these countries may differ in population size, but are otherwise isomorphic, our exposition focuses on the "home" country. Each country in effect produces a single domestic output good, though we adopt a standard monopolistically competitive framework to rationalize stickiness in the aggregate price level. Households consume both the domestically-produced good and an imported good. Household preferences are assumed to be of the constant elasticity form, which allows us to analyze the implications of home bias, and a price elasticity of import demand different from unity. Finally, we generalize the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model by incorporating nominal wage rigidities.
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive households
indexed by
, each of which supplies a
differentiated labor service to an intermediate goods-producing
sector (the only producers demanding labor services in our
framework). It is convenient to assume that a representative labor
aggregator (or "employment agency") combines households' labor
hours in the same proportions as firms would choose. Thus, the
aggregator's demand for each household's labor is equal to the sum
of firms' demands. The aggregate labor index
has the Dixit-Stiglitz form:
![]() |
(1) |
where
and
is
hours worked by each member of household
. The
parameter
is the size of a household of type
. It determines the size of the home
country's population, and effectively the share of world output
produced by the home country in the steady state. The aggregator
minimizes the cost of producing a given amount of the aggregate
labor index, taking each household's wage rate
as given, and then
sells units of the labor index to the production sector at their
unit cost
:
![]() |
(2) |
It is natural to interpret as the
aggregate wage index. The aggregator's demand for the labor
services of a typical member of household
is given
by
![]() |
(3) |
The utility functional of household is
![]() |
(4) |
where
and
denote each household's
current consumption and hours of labor, respectively (which are
assumed to be identical across the household's individual members).
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption,
, satisfies
,
and we assume that
,
, and
.
Household faces a flow budget constraint in
period
which states that combined expenditure on
goods and on the net accumulation of financial assets must equal
its disposable income:
![]() |
(5) |
(where variables have been expressed in per capita terms). We
assume that household can trade a complete set of
contingent claims, with
denoting the price of an asset
that will pay one unit of domestic currency in a particular state
of nature at date
, and
the quantity of claims purchased
(for notational simplicity, we have suppressed all of the state
indices.) Each household purchases the consumption good at a price
, and earns (per capita) labor income
of
,
where
is an employment subsidy (designed
to allow the flexible price equilibrium to be efficient). Each
household also has a fixed stock of capital (
)
which it leases to firms at the rental rate
. It
receives an aliquot share
of the profits of
all firms, and pays lump sum taxes,
to the government. In
every period
, household
maximizes the
utility functional (4) with respect to
its consumption and holdings of contingent claims subject to its
budget constraint (5), taking bond
prices, the rental price of capital, and the price of the
consumption bundle as given.
We assume that household wages are determined by Calvo-style
staggered contracts subject to wage indexation. In particular, with
probability , each household is allowed to
reoptimize its wage contract. If a household is not allowed to
optimize its wage rate, it resets its wage according to
, where
. Household
chooses the value of
to maximize its utility functional (4), yielding the
following first-order condition:
![]() |
(6) |
where
is the marginal value of a unit
of consumption, and
. The
employment subsidy
is chosen to exactly
offset the monopolistic distortion
, so that the household's marginal
rate of substitution would equal the consumption real wage in the
absence of nominal wage rigidities.
Production of Domestic Intermediate
Goods. There is a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods
(indexed by
) in the home country, each of
which is produced by a single monopolistically competitive firm.
These differentiated goods are combined into a composite home good,
, according to
![]() |
(7) |
by a representative firm, or "domestic goods aggregator," that is
a perfect competitor in both output and input markets. The
aggregator's demand for good is given by:
![]() |
(8) |
where is the price of good
and
is an aggregate price index given
by
.
Intermediate good is produced by a
monopolistically competitive firm, whose output
is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production
function:
![]() |
(9) |
where and
denotes a
stationary, country-specific shock to the level of technology.
Intermediate goods producers face perfectly competitive factor
markets for hiring capital and labor. Thus, each firm chooses
and
, taking as given both
the rental price of capital
and the
aggregate wage index
. Within a country, both
capital and labor are completely mobile; thus, the standard static
first-order conditions for cost minimization imply that all firms
have identical marginal cost per unit of output:
![]() |
(10) |
Similar to household wages, the domestic-currency prices of
firms are determined according to Calvo-style staggered contracts
subject to indexation. In particular, firm faces a
constant probability,
, of being able to
re-optimize its price,
. If firm
can not re-optimize its price in period
,
the firm resets its price according to
where
. When firm
can re-optimize in period
,
the firm maximizes
![]() |
(11) |
taking
,
,
,
, and its
demand schedule as given. Here,
is the stochastic discount
factor,
is defined as
, and
is a production subsidy that is
calibrated to make the flexible price equilibrium
efficient.14 The first-order condition for
setting
is:
![]() |
(12) |
Production of Consumption
Goods. Final consumption goods are produced by a perfectly competitive
"consumption good distributor." The representative distributor
combines purchases of the domestically-produced composite good,
(obtained from the domestic goods
distributor), with an imported good,
, to
produce private consumption,
, according to a
CES production function:
![]() |
(13) |
We assume that the form of this CES aggregator mirrors the
preferences of households over consumption of domestically-produced
goods and imports. Accordingly, the quasi-share parameter
in equation (13) may be
interpreted as determining household preferences for foreign
relative to domestic goods. In the steady state,
is the share of imports in the
household's consumption bundle, so that the import share of the
economy is determined as the product of
and the (private) consumption
share of GDP.
The distributor sells its final consumption good to households
at price and also purchases the home and
foreign composite goods at their respective prices,
and
. We assume that producers of
the composite domestic and foreign goods practice producer currency
pricing. Accordingly,
, where
is the exchange rate expressed as units of domestic
currency required to purchase one unit of foreign currency and
is the price of the foreign
composite good in the foreign currency (we use an asterisk to
denote foreign variables). Profit maximization implies that the
demand schedules for the imported and domestically-produced
aggregate goods are given by:
![]() ![]() |
(14) |
The zero profit condition in the distribution sector implies:
![]() |
(15) |
According to equation (15), in an open
economy, the consumer price level depends on both domestic and
foreign prices, while if an economy is closed to trade (i.e.,
), consumer prices depend only
on domestic prices.
We assume that the central bank follows an interest rate reaction function:
![]() |
(16) |
where the variables have been specified as the logarithmic
deviation from its steady state value. The nominal interest rate
responds to the deviation of domestic price inflation from the
central bank's exogenous inflation target,
, and the deviation of output
from potential output (
), where potential
output is defined as the economy's level of output in the absence
of sticky wages and prices.
As noted above, openness can give rise to important differences between the domestic price level and the consumer price level. We specify a rule that responds to domestic price inflation rather than consumer price inflation in order to minimize differences between an open and closed economy that would simply be attributable to the monetary rule, rather than to differences in the underlying structure of the economy.
The government purchases some of the domestically produced good.
Government purchases, , are assumed to follow
an exogenous, stochastic process. The government's budget is
balanced every period so that lump sum taxes equal government
spending plus the subsidy to firms and households.
The home economy's aggregate resource constraint can be written as:
![]() |
(17) |
where the inclusion of the relative population size
reflects that all
variables are expressed in per capita terms, and
denotes the purchases of the
domestically-produced good by foreign final consumption producers.
Market clearing in the labor and capital markets implies:
![]() ![]() |
(18) |
Finally, we assume that the structure of the foreign economy is isomorphic to that of the home country.
Three key parameters that play a crucial role in influencing our
results are the price elasticity for trade,
, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
,
and the labor supply elasticity,
. While we
choose benchmark values of these parameters to be consistent with
our interpretation of the evidence, it is important to note that
there is wide range of values for these parameters used in the
literature and thus we also consider alternative calibrations.
For the trade price elasticity, we assume that
which implies
. This estimate
is towards the higher end of estimates derived using macroeconomic
data, which are typically below unity in the short run and near
unity in the long run (e.g., Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (2000)). Nevertheless,
estimates of this elasticity following a tariff change are
typically much higher, and we consider higher values in alternative
calibrations.15
We choose the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to be an
intermediate value between estimates derived from two separate
literatures. In the micro literature, estimates of the coefficient
of relative risk aversion, which correspond to the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution suggest values in the
range of 0.2-0.7.16 In contrast, the business cycle
literature frequently uses log utility over consumption (i.e.,
) to be consistent with balanced
growth. We set
as a compromise between these
two different perspectives.
The parameter corresponds to the inverse of
the (Frisch) wage elasticity of labor supply. A vast amount of
evidence from micro-data suggests labor supply elasticities in the
range of 0.05-0.3, though the real business cycle literature tends
to use much higher values.17 We set
for
the benchmark calibration, which is at the upper end of estimates
from the micro data.
We choose the remaining parameters of the model as follows.
Given that the model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency, our
choice of
implies an annualized real
interest rate of 3 percent. The government spending share of output
is set to 18 percent, so
. We set the elasticity of
capital in production function,
and choose
so that hours worked are normalized to unity in
steady state. For the price and wage markup parameters, we choose
, and set the
corresponding subsidies to equivalent values,
. We choose
and
to be
consistent with four quarter contracts (subject to full
indexation). Finally, we set the relative population size of the
home economy (
) to 1/3. This value
implies that the home economy corresponds to 25 percent of world
output, which is roughly consistent with the U.S. share of world
output.
It is useful to begin our analysis by investigating the behavior of a log-linearized version of the workhorse model under the assumption that wages and prices are fully flexible. For heuristic reasons, we conduct this analysis under the assumption that home country is a small enough fraction of world output that any spillovers to the foreign country (in particular, to interest rates and domestic demand) can be ignored. Insofar as we have verified by model simulations that spillovers from domestic shocks to the foreign sector are small even when the home country constitutes 25 percent of world output (as in our benchmark calibration), examining the model's implications under the assumption of a very small world output share yields considerable insight. Thus, our analysis here closely parallels that of Galí and Monacelli (2005), aside from modest differences arising from our inclusion of a government spending shock, and allowing for diminishing returns to labor. However, while their paper focused on the formal similarity between open and closed economy models, our goal is to explore the quantitative differences that arise as an economy becomes more open, and how these differences depend on underlying structural parameters such as trade price elasticities.
We begin by deriving a relationship between output and the domestic real interest rate, which Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002) have characterized as an open economy IS curve. Substituting the (log-linearized) production function for final consumption goods (13) into the resource constraint (17), the latter may be expressed:
![]() |
(19) |
where small letters denote the deviations of the logarithms of
variables from their corresponding level, and is the government share of output. The risk-sharing
condition under complete markets can be used to relate private
consumption to foreign consumption
and
to the terms of trade
:
![]() |
(20) |
where the parameter
denotes
the sensitivity of private consumption to the terms of trade. Using
the export and import demand functions, the difference between real
exports and imports
may be expressed:
![]() |
(21) |
Thus, real net exports depend on an activity term (rising as
foreign consumption expands relative to domestic consumption), and
on the terms of trade. Because a one percent deterioration of the
terms of trade raises exports by an amount equal to the export
price elasticity of demand , while
causing real imports to contract by
, the overall relative
price sensitivity of net exports is captured by the composite
parameter
.
Substituting these expressions into the resource constraint (19) yields:
![]() |
(22) |
or simply:
![]() |
(23) |
The parameter
may be interpreted as either the sensitivity of private aggregate
demand to the terms of trade, or the (absolute value of) the
sensitivity of private aggregate demand to the long-term real rate
of interest. The latter follows from the UIP condition:
![]() |
(24) |
where the long-term real interest rate is an
infinite sum of expected short-term real interest rates
. Alternatively, equation (23) can be
expressed in terms of the current short-term real interest rate to
yield an "open economy IS curve" of the form:
![]() |
(25) |
Based on the foregoing analysis, the interest-sensitivity of
private demand
can be regarded as a weighted
average of the interest-sensitivity of consumption
, and of real net exports
, with the interest-sensitivity
of the latter arising from the UIP relation, and depending on the
trade price elasticity. With some algebraic manipulation,
can be expressed alternatively
as a simple weighted average of the underlying structural
parameters
(the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption) and
(the price
elasticity of both exports and imports):
![]() |
(26) |
The quadratic weight
on
reflects both that consumption gets an effective
weight of
in private demand (as seen
from equation 22),
and that the elasticity of private consumption with respect to the
domestic real interest rate (
)
declines linearly as the share of foreign goods rises in the
domestic consumption bundle.
Equation (26)
provides confirmation of the intuitively plausible argument that
the interest-sensitivity of the economy should rise with openness
if the trade price elasticity is high relative to the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption; and conversely, if the
trade price elasticity is relatively low.18 Formally, the
derivative of
with respect to
equals
, and hence
rises if
. Thus, even if
consumption responded very little to the domestic real interest
rate - implying a low interest-elasticity of output in a closed
economy - output could still be highly interest-sensitive in an
open economy if the interest rate changes generated large movements
in real exports and imports (through their influence on the the
terms of trade).
From a quantitative perspective, the quadratic weights in
(26) imply that
openness can have very substantial implications for the
interest-sensitivity of the economy if there is a significant
divergence between the intertemporal elasticity and the trade price elasticity
.
This is apparent from Table 1, which shows how the
interest-elasticity of aggregate demand
varies with openness for
alternative values of
and
. For example, using a trade share of
, the weight on
in determining the interest-elasticity of private
demand is only
. In this case, an open
economy with
and
- as in our benchmark
calibration - implies
, or more than double the
interest-sensitivity of its closed economy counterpart. With an
even higher trade price elasticity of 6,
rises to 3.6, or more than
seven times its closed-economy counterpart. However, changes in the
effective interest-sensitivity of aggregate output due to openness
are almost certainly much smaller than suggested by this latter
computation, and probably significantly smaller than implied by our
workhorse model which ignores capital. As we show below, to the
extent that the disparity between the effective
interest-sensitivity of domestic demand and that of real trade
narrows in a model with capital accumulation, the
interest-sensitivity of the economy shows less variation with
openness.
We next turn to the determinants of employment, output, and the real wage (which we will refer to as potential employment, potential output, and the potential real wage in the model with sticky prices). If prices are flexible, firms behave identically in setting prices and hiring factor inputs, so that there is effectively a single representative firm. The labor demand schedule is derived directly from the representative firm's optimality condition for choosing its price, which equates the marginal product of labor to the product real wage (n.b., the product real wage is expressed in units of the domestically produced good). Thus, the (inverse) labor demand schedule may be expressed:
![]() |
(27) |
so that the "demand real wage"
varies inversely with hours
worked. Clearly, both the slope of this schedule and the manner in
which it is affected by shocks is identical to a closed economy.
The labor supply schedule is derived from the household's optimality condition equating its marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption to the consumption real wage. It is convenient to express labor supply in terms of the product real wage, so that:
![]() |
(28) |
where should be interpreted as the
marginal cost of working in terms of the domestically produced
good. The terms of trade enters as an additional shift variable. A
depreciation of the terms of trade shifts the labor supply schedule
inward, because a given product real wage translates into a smaller
consumption real wage.
For heuristic purposes, it is useful to derive a labor supply schedule that is expressed exclusively in terms of labor (or output) and endogenous shocks, as is familiar from the closed economy analogue, i.e.,
![]() |
(29) |
This is easily accomplished by using equation (23) to solve for the terms of trade in terms of output, and then the risk-sharing condition (20) to solve for consumption in terms of output. Finally, using the production function to solve for output in terms of labor, the labor supply function may be expressed:
![]() |
(30) |
It is clear from comparing equation (30) with its closed
economy analogue (29) that openness
can only alter the impact of domestic shocks on the labor market
through the parameter
. This parameter can be
interpreted as determining the wealth effect on labor supply in an
open economy, influencing both the slope of the labor supply
schedule, and how it is affected by shocks. Given the dependence of
the "primitive" labor supply schedule (28) on both
consumption and the terms of trade, the wealth effect in (30) captures the
effects of movements in both variables. From our earlier derivation
of the open-economy IS curve,
rises relative to the
intertemporal elasticity
if the trade price
elasticity
exceeds
.
Intuitively, a relatively high degree of substitutibility between
home and foreign goods should enhance opportunities for
international risk-sharing, serving to weaken the relationship
between consumption and output, and hence the wealth effect on
labor supply.
Figure 5
illustrates how openness affects labor market equilibrium in
response to a technology shock through changing both the slope of
the labor supply schedule, and the extent to which it shifts in
response to the shock. The left panel shows the response in a
closed economy, while the right panel shows the response in an open
economy. The technology shock shifts the labor demand schedule up
by one percent in both the closed and open economy (recalling that
this schedule is the same in each). In the closed economy, the
wealth effect on labor supply is determined by the parameter
(in equation (29)), which is
assumed to be less than unity. Accordingly, the wealth effect on
labor supply dominates the substitution effect. In the new
equilibrium at point B, hours worked decline, and the real wage
rises. Turning to the open economy case, the structural parameters
are assumed to imply a value of
in equation (30) that
significantly exceeds unity (as would occur with a high value of
the trade price elasticity, and high degree of openness). In this
case, the open economy MRS schedule shifts inward by much less
(i.e., from A to E) than its closed economy counterpart (from A to
D in the left panel). In addition to reducing the shift in the
schedule, the smaller wealth effect implies a flatter MRS schedule.
Accordingly, with the substitution effect dominating the wealth
effect, labor hours expand, and the real wage rises by less than in
the closed economy.
From a quantitative perspective, openness can have sizeable
macroeconomic consequences under calibrations of structural
parameters that imply a large wedge between
and
,
and that embed a high Frisch elasticity of labor supply
. The Frisch elasticity is
relevant because it determines the sensitivity of the MRS slope (of
). As the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply and the trade price elasticity become
very large, the labor supply schedule flattens, and also becomes
unresponsive to the technology and government spending shocks.
Under these limiting conditions, the productivity shock exerts a
large effect on output with no impact on the real wage. The
government spending shock has no effect on output, employment, or
wages, which is reminiscent of the dramatically different effects
of fiscal expansion on output in a closed versus open economy that
obtain in a traditional Mundell-Fleming style model.
However, although increased openness can have large effects in principle, it has much less dramatic implications for flexible-price employment, output, and the real wage under plausible calibrations. This is apparent from Tables 1 and 2, which show how the responses of these key variables in the flexible price equilibrium vary with openness under a wide range of values of the trade price elasticity and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption (the superscript "pot" on each variable is used to denote "potential" responses, meaning the responses under flexible prices and wages). Table 1 shows responses under a Frisch elasticity of 0.2, as in our benchmark calibration, while Table 2 considers a higher elasticity of unity. Importantly, for trade price elasticities in the empirically-reasonable neighborhood of 1 to 1.5, and a Frisch elasticity of unity or below, differences between the closed and open economy responses to a technology shock are quite small, and only modestly larger in the case of a government spending shock.
We next turn to analyzing the model's behavior in the presence of nominal wage and price rigidities. We continue to maintain the assumption that the relative share of the home economy in world output is arbitrarily small. In this case, the log-linearized behavioral equations can be expressed in a simple form that is essentially identical to that derived in the closed economy model of Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), aside from allowing for the indexation of wages and prices:
![]() |
(31) |
![]() |
(32) |
![]() |
(33) |
![]() |
(34) |
![]() |
(35) |
![]() |
(36) |
where is the output gap (i.e.,
),
is the employment gap (i.e.,
),
is the "potential" (or
"natural") rate of interest,
the potential real wage, and
the composite parameters are defined by
,
,
, and
. The potential level
of a variable is defined as the value it would assume if prices and
wages were fully flexible. The model is completed with the
inclusion of the monetary rule given in equation (16).
Equation (31)
parsimoniously expresses the open economy IS curve in terms of
output and real interest rate gaps. Thus, the output gap depends
inversely on the deviation of the real interest rate (
) from its potential
rate
. The price-setting equation
(32) specifies the
change in domestic price inflation to depend on the future expected
change in inflation and real marginal cost, where the latter is the
difference between the real wage and marginal product of labor. The
wage-setting equation (33) specifies the
change in wage inflation to depend on the future expected change in
wage inflation and the difference between the MRS and real wage
(both in product terms). The equations determining the MPL
(34) and MRS
(35) can be
specified to depend only on the real wage under flexible prices
, and the employment gap (or
equivalently, the output gap, since the latter is proportional).
Finally, equation (36) is an identity
for the evolution of the product real wage.
The log-linearized representation given by equations (31) - (36) is insightful
in helping to assess how openness affects the transmission of
domestic shocks under a given policy rule, and also the
policymaker's tradeoff frontier under certain commonly specified
loss functions. In particular, equations (31) - (36) identify
several channels through which openness can affect the economy. It
is evident from (31)
that openness can influence aggregate demand through affecting both
the potential real interest rate
, and the sensitivity of the
output gap to a given-sized real interest rate change (this
sensitivity is determined by
). The
interest-sensitivity of aggregate demand increases with openness if
the trade price elasticity exceeds the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption; conversely, the interest-sensitivity
decreases if the trade price elasticity is relatively low.
It is apparent that openness influences aggregate supply
directly through affecting the sensitivity of the household's MRS
to the employment gap, i.e., the parameter
in equation (35). The effects of
this slope change on price-setting are most pronounced in the
special case of fully flexible wages. In this case, equation
(35) implies that
the real wage can be expressed directly in terms of the potential
real wage and employment gap, i.e.,
.
Substituting for the real wage into the price-setting equation
(32), and for the
MPL using (34), yields an
"open economy New Keynesian Phillips Curve" similar to that
derived by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (aside from allowing for
indexation):
![]() |
(37) |
Given that
is determined by the capital
share - a small number equal to 0.35 under our benchmark
calibration - the slope of the Phillips Curve hinges crucially on
. Under the conditions
discussed previously in which openness markedly affects
, it also exerts substantial
effects on the Phillips Curve slope. For instance, if openness
significantly reduces
- as occurs under a high
Frisch elasticity and relatively high trade price elasticity -
marginal cost and hence price inflation are much less responsive to
the output gap in a highly open economy. In the presence of nominal
wage rigidities, however, the close linkage between the real wage
and employment gap is severed, with the implication that the MRS
slope has much less of a direct impact on the transmission of
shocks to marginal costs and price inflation. Even so, changes in
the MRS slope due to openness can have an important impact on the
behavior of wage inflation.
Openness also influences aggregate supply through altering the
response of the potential real wage
: from equations (32) - (35), it is evident
that
affects both price- and
wage-setting behavior. Because openness affects
through altering the MRS
slope
as well as the wealth effect
of shocks on labor supply (as discussed above, following equation
30), this provides
a second, albeit indirect, channel through which the MRS slope
affects aggregate supply. Importantly, changes in
due to openness can in
principle have substantial consequences for price-setting. To
see this, it is useful to substitute equation (34) into (32) to obtain:
![]() |
(38) |
Thus, in the presence of sticky nominal wages, price inflation
depends on the wage gap
in addition to
the employment gap
. Even a policy that
closed the employment (or output) gap would imply pressure on
inflation if real wages did not immediately adjust to their
potential level, implying a policymaker tradeoff between
stabilizing inflation and the employment gap. As might be expected,
the size of the real wage gap matters for this tradeoff, and for
the transmission of shocks to inflation. Because the actual real
wage adjusts sluggishly, the behavior of the wage gap depends
critically on the potential real wage, which varies with openness.
Accordingly, to the extent that openness reduces variation in the
potential real wage - as under our benchmark calibration - greater
openness can be expected to reduce the real wage gap associated
with a zero employment gap, allowing policymakers to come closer to
stabilizing both employment and inflation. But recalling Tables 1
and 2, openness does not exert large quantitative effects on
under reasonable
calibrations: even with the high Frisch elasticity of unity,
increased openness only has a modest effect in dampening the
response of
to real shocks.
Notwithstanding that it is helpful for economic interpretation
to think of openness as operating through several channels that
affect aggregate supply and demand, it is bears emphasizing that
the composite parameter
provides a summary statistic
for how the model economy is affected by openness. As an
implication, differences between closed and open economy responses
- including of nominal variables such as inflation - can only be
substantial under conditions that induce a significant disparity
between
and the intertemporal
substitution elasticity
. Moreover, while such
a wedge is clearly a sufficient condition for the IS curve
(31) to be affected
by openness, the effects of openness on the AS block still tend to
be quite small under plausible calibrations of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply.
These considerations are useful in interpreting how impulse
responses to the same three shocks considered above in our SIGMA
simulations depend on the openness of the economy. Figure 6 compares
responses to a 1 percentage point decline in the inflation target
under three calibrations of openness, ranging from a trade share of
1 percent of GDP under the "nearly closed" calibration, to 12
percent under our benchmark, to 35 percent under 'high
openness."19 It is evident that output contracts
by a somewhat larger amount in the highly open economy. The larger
output contraction occurs because the target reduction causes a
rise in real interest rates, and the interest-sensitivity of output
rises with greater openness in our benchmark calibration
(quantitatively, the interest-sensitivity
) rises from
0.5*(1-.18) = 0.41 under the "nearly closed" calibration to 0.90
in the high openness case). Price inflation also falls a bit more
as openness increases, reflecting the larger output contraction;
however, the low sensitivity of marginal cost to the employment gap
(i.e.,
in equation (34) is only 0.35)
accounts for the small quantitative differences in the
responses.20 Overall, given the wide differences
in the trade shares, the responses of aggregate output, inflation,
and the real interest rate seem quite unresponsive to openness. The
main differences are that exports account for a larger share of the
output contraction as openness increases (i.e., exports/GDP fall by
more), and that consumer price inflation falls more abruptly in the
highly open economy (as the real exchange rate appreciation exerts
a larger effect given the greater share of imported goods in the
household consumption bundle).
Figure 7 compares the
effects of a rise in government spending across the three
calibrations. The responses of output and inflation diverge
noticeably with openness, with output and inflation rising much
less under the high openness calibration. Because the Taylor rule
keeps output close to potential (), the
differences in the output responses mainly reflect that the wealth
effect on labor supply is smaller in a relatively open economy (as
noted in our discussion of the flexible price equilibrium). Given
sluggish wage adjustment, the smaller output expansion in turn
reduces pressure on marginal cost in the more open economy. In
terms of our discussion of (38), the real wage
gap
is smaller and
less persistent in a relatively open economy (as
falls by less), and hence
generates weaker pressure on inflation. Finally, the higher
interest-elasticity of aggregate demand translates into less real
interest rate adjustment in the highly open economy.
Figure 8
compares the effects of a highly persistent rise in technology. The
response of output is somewhat larger in the highly open
calibration, while the response of the real wage is smaller. To
understand this, recall from our discussion of the flexible price
equilibrium that greater openness (assuming
as under our benchmark
calibration) tends to damp the wealth effect of the shock on labor
supply. This boosts potential output - and thus accounts for some
of the larger output increase in the figure in the high openness
case - while reducing the rise in the flexible price real wage. The
smaller real wage gap (in absolute value) helps account for some of
the less pronounced decline in inflation. In addition, as we
discuss in Section 3.8, some of the disparity in the output and
inflation responses reflects that the Taylor rule in effect fails
to account for the higher interest-sensitivity of the economy as
openness increases; thus, an alternative policy that kept output at
potential would imply a smaller disparity in the output and
inflation responses than depicted in the figure.
But notwithstanding some differences, the salient feature of the foregoing results is that even substantial variation in openness seems to have fairly small effects on the responses, except in the case of the government spending shock. Moreover, the SIGMA simulations discussed in Section 2 indicate that some of the disparities in the responses to the fiscal shock would narrow with the inclusion of endogenous capital, and adjustment costs on the expenditure components; notably, endogenous capital would reduce the pronounced disparity between the interest elasticity of private absorption and of trade flows under our benchmark calibration, so that the interest elasticity of demand would rise by less as openness increased.
We conclude this section by illustrating a case in which
openness exerts fairly dramatic effects on the impulse responses of
the model. In particular, Figure 9 shows responses
to the technology shock under an alternative calibration that
imposes a very high trade price elasticity of 6, and a Frisch
elasticity of labor supply of unity. As seen in Table 2, the parameter
rises from 0.5 under the
"nearly closed" calibration to 3.6 in the high openness case,
consistent with roughly a halving of the slope of the MRS schedule
(from 3.5 to 1.8). Given that the wealth effect on labor supply
diminishes rapidly with greater openness under this calibration,
output exhibits a much more pronounced rise in the highly open
economy. The smaller rise in the real wage in the highly open
economy implies a much smaller real wage gap (in absolute value),
and accounts for why inflation falls only about half as much on
impact as in the closed economy. Accordingly, as suggested by the
figure, a policymaker concerned about the variability of domestic
price inflation and the output gap would face a markedly improved
tradeoff locus in the open economy. However, we emphasize that this
large divergence hinges on a high Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, and a fairly extreme assumption about the trade price
elasticity.
A limitation of our preceding analysis that characterized policy as following a simple (Taylor-style) interest rate reaction function is that it is difficult to disentangle what components of the transmission channel change with trade openness. In particular, it is hard to ascertain whether differences are attributable to disparities in the "IS" block of the model, i.e., in the interest-sensitivity of the economy, or in the equations governing aggregate supply.
Toward this end, it is useful to follow Taylor (1979) in characterizing the variance tradeoff frontier of the home economy. Accordingly, we assume that the monetary policy of the home country is determined by an optimal targeting rule that minimizes the following quadratic discounted loss function:
![]() |
(39) |
where
is the relative weight on the
output gap. The policymaker is assumed to minimize the loss
function subject to the log-linearized behavioral equations of the
model, while taking as given that monetary policy in the foreign
economy continues to follow a Taylor rule.21 This case
parallels related analysis in a closed economy setting (as in
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003)) insofar as the optimal policy
does not depend on the model's IS curve (at least given our
assumption that the policymaker's loss function does not penalize
interest rate variability).
The left panel of Figure 10 shows a policy
tradeoff frontier between inflation and output gap variability for
the case of a technology shock. The tradeoff frontier is obtained
by minimizing the policymaker's loss function (39) over all
possible values of
subject to the log-linearized
behavioral equations.22 For visual clarity, the tradeoff
frontiers are shown only for the alternative calibrations of a
highly open economy (in which the trade share is 35 percent), and
the nearly closed case (with a trade share of 1 percent). Under
either calibration, the standard deviation of inflation declines to
zero as the policymaker's weight on the output gap
declines to zero, while the
standard deviation of the output gap declines to zero as
approaches infinity.
As is familiar from closed-economy analysis, the presence of
wage rigidities gives rise to a tradeoff between stabilizing the
output gap and inflation. However, the striking feature of the
figure is that the tradeoff frontiers are virtually identical,
notwithstanding very pronounced differences in trade openness. This
similarity reflects that the only channels through which trade
openness can influence the tradeoff frontier is by affecting the
slope of the MRS schedule (recalling the MPL is invariant), or by
affecting the potential real wage
; as noted above, while
openness affects the slope of the IS curve and potential real
interest rate
, this is inconsequential for a
policymaker loss function such as (39) that does not
explicitly depend on the interest rate. Thus, insofar as it is
clear from Table 1 that the
potential real wage and slope of the MRS show little variation with
openness under our benchmark calibration, it is unsurprising that
the policy frontiers are nearly identical.
Although the policy tradeoff frontiers are nearly identical, the
right panel - which plots how interest rate volatility varies with
- shows that implementation of
the policy implies considerably less real interest variation in the
more open economy.23 This simply reflects that openness
markedly raises the interest sensitivity of the economy, even if
not the slope of the MRS schedule and
(as seen from Table 1,
rises from 0.5 in the closed
economy case to 1.1 when the trade share is 35 percent). Thus, some
of the relatively small differences in the transmission of the
technology shock shown in Figure 8 are in fact
attributable to the aggregate demand block of the model. For
example, the optimal rule that puts a high enough weight on output
gap stabilization to keep output at potential (i.e., a very large
) implies output and inflation
responses that are even closer than those depicted in Figure
8 (as easily
verified by plotting impulse responses for this calibration of the
optimal rule).
Figure 11
considers how the highly open and closed economy policy frontiers
shift given changes in key structural parameters that affect the
slope of the MRS schedule. The upper panel shows that even adopting
an extremely high value of the trade price elasticity of 3, and a fairly high Frisch elasticity of labor
supply of 0.5 (i.e.,
), is not sufficient
to induce much of a disparity between the tradeoff frontiers. Not
surprisingly, the high trade price elasticity does drive a large
wedge in the variability of the interest rate response associated
with any given policy rule, i.e., value of
.
The policy frontiers may show considerable more variation with
openness, but only under rather extreme calibrations. Thus, the
middle panel shows that the open economy tradeoff frontier would
move further inside the (nearly) closed economy frontier in the
case in which both the trade price elasticity and Frisch elasticity
of labor supply are extremely high (
, and the value of
of .05 implies a Frisch elasticity of 20). In this case,
the wealth effect dominates the behavior of the MRS slope, so that
the latter flattens considerably with openness. Provided that the
MPL slopes downward enough, the response of the potential real wage
is damped considerably as openness increases; and because real
wages are sticky, this improves the tradeoff locus open to
policymakers in the highly open economy. However, the manner in
which the tradeoff frontier varies with openness in an environment
with an extremely flat MRS tends to be quite sensitive to the slope
of the MPL schedule (unlike under our benchmark, in which the
frontier is much less sensitive to the slope of the MPL). As
illustrated by the last panel, the open economy tradeoff frontier
actually lies well outside the closed economy frontier if the MPL
slope is reduced to 0.05 in absolute value.
Our workhorse model made a number of simplifying assumptions to keep the analysis tractable. We now investigate the robustness of these conclusions to several extensions of the model, including incomplete asset markets, endogenous capital accumulation, imported intermediate goods, and local currency pricing.
Our baseline model assumes that asset markets are complete both domestically and internationally. However, as this is an extreme assumption, we now consider an alternative in which households only have access to a non-state contingent international bond.
Under this alternative, the household's budget constraint can be expressed as:
![]() |
(40) |
where
denotes the household's
purchases of the foreign bond,
is the price of the foreign bond
(in foreign currency), and
denotes state-contingent bonds
traded amongst domestic households. We follow Turnovsky (1985)
and assume there is an intermediation cost,
, paid by domestic
households for purchases of the international bond to ensure that
net foreign assets are stationary.24 This intermediation
cost depends on the ratio of economy wide holdings of net foreign
assets to nominal output (
):
![]() |
(41) |
and rises when the home country is a net debtor. We set
to be very small (
), which effectively
implies that uncovered interest rate parity holds in our model.
Given this alternative financial structure, the risk sharing condition (i.e., equation (20)) no longer holds and the domestic economy's level of net foreign assets influences model dynamics. To understand how, we begin by considering the demand side of the model. As in Section 3, it remains possible to derive a (log-linearized) open-economy IS curve of the form:
![]() |
(42) |
where
, and
.
This expression for the IS curve is the same as in the workhorse
model (expression (25)) except that it
involves the home country's net foreign asset position due to the
presence of the intermediation cost. Since we set
to be very small,
is very small, and the IS
curve is virtually unchanged vis-á-vis the workhorse model.
Under incomplete markets, however, the IS curve does not provide
a complete description of aggregate demand. Intuitively, the IS
curve determines how aggregate demand grows through time, but the
current level is only pinned down by the intertemporal budget
constraints of households, which at a national level constrains the
evolution of net foreign assets. Accordingly, the aggregate demand
block also includes a (log-linearized) law of motion specifying how
net foreign assets evolve given the
home country's net savings
:
![]() |
(43) |
where is the country's total income less
household and government expenditures (i.e.,
). Because consumption depends only on output and the terms of
trade (given the resource constraint and equation for real net
exports), net savings can also be expressed simply in terms of
output and the terms of trade. Finally, the terms of trade are
determined by a modified uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition,
which is the same as in the workhorse model except that it reflects
the presence of the intermediation cost:
![]() |
(44) |
where corresponds to the domestic long-term
real interest rate (see equation (24)).
Turning to aggregate supply, the MPL schedule remains unchanged under incomplete markets, as discussed in Section 3. However, the MRS schedule is influenced by the country's ability to borrow and lend, so that changes in the home country's net foreign asset position influence aggregate supply. In particular, the marginal rate of substitution (in product terms) can be written as:
![]() |
(45) |
This expression for the marginal rate of substitution is similar to
the one for the closed economy (i.e., equation (29)), except for
the inclusion of the last two terms involving net savings and the
terms of trade. Clearly, for the special case of , the terms of trade drops from the above equation,
so that the only difference between the closed and open economy
expression for the marginal rate of substitution involves the term
in net savings. An increase in net savings, all else equal, lowers
the marginal rate of substitution, which under flexible prices and
wages, lowers the product real wage. By contrast, this effect is
absent in a closed economy, since
.
The above discussion suggests that the effects of domestic shocks may diverge considerably between a closed and open economy if the IS curve slope is sensitive to the degree of trade openness (for the same reasons discussed in Section 3), or if the shocks exert large effects on net savings. To investigate the quantitative effects of openness under our benchmark calibration, the right column of Figure 12 shows the responses of output, domestic inflation, and consumption to a persistent rise in technology (the AR(1) coefficient equals 0.97) for different degrees of trade openness under incomplete markets; for point of reference, corresponding results under complete markets are shown in the left column. Clearly, under either financial structure, technology shocks have somewhat larger effects on output, and smaller effects on inflation, as the openness of the economy increases. This reflects that openness damps the expansion in consumption under either financial market structure: under complete markets, because of insurance arrangements, while under incomplete markets it reflects an increase in desired saving because current income exceeds permanent income. As observed in Section 3, the smaller implied wealth effect on labor supply translates into a larger output response, and mitigates the decline in inflation. Nevertheless, the differences in the responses of output and inflation appear fairly small given the large changes in openness examined. The modest size of the disparities reflects that home and foreign goods are not substitutable enough in our benchmark calibration to have large effects on the MRS schedule (i.e., net savings does not change enough to exert much of an effect on the MRS schedule given by equation (45)).
To demonstrate that there can potentially be large differences between an open and closed economy under incomplete markets, Figure 13 shows the effects of a more transitory technology shock (the AR(1) coefficient equals 0.8) on output under three alternative calibrations of the trade price elasticity and the Frisch labor supply elasticity. We consider a transitory shock rather than a permanent shock, because, regardless of the degree of openness, consumption will rise immediately to its new higher level in response to a permanent shock without any change in aggregate savings.
The top panel shows the effect on output under a trade price
elasticity of 6 (keeping the Frisch elasticity at its benchmark
value of 0.2, so ). The combination of the
more transient shock and greater substitutability between home and
foreign goods generates a larger increase in net savings in the
domestic economy, and hence larger output differences than under
the benchmark calibration. As shown in the middle and lower panels,
these differences in the output responses become even larger as the
labor supply curve becomes more elastic (i.e., a lower value of
) and as the trade price elasticity
increases. However, it bears reiterating that rather extreme
calibrations of the trade price elasticity (and a high Frisch
elasticity) seem required for the responses to show large
divergence based on openness.
We next investigate the robustness of our results to including endogenous investment into the workhorse model of Section 3. In the modified framework, households augment their stock of capital according to:
![]() |
(46) |
where and
denote household investment and the beginning of period
stock of capital, respectively. The household budget
constraint is also modified to reflect investment purchases:
![]() |
(47) |
In equation (47), denotes an adjustment cost given by:
![]() |
(48) |
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), it is costly to change the level of investment from the previous period. Investment goods are produced using the same technology as final consumption goods (see equation (13)), and hence require both the domestically-produced composite good as well as imports. The import share of investment goods and elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and imports in the production function for investment is assumed to be the same as for consumption.
The inclusion of endogenous investment tends to markedly boost the interest-sensitivity of domestic demand under plausible calibrations. Accordingly, as suggested by the SIGMA simulations in Section 2, the interest-sensitivity should be expected to rise less steeply with openness compared with the workhorse model; in fact, the aggregate interest-sensitivity of the economy can even decline with greater openness if investment is sufficiently interest-sensitive.
To illustrate these points, the upper panel of Figure 14 reexamines the
reduction in the inflation target shock in the augmented model with
investment. The calibration in the top panel sets the adjustment
cost on investment parameter
, which effectively serves to
equalize the interest elasticity of domestic demand and of real net
exports (notwithstanding that the interest elasticity of
consumption is unchanged from our benchmark calibration). In
contrast to the model with fixed capital (see Figure 6), which implied
a modestly larger output contraction in the highly open economy
relative to the closed economy, the response of both output and
inflation is nearly invariant to trade openness . The virtually
identical output responses reflect that the effective interest
sensitivity of domestic demand is very close to that of real net
exports, so that putting a higher weight on the latter as trade
openness rises has little effect on the overall interest
sensitivity of the economy. The similar output responses across the
calibrations translate into commensurate effects on marginal cost
and inflation.
The two lower panels consider alternative calibrations which
show that the general conditions highlighted in Section 3 as
potentially giving rise to large differences between closed and
open economies continue to remain operative under endogenous
capital accumulation. Thus, the middle panel considers the case in
which the trade price elasticity is set to 6, rather than 1.5 as in
our benchmark. In this case, the interest-sensitivity of real net
exports is much higher than that of domestic demand, so that the
aggregate interest-sensitivity of the economy rises with openness,
and output shows a larger contraction as openness increases. The
final panel keeps the trade price elasticity at its benchmark value
of 1.5, but increases the effective interest-sensitivity of
domestic demand relative to the first panel by reducing the
adjustment cost parameter to 0.01. In
this case, output contracts by somewhat more in the closed than in
the open economy.
Our workhorse model treats imports as finished goods. However, many imported goods are used as intermediate inputs in production, and their use in production may alter the transmission of domestic shocks.
To investigate this possibility, we follow McCallum and Nelson (1999)
and modify the production process of intermediate goods producers
discussed in Section 3 so that gross output of intermediate good
,
, is
produced according to the CES gross production function:
![]() |
(49) |
In the above, value-added for good is produced
via a Cobb-Douglas production function and combined with firm i's
purchases of the foreign aggregate good used as intermediate
inputs,
to produce the gross output of
good
. Also, the parameter
determines the share of imported
materials in gross production, and
is the
elasticity of substitution between value-added and imported
materials. We assume that capital, labor, and imported materials
are perfectly mobile across firms within a country so that all
firms have identical marginal costs per unit of gross output
(
):
![]() |
(50) |
where is marginal cost per unit of
value-added defined earlier as equation (10).
The inclusion of intermediate inputs in the model changes the home economy's resource constraint so that:
![]() |
(51) |
where
denote exports of the domestic
good used as an intermediate inputs. Market clearing in the factor
market for intermediate inputs is given by:
![]() |
(52) |
Relative to the workhorse model, allowing for fluctuations in
imported materials provides another channel through which openness
affects the MPL schedule. In particular, a terms of trade
appreciation increases labor demand by an amount that depends
crucially on the value of
.
An additional channel through which imported materials affects
the domestic economy is by altering the sensitivity of demand to
interest rates. As discussed in the Appendix, under the assumption
of flexible wages and so that value added
is linear in labor, the IS curve is given by:
![]() |
(53) |
where is a term reflecting the government
spending shock and foreign shocks. This expression confirms that it
remains possible to follow the basic logic of Section 3 to derive a
new composite parameter,
, which has the
interpretation of the elasticity of aggregate demand to real
interest rates. This elasticity
can be related to the one
obtained in the workhorse model,
, as follows:
. Accordingly, the interest rate sensitivity of demand can be
regarded as a weighted average of the interest-sensitivity of
consumption, real net exports of final goods, and real net exports
of intermediate inputs.
Because the elasticity of substitution between value added and
materials is fairly low, the inclusion of imported materials can
reduce the difference in interest-rate elasticities of demand
between an open and closed economy. For example, consider a share
of imported materials in gross production of 5 percent (
), and elasticity of
substitution between value added and materials of 1/3, as in
McCallum and Nelson (1999). With these values along with our benchmark
values for
,
,
, and
, then
instead of
.
The presence of imported materials also affects the pricing
decisions of intermediate producers by altering their marginal
costs. In particular, producers set gross output prices in a
staggered fashion rather than value-added prices, and the first
order condition for the price of good is:
![]() |
(54) |
where
now has an
interpretation as a gross output price and
.
Equation (54)
can be log-linearized and rewritten as:
![]() |
(55) |
where
corresponds to the marginal product of labor -- in terms of value
added -- described in Section 3. In the previous expression we have
written the marginal cost in terms of the value-added output to
make clear that with imported materials, gross output price
inflation depends on fluctuations in the terms of trade.
Relative to the workhorse model, allowing for fluctuations in
imported materials has two effects on the price equation. First,
the presence of materials inputs contribute to reducing the
pass-through from marginal cost to prices, thus resulting in
smaller price adjustments in response to higher nominal aggregate
demand. Second, since a more open economy may be associated with a
high fraction of imported materials in gross output production
(i.e., a larger
), fluctuations in the terms of
trade may have a greater influence on gross output price inflation
than in a closed economy.
To investigate the quantitative importance of imported
materials, Figure 15 shows the
effects of a technology shock for different degrees of openness. In
each case, we set
and calibrated
and
so that material imports account
for roughly 25 percent of total imports in each economy.25 As
in the workhorse model, the highly open economy experiences a
larger increase in output and smaller decline in inflation. The
inclusion of intermediate inputs tends to dampen the fall in
inflation in response to the technology shock, reflecting that the
fall in unit labor costs is offset to a greater degree by higher
import prices. However, the differences between the highly open
economy and the closed economy do not appear large, so that the
inclusion of intermediate goods only modestly amplifies the
differences evident in the workhorse model.
Our workhorse model assumed that the law of one price holds for each intermediate good. However, there is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that the law of one price does not hold. A related literature emphasizes that U.S. import prices at the point of entry respond less than one for one with a change in the exchange rate (i.e., exchange rate pass-through to U.S. import prices is incomplete).26 We now consider an alternative version of our model which can account for these findings.
In this alternative version, intermediate goods firms set different prices at home and abroad or 'price to market'. This pricing to market behavior arises for two reasons. First, we assume, as in Betts and Devereux (1996), intermediate goods' prices are sticky in local currency terms. We also work with aggregators for intermediate goods that have non-constant elasticities of demand as in Kimball (1995), implying that a firm may face different demand elasticities at home and abroad.27
To incorporate these features, we modify the problem of the
consumption goods distributor who purchases all of the intermediate
goods both at home and abroad to produce a final good that can be
used either for private consumption, , or
government consumption,
. Using the demand
aggregator discussed in Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2006), the final consumption good
distributor's demand for imported and domestic good
is given by:
![]() |
(56) |
![]() |
(57) |
As in Dotsey and King (2005), when , these
demand curves have a linear term which implies that the elasticity
of demand of producer
depends on its price
relative to an index of the prices
of its competitors (see below). When
, the
demand elasticity is constant and
has the interpretation
as the elasticity of substitution between home brands (i.e.,
is equivalent to
in the workhorse model).
and
are
price indices of domestic and imported goods given by:
![]() ![]() |
(58) |
while is a price index consisting of all
the prices of a firm's competitors:
![]() |
(59) |
Intermediate goods producers sell their products to the
consumption goods distributors and can charge different prices at
home and abroad. These prices are determined according to
Calvo-style contracts subject to indexation. The first order
condition associated with the optimal setting of the domestic price
of intermediate good (i.e.,
) is given by:
![]() |
(60) |
where the elasticity of demand for good in the
domestic market is:
![]() |
(61) |
With , as in Kimball (1995),
may be an increasing
function of a firm's price relative to its competitors, and a firm
will not want its desired price (i.e., its optimal price in the
absence of price rigidities) to deviate too far from its
competitors.
Equation (60) can be log-linearized and expressed as:
![]() |
(62) |
where
denotes the
steady state (net) markup over marginal cost,
is
the steady state value of
, and
denotes the aggregate elasticity between home and foreign goods in
steady state. The parameter
reflects
the degree of 'strategic' complementarity in price-setting (e.g.,
Woodford (2003)). That is, with
, a
firm's demand elasticity is constant, and this expression is the
same as in the workhorse model. With
,
there are variations in desired markups associated with changes in
a firm's price relative to its competitors. In this case, inflation
is less sensitive to marginal cost, and in the open economy more
sensitive to foreign prices. Furthermore, the importance of foreign
prices in affecting domestic inflation depends directly on the
degree of openness,
.
According to equation (62), foreign competition can influence domestic inflation through changes in desired markups. This expression is reminiscent of Dornbusch and Fischer (1984), who described how foreign competition could influence the desired markups of domestic firms and effectively change the slope of the Phillips curve. In particular, they argued that monetary shocks were likely to cause domestic prices in an open economy to respond more quickly, which they interpreted as a steepening of the slope of the Phillips Curve. From a qualitative perspective, monetary policy shocks can also steepen the Phillips curve in our model with variable markups. In particular, a monetary contraction occurring in response to a decrease in the central bank's inflation target lowers marginal cost and generates a real appreciation of the domestic currency. This appreciation lowers import prices relative to domestic prices, and domestic producers respond by reducing their desired markups. As a result, domestic price inflation can appear more sensitive to the fall in demand associated with the monetary contraction.
However, we emphasize that the source of the shock in our framework has crucial bearing for the question of whether inflation becomes more or less sensitive to aggregate demand. For example, in response to a government spending shock, inflation can appear less sensitive to demand. Higher government spending puts upward pressure on marginal cost but the real exchange rate appreciates. This appreciation reduces relative import prices, forcing domestic producers to lower their desired markups. This reduction in desired markups has the effect of making domestic price inflation less sensitive to the increase in aggregate demand.
A domestic firm also sets a sticky price in the local currency
of the foreign economy. These prices are also determined according
to Calvo-style contracts indexed to lagged foreign import price
inflation, with the log-linearized first order condition associated
with domestic producer
choice of a price to set in the
foreign market given by:
![]() |
(63) |
where
is
the real exchange rate in terms of domestic prices. This equation
implies that foreign import prices (i.e., domestic export prices in
units of the foreign currency) do not respond fully to changes in
domestic marginal cost, or to changes in real exchange rates. In
turn, the response of real trade flows is also muted. In contrast,
in the workhorse model, changes in exchange rates have a relatively
large effect on import prices and thus on real trade flows.
Figure 16 shows
the effects of a technology shock for different degrees of openness
in both the workhorse model with a constant elasticity of demand
and the model with variable markups and pricing to market. For the
model with variable markups, we set ,
such that the aggregate elasticity
equals its benchmark value of 1.5,
and
so that the steady state markup is 20
percent. Under our benchmark calibration, the variation in desired
markups mutes the responsiveness of import and export prices to
exchange rate changes and reduces the interest sensitivity of real
trade flows. Comparing the top panels, there is a smaller
difference in the response of output across the three calibrations
in the pricing to market model, reflecting the lower sensitivity of
aggregate demand to changes in interest rates. The response of
output is also more persistent in the model, reflecting the higher
degree of strategic complementarities associated with the variable
desired markups.
The higher degree of strategic complementarity also implies less pass-through from marginal cost to domestic prices. Hence, there is a smaller response of inflation in the variable desired markups model than the workhorse model, regardless of the degree of openness. In addition, there are relatively large differences in the response of domestic inflation across the three calibrations in the variable markups model. Given that import prices rise, domestic firms have an incentive to raise their markups in response to weaker competition from imports, thus mitigating the fall in domestic price inflation. This effect is clearly more important in a highly open economy than in a relatively closed economy.
In this paper, we used an open economy DSGE model to explore how trade openness affects the transmission of domestic shocks. Our results indicate that increased trade openness and international linkages are likely to have fairly modest implications for real activity and inflation, though more pronounced effects on the composition of expenditure and the wedge between consumer and domestic prices. Accordingly, to the extent that openness changes the behavior of the domestic economy, it seems plausible that the main effects would occur through an increased role of foreign shocks.
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This appendix describes how the presence of imported materials affect the overall elasticity of demand with respect to the real interest rate.
Proceeding as in Section 3, simple algebraic manipulations allow us to obtain a relationship among domestic output, the terms of trade, and domestic and foreign shocks. A log-linear approximation to the aggregate resource constraint can be written as follows:
Following the steps used in Section 3, the term in brackets
can be
written in terms of foreign consumption and terms of trade (i.e.
).
The task then is to find an expression that relates
to foreign variables and the
terms of trade. Import demand of materials in the foreign economy
is given by:28
Assuming that wages are flexible, we can use the MRS in the foreign economy to express the foreign product real wage real wage in terms of foreign variables and the terms of trade. Thus, domestic demand can be written in a more compact way as follows:
![]() |
|
![]() |
where
represents a combination of
foreign variables. Relative to the benchmark model, the previous
expression makes clear that fluctuations in imported materials
introduce an additional effect of the terms of trade on domestic
output, whose intensity depends upon the share of imported
materials on gross production (
), the share of imports of the
foreign economy (
) and the elasticity of
substitution of materials (
) and value
added in gross production. The previous expression can be
rearranged as follows:
where
is given by:
Assuming that the home economy is sufficiently small, we can rewrite this expression as:
If
, this expression is the same as
the one for the workhorse model.
Table 1: Slope of Reduced Form MRS Schedule
for Alternative Calibrations: Benchmark Frisch Elasticity (
)
Parameters | Parameters | Parameters | Parameters | Parameters | Flexible Price Responses to: Technology Shock | Flexible Price Responses to: Technology Shock | Flexible Price Responses to: Technology Shock | Flexible Price Responses to: Technology Shock | Flexible Price Responses to: Government Spending Shock | Flexible Price Responses to: Government Spending Shock | Flexible Price Responses to: Government Spending Shock |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | MRS Slope | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() |
0 | 0.25 | 1 | 0.25 | 12 | 0.6 | 0.49 | -0.25 | 0.74 | -0.82 | 0.33 | -0.18 |
0 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.5 | 9.7 | 0.72 | 0.59 | -0.098 | 0.68 | -0.98 | 0.2 | -0.11 |
0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8.7 | 0.79 | 0.65 | 0 | 0.65 | -1.1 | 0.11 | -0.058 |
0.12 | 0.25 | 1 | 0.42 | 10 | 0.36 | 0.56 | -0.13 | 0.7 | -0.49 | 0.22 | -0.12 |
0.12 | 0.25 | 1.5 | 0.53 | 9.6 | 0.3 | 0.59 | -0.088 | 0.68 | -0.41 | 0.19 | -0.1 |
0.12 | 0.25 | 6 | 1.5 | 8.4 | 0.12 | 0.67 | 0.038 | 0.64 | -0.16 | 0.074 | -0.04 |
0.12 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.61 | 9.3 | 0.53 | 0.61 | -0.064 | 0.67 | -0.73 | 0.17 | -0.089 |
0.12 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 0.72 | 9.1 | 0.46 | 0.62 | -0.039 | 0.66 | -0.63 | 0.14 | -0.077 |
0.12 | 0.5 | 6 | 1.7 | 8.3 | 0.21 | 0.68 | 0.048 | 0.63 | -0.29 | 0.066 | -0.035 |
0.12 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8.7 | 0.7 | 0.65 | 0 | 0.65 | -0.96 | 0.11 | -0.058 |
0.12 | 1 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 8.6 | 0.63 | 0.66 | 0.011 | 0.65 | -0.87 | 0.098 | -0.053 |
0.12 | 1 | 6 | 2.1 | 8.2 | 0.35 | 0.69 | 0.061 | 0.63 | -0.48 | 0.054 | -0.029 |
0.35 | 0.25 | 1 | 0.68 | 9.2 | 0.18 | 0.62 | -0.049 | 0.67 | -0.24 | 0.15 | -0.082 |
0.35 | 0.25 | 1.5 | 0.96 | 8.7 | 0.13 | 0.65 | -0.0047 | 0.65 | -0.18 | 0.11 | -0.061 |
0.35 | 0.25 | 6 | 3.3 | 8 | 0.039 | 0.7 | 0.082 | 0.62 | -0.053 | 0.035 | -0.019 |
0.35 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.79 | 9 | 0.32 | 0.63 | -0.028 | 0.66 | -0.43 | 0.13 | -0.072 |
0.35 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 8.6 | 0.24 | 0.65 | 0.0074 | 0.65 | -0.33 | 0.1 | -0.055 |
0.35 | 0.5 | 6 | 3.6 | 8 | 0.075 | 0.7 | 0.084 | 0.62 | -0.1 | 0.033 | -0.018 |
0.35 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8.7 | 0.51 | 0.65 | 0 | 0.65 | -0.7 | 0.11 | -0.058 |
0.35 | 1 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 8.5 | 0.41 | 0.67 | 0.025 | 0.64 | -0.56 | 0.086 | -0.046 |
0.35 | 1 | 6 | 3.8 | 8 | 0.14 | 0.71 | 0.087 | 0.62 | -0.2 | 0.031 | -0.017 |
Table 2: Slope of Reduced Form MRS Schedule
for Alternative Calibrations: Benchmark Frisch Elasticity: Higher Frisch Elasticity (
)
Parameters | Parameters | Parameters | Parameters | Parameters | Flexible Price Responses to: Technology Shock | Flexible Price Responses to: Technology Shock | Flexible Price Responses to: Technology Shock | Flexible Price Responses to: Technology Shock | Flexible Price Responses to: Government Spending Shock | Flexible Price Responses to: Government Spending Shock | Flexible Price Responses to: Government Spending Shock |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | MRS Slope | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() |
0 | 0.25 | 1 | 0.25 | 5.5 | 0.4 | 0.33 | -0.49 | 0.82 | -0.42 | 0.66 | -0.35 |
0 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.5 | 3.5 | 0.6 | 0.49 | -0.25 | 0.74 | -0.62 | 0.49 | -0.26 |
0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2.5 | 0.79 | 0.65 | 0 | 0.65 | -0.82 | 0.33 | -0.17 |
0.12 | 0.25 | 1 | 0.42 | 3.9 | 0.29 | 0.45 | -0.31 | 0.76 | -0.3 | 0.53 | -0.29 |
0.12 | 0.25 | 1.5 | 0.53 | 3.4 | 0.25 | 0.5 | -0.22 | 0.73 | -0.26 | 0.48 | -0.26 |
0.12 | 0.25 | 6 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 0.13 | 0.73 | 0.12 | 0.61 | -0.13 | 0.24 | -0.13 |
0.12 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.61 | 3.2 | 0.47 | 0.54 | -0.17 | 0.71 | -0.49 | 0.44 | -0.24 |
0.12 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 0.72 | 2.9 | 0.43 | 0.58 | -0.11 | 0.69 | -0.44 | 0.4 | -0.21 |
0.12 | 0.5 | 6 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 0.23 | 0.75 | 0.16 | 0.59 | -0.24 | 0.22 | -0.12 |
0.12 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2.5 | 0.7 | 0.65 | 0 | 0.65 | -0.72 | 0.33 | -0.17 |
0.12 | 1 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 2.4 | 0.65 | 0.67 | 0.034 | 0.64 | -0.67 | 0.3 | -0.16 |
0.12 | 1 | 6 | 2.1 | 2 | 0.39 | 0.78 | 0.21 | 0.58 | -0.41 | 0.19 | -0.1 |
0.35 | 0.25 | 1 | 0.68 | 3 | 0.16 | 0.56 | -0.13 | 0.7 | -0.17 | 0.42 | -0.22 |
0.35 | 0.25 | 1.5 | 0.96 | 2.6 | 0.13 | 0.64 | -0.014 | 0.65 | -0.13 | 0.33 | -0.18 |
0.35 | 0.25 | 6 | 3.3 | 1.8 | 0.046 | 0.84 | 0.29 | 0.55 | -0.048 | 0.13 | -0.068 |
0.35 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.79 | 2.8 | 0.3 | 0.6 | -0.081 | 0.68 | -0.31 | 0.38 | -0.2 |
0.35 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 2.5 | 0.24 | 0.66 | 0.022 | 0.64 | -0.25 | 0.31 | -0.17 |
0.35 | 0.5 | 6 | 3.6 | 1.8 | 0.091 | 0.85 | 0.3 | 0.54 | -0.094 | 0.12 | -0.064 |
0.35 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2.5 | 0.51 | 0.65 | 0 | 0.65 | -0.53 | 0.33 | -0.17 |
0.35 | 1 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 2.3 | 0.43 | 0.7 | 0.078 | 0.62 | -0.44 | 0.27 | -0.15 |
0.35 | 1 | 6 | 3.8 | 1.8 | 0.17 | 0.86 | 0.32 | 0.54 | -0.18 | 0.11 | -0.06 |
Figure 1: Permanent Reduction in the Inflation Target in SIGMA (Deviation from Steady State)
Data for Figure 1
Quarter | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly Closed | Output: High Openness | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Benchmark | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Nearly Closed | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: High Openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly Closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High Openness | Consumer Price Inflation: Benchmark | Consumer Price Inflation: Nearly Closed | Consumer Price Inflation: High Openness | Private Absorption: Benchmark | Private Absorption: Nearly Closed | Private Absorption: High Openness | Real Exports: Benchmark | Real Exports: Nearly Closed | Real Exports: High Openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.10 | 0.45 | 0.44 | 0.46 | -0.15 | -0.14 | -0.16 | -0.18 | -0.15 | -0.28 | -0.13 | -0.13 | -0.13 | -0.09 | -0.10 | -0.08 |
2 | -0.21 | -0.20 | -0.22 | 0.47 | 0.48 | 0.48 | -0.29 | -0.28 | -0.31 | -0.33 | -0.28 | -0.45 | -0.24 | -0.24 | -0.23 | -0.25 | -0.26 | -0.23 |
3 | -0.30 | -0.27 | -0.32 | 0.46 | 0.47 | 0.45 | -0.42 | -0.41 | -0.45 | -0.45 | -0.41 | -0.56 | -0.31 | -0.32 | -0.29 | -0.43 | -0.44 | -0.40 |
4 | -0.35 | -0.32 | -0.39 | 0.42 | 0.43 | 0.40 | -0.54 | -0.53 | -0.58 | -0.56 | -0.53 | -0.62 | -0.36 | -0.38 | -0.32 | -0.56 | -0.57 | -0.52 |
5 | -0.38 | -0.35 | -0.42 | 0.36 | 0.38 | 0.33 | -0.65 | -0.63 | -0.69 | -0.64 | -0.63 | -0.67 | -0.39 | -0.41 | -0.33 | -0.62 | -0.63 | -0.59 |
6 | -0.38 | -0.36 | -0.42 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.27 | -0.73 | -0.73 | -0.77 | -0.71 | -0.72 | -0.71 | -0.40 | -0.43 | -0.32 | -0.61 | -0.61 | -0.59 |
7 | -0.37 | -0.36 | -0.38 | 0.24 | 0.26 | 0.20 | -0.80 | -0.80 | -0.83 | -0.78 | -0.80 | -0.75 | -0.40 | -0.43 | -0.31 | -0.54 | -0.52 | -0.53 |
8 | -0.34 | -0.34 | -0.33 | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.15 | -0.86 | -0.86 | -0.88 | -0.83 | -0.86 | -0.80 | -0.39 | -0.42 | -0.29 | -0.43 | -0.39 | -0.45 |
9 | -0.30 | -0.32 | -0.27 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.11 | -0.90 | -0.91 | -0.91 | -0.88 | -0.91 | -0.84 | -0.37 | -0.40 | -0.27 | -0.30 | -0.24 | -0.35 |
10 | -0.26 | -0.30 | -0.21 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.07 | -0.93 | -0.95 | -0.93 | -0.91 | -0.95 | -0.88 | -0.35 | -0.37 | -0.25 | -0.17 | -0.09 | -0.25 |
11 | -0.23 | -0.27 | -0.17 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.05 | -0.95 | -0.97 | -0.94 | -0.94 | -0.97 | -0.91 | -0.32 | -0.34 | -0.23 | -0.07 | 0.04 | -0.17 |
12 | -0.20 | -0.25 | -0.13 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.03 | -0.96 | -0.99 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.99 | -0.94 | -0.29 | -0.31 | -0.22 | 0.01 | 0.13 | -0.11 |
13 | -0.17 | -0.22 | -0.11 | 0.00 | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.96 | -1.00 | -0.95 | -0.96 | -1.00 | -0.95 | -0.27 | -0.28 | -0.20 | 0.06 | 0.19 | -0.08 |
14 | -0.15 | -0.20 | -0.09 | -0.02 | -0.04 | 0.01 | -0.97 | -1.00 | -0.95 | -0.97 | -1.00 | -0.96 | -0.24 | -0.25 | -0.18 | 0.09 | 0.21 | -0.06 |
15 | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.09 | -0.03 | -0.06 | 0.00 | -0.96 | -0.99 | -0.95 | -0.97 | -0.99 | -0.96 | -0.22 | -0.22 | -0.17 | 0.09 | 0.20 | -0.05 |
16 | -0.13 | -0.15 | -0.08 | -0.04 | -0.07 | 0.00 | -0.96 | -0.99 | -0.95 | -0.96 | -0.99 | -0.96 | -0.20 | -0.19 | -0.15 | 0.07 | 0.17 | -0.05 |
17 | -0.12 | -0.14 | -0.08 | -0.04 | -0.07 | -0.01 | -0.95 | -0.98 | -0.95 | -0.96 | -0.98 | -0.95 | -0.18 | -0.17 | -0.14 | 0.05 | 0.13 | -0.05 |
18 | -0.11 | -0.12 | -0.07 | -0.04 | -0.07 | -0.01 | -0.95 | -0.97 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.97 | -0.95 | -0.17 | -0.15 | -0.13 | 0.02 | 0.07 | -0.06 |
19 | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.07 | -0.04 | -0.07 | -0.01 | -0.94 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.94 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.15 | -0.14 | -0.12 | -0.01 | 0.02 | -0.06 |
20 | -0.10 | -0.10 | -0.07 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.01 | -0.94 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.94 | -0.95 | -0.94 | -0.14 | -0.12 | -0.11 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.07 |
Figure 2: Disinflation Episodes in U.S., Canada, and the U.K.
Data for Figure 2 - Disinflation Episodes of the 1980s
Year / Quarter | US Disinflation Episodes of the 1980s: Output | US Disinflation Episodes of the 1980s: Inflation | Canada Disinflation Episodes of the 1980s: Output | Canada Disinflation Episodes of the 1980s: Inflation | UK Disinflation Episodes of the 1980s: Output | UK Disinflation Episodes of the 1980s: Inflation |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
78.75 | 2.86 | 7.35 | 0.54 | 6.47 | -2.79 | 14.31 |
79.00 | 3.41 | 7.29 | 0.74 | 7.61 | -2.47 | 14.26 |
79.25 | 2.83 | 7.57 | 0.95 | 8.69 | -1.48 | 12.99 |
79.50 | 2.17 | 8.25 | 1.45 | 9.85 | -1.32 | 13.19 |
79.75 | 2.14 | 8.78 | 1.46 | 10.54 | -0.74 | 11.80 |
80.00 | 1.64 | 8.65 | 1.36 | 10.76 | -0.09 | 10.97 |
80.25 | 1.20 | 9.02 | 1.60 | 10.48 | 0.24 | 10.78 |
80.50 | -1.58 | 8.75 | 0.66 | 9.58 | -1.03 | 10.82 |
80.75 | -2.49 | 8.87 | -0.16 | 9.71 | 2.70 | 10.63 |
81.00 | -1.40 | 9.69 | 0.15 | 10.59 | -0.19 | 17.31 |
81.25 | -0.14 | 10.19 | 1.75 | 11.60 | 0.45 | 19.09 |
81.50 | -1.63 | 9.84 | 1.79 | 11.50 | -0.89 | 20.24 |
81.75 | -1.17 | 9.31 | 0.18 | 10.92 | -3.21 | 22.52 |
82.00 | -3.13 | 8.31 | -1.17 | 9.23 | -3.86 | 17.85 |
82.25 | -5.40 | 7.02 | -2.95 | 9.05 | -5.34 | 17.68 |
82.50 | -5.57 | 6.32 | -4.75 | 8.41 | -6.40 | 15.30 |
82.75 | -6.62 | 5.94 | -6.39 | 8.16 | -6.70 | 11.98 |
83.00 | -7.24 | 5.16 | -8.00 | 8.40 | -5.92 | 9.66 |
83.25 | -6.79 | 4.60 | -7.22 | 6.53 | -6.38 | 8.51 |
83.50 | -5.39 | 4.10 | -5.71 | 5.35 | -6.36 | 8.08 |
83.75 | -4.26 | 3.69 | -5.36 | 5.46 | -5.74 | 7.28 |
84.00 | -3.05 | 3.36 | -4.82 | 4.28 | -6.26 | 7.60 |
84.25 | -1.99 | 3.80 | -3.83 | 4.05 | -6.28 | 6.96 |
84.50 | -1.05 | 3.95 | -2.83 | 3.92 | -5.39 | 6.49 |
84.75 | -0.84 | 3.72 | -3.00 | 2.80 | -5.13 | 5.72 |
85.00 | -0.79 | 3.59 | -1.97 | 2.44 | -4.50 | 5.49 |
85.25 | -0.62 | 3.47 | -1.20 | 2.36 | -3.89 | 4.67 |
85.50 | -0.52 | 3.17 | -1.50 | 3.63 | -3.52 | 2.80 |
85.75 | 0.27 | 2.77 | -0.58 | 3.15 | -4.65 | 5.88 |
86.00 | 0.24 | 2.79 | 0.48 | 3.27 | -4.68 | 4.73 |
86.25 | 0.42 | 2.16 | -0.46 | 3.60 | -3.75 | 4.54 |
86.50 | 0.05 | 2.11 | -0.27 | 2.14 | -3.16 | 5.87 |
86.75 | 0.23 | 2.27 | -0.71 | 2.64 | -2.10 | 5.08 |
87.00 | -0.06 | 2.28 | -1.99 | 3.78 | -2.61 | 5.82 |
87.25 | -0.23 | 2.60 | -0.56 | 3.93 | -2.51 | 6.01 |
Data for Figure 2 -Disinflation Episodes of the 1990s
Year / Quarter | US Disinflation Episodes of the 1990s: Output | US Disinflation Episodes of the 1990s: Inflation | Canada Disinflation Episodes of the 1990s: Output | Canada Disinflation Episodes of the 1990s: Inflation | UK Disinflation Episodes of the 1990s: Output | UK Disinflation Episodes of the 1990s: Inflation |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
87.75 | 1.22 | 2.87 | 1.64 | 4.56 | 2.10 | 5.82 |
88.00 | 0.96 | 2.90 | 2.57 | 4.55 | 3.13 | 5.52 |
88.25 | 1.51 | 3.32 | 3.14 | 4.09 | 2.98 | 5.79 |
88.50 | 1.31 | 3.70 | 2.79 | 4.69 | 3.75 | 6.22 |
88.75 | 1.92 | 3.72 | 3.02 | 4.66 | 3.87 | 7.77 |
89.00 | 2.19 | 4.01 | 3.50 | 4.42 | 3.50 | 8.07 |
89.25 | 2.17 | 4.02 | 3.37 | 5.23 | 3.55 | 7.26 |
89.50 | 2.20 | 3.60 | 3.00 | 4.63 | 3.09 | 7.56 |
89.75 | 1.77 | 3.54 | 2.60 | 3.92 | 2.67 | 7.10 |
90.00 | 2.26 | 3.60 | 2.85 | 3.65 | 2.94 | 6.77 |
90.25 | 1.80 | 3.81 | 1.92 | 3.11 | 2.82 | 8.16 |
90.50 | 1.08 | 3.99 | 0.77 | 2.93 | 0.99 | 8.62 |
90.75 | -0.43 | 4.06 | -0.57 | 3.05 | -0.18 | 7.05 |
91.00 | -1.63 | 4.04 | -2.56 | 3.71 | -0.79 | 7.68 |
91.25 | -1.68 | 3.51 | -2.79 | 3.32 | -1.58 | 7.00 |
91.50 | -1.93 | 3.33 | -2.91 | 2.76 | -2.45 | 5.47 |
91.75 | -2.23 | 3.10 | -3.01 | 2.03 | -2.85 | 6.39 |
92.00 | -1.96 | 2.50 | -3.64 | 1.32 | -3.00 | 5.57 |
92.25 | -1.76 | 2.41 | -3.89 | 1.02 | -3.86 | 5.00 |
92.50 | -1.57 | 2.15 | -4.05 | 1.32 | -3.85 | 3.26 |
92.75 | -1.30 | 2.14 | -4.24 | 1.61 | -3.92 | 2.26 |
93.00 | -1.96 | 2.32 | -4.12 | 1.33 | -3.78 | 2.40 |
93.25 | -2.24 | 2.32 | -4.07 | 1.77 | -3.75 | 1.75 |
93.50 | -2.52 | 2.30 | -4.11 | 1.23 | -3.36 | 3.20 |
93.75 | -2.04 | 2.31 | -3.88 | 1.42 | -2.79 | 3.30 |
94.00 | -1.83 | 2.13 | -3.11 | 1.24 | -2.30 | 2.17 |
94.25 | -1.35 | 2.00 | -2.33 | 0.51 | -1.56 | 1.78 |
94.50 | -1.65 | 2.21 | -1.63 | 1.39 | -1.21 | 0.77 |
94.75 | -1.35 | 2.15 | -1.40 | 1.43 | -1.08 | 1.65 |
95.00 | -1.84 | 2.18 | -1.20 | 1.92 | -1.31 | 1.85 |
95.25 | -2.47 | 2.12 | -1.93 | 2.64 | -1.12 | 3.01 |
95.50 | -2.51 | 1.94 | -2.68 | 2.32 | -1.33 | 3.41 |
95.75 | -2.64 | 1.96 | -2.98 | 2.19 | -1.14 | 2.48 |
96.00 | -2.76 | 1.96 | -3.58 | 1.66 | -0.94 | 3.28 |
96.25 | -2.00 | 1.96 | -3.97 | 1.61 | -1.53 | 3.52 |
96.50 | -2.03 | 1.80 | -3.64 | 1.43 | -1.34 | 3.83 |
96.75 | -1.76 | 1.85 | -3.49 | 1.75 | -0.69 | 3.22 |
97.00 | -1.83 | 1.85 | -3.37 | 2.17 | -0.76 | 2.92 |
Figure 3: Increase in Government Spending in SIGMA (Deviation from Steady State)
Data for Figure 3
Quarter | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly Closed | Output: High Openness | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Benchmark | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Nearly Closed | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: High Openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly Closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High Openness | Consumer Price Inflation: Benchmark | Consumer Price Inflation: Nearly Closed | Consumer Price Inflation: High Openness | Real Exchange Rate : Benchmark | Real Exchange Rate: Nearly Closed | Real Exchange Rate: High Openness | Real Export Share of Output: Benchmark | Real Export Share of Output: Nearly Closed | Real Export Share of Output: High Openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.10 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.02 | -0.74 | -1.11 | -0.31 | -0.02 | 0.00 | -0.03 |
2 | -0.21 | -0.20 | -0.22 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.17 | 0.04 | -0.73 | -1.14 | -0.29 | -0.04 | -0.01 | -0.07 |
3 | -0.30 | -0.27 | -0.32 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.22 | 0.07 | -0.72 | -1.14 | -0.26 | -0.08 | -0.01 | -0.12 |
4 | -0.35 | -0.32 | -0.39 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.19 | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.24 | 0.10 | -0.69 | -1.13 | -0.23 | -0.11 | -0.02 | -0.17 |
5 | -0.38 | -0.35 | -0.42 | 0.13 | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.19 | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.18 | 0.25 | 0.12 | -0.66 | -1.11 | -0.20 | -0.13 | -0.02 | -0.20 |
6 | -0.38 | -0.36 | -0.42 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 0.09 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.13 | 0.19 | 0.25 | 0.13 | -0.64 | -1.08 | -0.19 | -0.15 | -0.02 | -0.22 |
7 | -0.37 | -0.36 | -0.38 | 0.14 | 0.21 | 0.09 | 0.17 | 0.23 | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.23 | 0.13 | -0.61 | -1.04 | -0.18 | -0.15 | -0.02 | -0.23 |
8 | -0.34 | -0.34 | -0.33 | 0.14 | 0.22 | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.13 | -0.59 | -0.99 | -0.17 | -0.15 | -0.02 | -0.22 |
9 | -0.30 | -0.32 | -0.27 | 0.14 | 0.21 | 0.08 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.10 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.12 | -0.56 | -0.94 | -0.16 | -0.15 | -0.02 | -0.21 |
10 | -0.26 | -0.30 | -0.21 | 0.13 | 0.20 | 0.08 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.11 | -0.54 | -0.88 | -0.16 | -0.13 | -0.02 | -0.20 |
11 | -0.23 | -0.27 | -0.17 | 0.12 | 0.19 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.10 | -0.51 | -0.83 | -0.15 | -0.12 | -0.02 | -0.18 |
12 | -0.20 | -0.25 | -0.13 | 0.12 | 0.17 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.09 | -0.49 | -0.78 | -0.15 | -0.11 | -0.02 | -0.17 |
13 | -0.17 | -0.22 | -0.11 | 0.11 | 0.15 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.09 | -0.46 | -0.73 | -0.14 | -0.10 | -0.01 | -0.15 |
14 | -0.15 | -0.20 | -0.09 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.06 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.08 | -0.44 | -0.69 | -0.13 | -0.09 | -0.01 | -0.14 |
15 | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.09 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.08 | -0.42 | -0.65 | -0.12 | -0.09 | -0.01 | -0.14 |
16 | -0.13 | -0.15 | -0.08 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.07 | -0.39 | -0.61 | -0.11 | -0.08 | -0.01 | -0.13 |
17 | -0.12 | -0.14 | -0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.07 | -0.37 | -0.58 | -0.10 | -0.08 | -0.01 | -0.12 |
18 | -0.11 | -0.12 | -0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.07 | -0.35 | -0.55 | -0.09 | -0.07 | -0.01 | -0.12 |
19 | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.07 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.07 | -0.33 | -0.53 | -0.08 | -0.07 | -0.01 | -0.11 |
20 | -0.10 | -0.10 | -0.07 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.06 | -0.32 | -0.51 | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.01 | -0.11 |
Figure 4: Increase in Technology in SIGMA (Deviation from Steady State)
Data for Figure 4
Quarter | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly Closed | Output: High Openness | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Benchmark | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Nearly Closed | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: High Openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly Closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High Openness | Consumer Price Inflation: Benchmark | Consumer Price Inflation: Nearly Closed | Consumer Price Inflation: High Openness | Real Exchange Rate : Benchmark | Real Exchange Rate: Nearly Closed | Real Exchange Rate: High Openness | Real Export Share of Output: Benchmark | Real Export Share of Output: Nearly Closed | Real Export Share of Output: High Openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.03 | -0.17 | -0.18 | -0.16 | -0.12 | -0.18 | -0.03 | 0.93 | 1.06 | 0.68 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.05 |
2 | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.28 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.28 | -0.30 | -0.25 | -0.21 | -0.29 | -0.08 | 0.94 | 1.11 | 0.64 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.13 |
3 | 0.38 | 0.32 | 0.44 | -0.09 | -0.11 | -0.08 | -0.33 | -0.36 | -0.29 | -0.27 | -0.35 | -0.14 | 0.94 | 1.14 | 0.60 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.21 |
4 | 0.49 | 0.41 | 0.57 | -0.15 | -0.19 | -0.12 | -0.34 | -0.37 | -0.29 | -0.30 | -0.37 | -0.19 | 0.93 | 1.14 | 0.56 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.28 |
5 | 0.57 | 0.49 | 0.66 | -0.19 | -0.24 | -0.14 | -0.32 | -0.36 | -0.27 | -0.30 | -0.35 | -0.23 | 0.91 | 1.12 | 0.54 | 0.13 | 0.01 | 0.32 |
6 | 0.62 | 0.55 | 0.69 | -0.21 | -0.27 | -0.15 | -0.28 | -0.31 | -0.24 | -0.28 | -0.32 | -0.24 | 0.88 | 1.08 | 0.52 | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.33 |
7 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.69 | -0.22 | -0.29 | -0.16 | -0.24 | -0.26 | -0.21 | -0.25 | -0.26 | -0.24 | 0.85 | 1.03 | 0.50 | 0.13 | 0.01 | 0.32 |
8 | 0.65 | 0.64 | 0.67 | -0.22 | -0.28 | -0.15 | -0.19 | -0.20 | -0.17 | -0.21 | -0.20 | -0.21 | 0.81 | 0.96 | 0.49 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.29 |
9 | 0.64 | 0.66 | 0.63 | -0.20 | -0.26 | -0.14 | -0.14 | -0.14 | -0.14 | -0.16 | -0.14 | -0.18 | 0.77 | 0.89 | 0.48 | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.26 |
10 | 0.63 | 0.67 | 0.59 | -0.18 | -0.23 | -0.13 | -0.09 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.08 | -0.15 | 0.72 | 0.82 | 0.47 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.23 |
11 | 0.62 | 0.68 | 0.55 | -0.16 | -0.19 | -0.12 | -0.05 | -0.03 | -0.08 | -0.07 | -0.03 | -0.12 | 0.68 | 0.75 | 0.45 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.21 |
12 | 0.60 | 0.67 | 0.53 | -0.13 | -0.15 | -0.10 | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.06 | -0.04 | 0.01 | -0.09 | 0.64 | 0.69 | 0.43 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.19 |
13 | 0.59 | 0.66 | 0.50 | -0.10 | -0.11 | -0.09 | 0.00 | 0.05 | -0.05 | -0.01 | 0.05 | -0.07 | 0.60 | 0.63 | 0.41 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.18 |
14 | 0.58 | 0.65 | 0.49 | -0.08 | -0.07 | -0.07 | 0.02 | 0.07 | -0.04 | 0.01 | 0.07 | -0.06 | 0.57 | 0.59 | 0.39 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.17 |
15 | 0.56 | 0.64 | 0.48 | -0.05 | -0.04 | -0.06 | 0.03 | 0.08 | -0.04 | 0.02 | 0.08 | -0.05 | 0.54 | 0.56 | 0.37 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.17 |
16 | 0.55 | 0.62 | 0.47 | -0.03 | -0.01 | -0.05 | 0.03 | 0.09 | -0.04 | 0.03 | 0.09 | -0.05 | 0.52 | 0.54 | 0.35 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.17 |
17 | 0.54 | 0.61 | 0.46 | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.04 | 0.03 | 0.08 | -0.04 | 0.03 | 0.08 | -0.05 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.34 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.17 |
18 | 0.53 | 0.59 | 0.45 | -0.01 | 0.02 | -0.03 | 0.02 | 0.08 | -0.04 | 0.02 | 0.08 | -0.05 | 0.49 | 0.52 | 0.32 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.16 |
19 | 0.52 | 0.58 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 0.03 | -0.02 | 0.01 | 0.06 | -0.05 | 0.01 | 0.06 | -0.06 | 0.48 | 0.52 | 0.31 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.16 |
20 | 0.51 | 0.57 | 0.43 | 0.01 | 0.04 | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.05 | -0.05 | 0.00 | 0.05 | -0.06 | 0.47 | 0.52 | 0.30 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.16 |
Figure 5: Rise in Technology: Closed vs. Open Labor Market Equilibrium under Flexible Prices and Wages
Figure 6: Increase in Inflation Target in Workhorse Model (Deviation from Steady State)
Data for Figure 6
Quarter | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly Closed | Output: High Openness | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Benchmark | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Nearly Closed | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: High Openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly Closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High Openness | Consumer Price Inflation: Benchmark | Consumer Price Inflation: Nearly Closed | Consumer Price Inflation: High Openness | Private Consumption : Benchmark | Private Consumption: Nearly Closed | Private Consumption: High Openness | Real Export Share of Output: Benchmark | Real Export Share of Output: Nearly Closed | Real Export Share of Output: High Openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | -0.22 | -0.18 | -0.27 | 0.29 | 0.31 | 0.26 | -0.29 | -0.27 | -0.31 | -0.46 | -0.28 | -0.74 | -0.17 | -0.21 | -0.12 | -0.03 | 0.00 | -0.05 |
2 | -0.16 | -0.13 | -0.18 | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.18 | -0.49 | -0.46 | -0.53 | -0.44 | -0.46 | -0.39 | -0.12 | -0.16 | -0.08 | -0.02 | 0.00 | -0.03 |
3 | -0.11 | -0.10 | -0.13 | 0.14 | 0.17 | 0.12 | -0.64 | -0.61 | -0.67 | -0.60 | -0.61 | -0.58 | -0.09 | -0.11 | -0.06 | -0.02 | 0.00 | -0.02 |
4 | -0.08 | -0.07 | -0.08 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.08 | -0.75 | -0.72 | -0.78 | -0.72 | -0.71 | -0.71 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.04 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 |
5 | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.06 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.06 | -0.82 | -0.79 | -0.84 | -0.80 | -0.79 | -0.80 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.03 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 |
6 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.04 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.04 | -0.87 | -0.85 | -0.89 | -0.86 | -0.85 | -0.86 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 |
7 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.03 | -0.91 | -0.89 | -0.92 | -0.90 | -0.89 | -0.90 | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
8 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 | -0.93 | -0.92 | -0.94 | -0.92 | -0.92 | -0.93 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
9 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | -0.95 | -0.94 | -0.96 | -0.94 | -0.94 | -0.95 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
10 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.97 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.96 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
11 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.97 | -0.96 | -0.97 | -0.96 | -0.96 | -0.97 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
12 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.97 | -0.97 | -0.98 | -0.97 | -0.97 | -0.97 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
13 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.97 | -0.97 | -0.98 | -0.97 | -0.97 | -0.98 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
14 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.98 | -0.97 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.97 | -0.98 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
15 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
16 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
17 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
18 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
19 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
20 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | -0.98 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Figure 7: Increase in Government Spending in Workhorse Model (Deviation from Steady State)
Data for Figure 7
Quarter | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly Closed | Output: High Openness | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Benchmark | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Nearly Closed | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: High Openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly Closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High Openness | Product Real Wage: Benchmark | Product Real Wage: Nearly Closed | Product Real Wage: High Openness | Output Gap: Benchmark | Output Gap: Nearly Closed | Output Gap: High Openness | Real Export Share of Output: Benchmark | Real Export Share of Output: Nearly Closed | Real Export Share of Output: High Openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.19 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.12 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 | -0.20 | -0.02 | -0.42 |
2 | 0.20 | 0.25 | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.22 | 0.27 | 0.18 | -0.04 | -0.05 | -0.03 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.03 | -0.20 | -0.02 | -0.41 |
3 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.20 | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.05 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 | -0.19 | -0.02 | -0.40 |
4 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.20 | -0.08 | -0.10 | -0.06 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | -0.19 | -0.02 | -0.39 |
5 | 0.17 | 0.22 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.20 | -0.09 | -0.11 | -0.07 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | -0.18 | -0.02 | -0.38 |
6 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.24 | 0.30 | 0.19 | -0.09 | -0.11 | -0.07 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | -0.18 | -0.02 | -0.37 |
7 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.19 | -0.09 | -0.11 | -0.07 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.17 | -0.02 | -0.36 |
8 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.18 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.07 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.17 | -0.02 | -0.35 |
9 | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.18 | -0.08 | -0.10 | -0.06 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.16 | -0.02 | -0.34 |
10 | 0.14 | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.18 | -0.07 | -0.09 | -0.06 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.16 | -0.02 | -0.33 |
11 | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.18 | -0.07 | -0.09 | -0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.15 | -0.02 | -0.32 |
12 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.18 | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.15 | -0.02 | -0.31 |
13 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.18 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.15 | -0.02 | -0.30 |
14 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.22 | 0.27 | 0.17 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.14 | -0.02 | -0.29 |
15 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 0.27 | 0.17 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.14 | -0.02 | -0.28 |
16 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.21 | 0.26 | 0.16 | -0.06 | -0.07 | -0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.13 | -0.02 | -0.27 |
17 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.20 | 0.25 | 0.16 | -0.06 | -0.07 | -0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.13 | -0.01 | -0.26 |
18 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.20 | 0.25 | 0.15 | -0.06 | -0.07 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.13 | -0.01 | -0.26 |
19 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 0.15 | -0.05 | -0.07 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.12 | -0.01 | -0.25 |
20 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 0.23 | 0.15 | -0.05 | -0.07 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.12 | -0.01 | -0.24 |
Figure 8: Increase in Technology in Workhorse Model (Deviation from Steady State)
Data for Figure 8
Quarter | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly Closed | Output: High Openness | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Benchmark | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Nearly Closed | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: High Openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly Closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High Openness | Product Real Wage: Benchmark | Product Real Wage: Nearly Closed | Product Real Wage: High Openness | Output Gap: Benchmark | Output Gap: Nearly Closed | Output Gap: High Openness | Real Export Share of Output: Benchmark | Real Export Share of Output: Nearly Closed | Real Export Share of Output: High Openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.70 | 0.64 | 0.76 | -0.26 | -0.29 | -0.22 | -0.46 | -0.50 | -0.42 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.13 |
2 | 0.70 | 0.64 | 0.75 | -0.31 | -0.35 | -0.27 | -0.59 | -0.65 | -0.53 | 0.32 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.13 |
3 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.70 | -0.27 | -0.31 | -0.23 | -0.53 | -0.59 | -0.47 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.12 |
4 | 0.60 | 0.56 | 0.64 | -0.20 | -0.23 | -0.17 | -0.39 | -0.45 | -0.34 | 0.61 | 0.63 | 0.59 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.11 |
5 | 0.55 | 0.52 | 0.58 | -0.12 | -0.15 | -0.10 | -0.25 | -0.29 | -0.20 | 0.67 | 0.69 | 0.66 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.10 |
6 | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.54 | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.05 | -0.13 | -0.17 | -0.10 | 0.69 | 0.71 | 0.68 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.03 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.09 |
7 | 0.50 | 0.47 | 0.52 | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.02 | -0.06 | -0.09 | -0.04 | 0.68 | 0.70 | 0.66 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.04 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.09 |
8 | 0.49 | 0.46 | 0.50 | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.06 | -0.01 | 0.65 | 0.67 | 0.64 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.04 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
9 | 0.48 | 0.46 | 0.50 | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.01 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.02 | 0.61 | 0.63 | 0.60 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.03 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
10 | 0.48 | 0.46 | 0.50 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.02 | -0.05 | -0.08 | -0.03 | 0.58 | 0.60 | 0.57 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
11 | 0.48 | 0.45 | 0.50 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.03 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.06 | 0.56 | 0.57 | 0.54 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
12 | 0.48 | 0.45 | 0.50 | -0.05 | -0.07 | -0.04 | -0.10 | -0.13 | -0.08 | 0.54 | 0.55 | 0.52 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
13 | 0.47 | 0.44 | 0.49 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.05 | -0.12 | -0.15 | -0.09 | 0.52 | 0.54 | 0.51 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
14 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.48 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.05 | -0.12 | -0.16 | -0.10 | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
15 | 0.46 | 0.43 | 0.48 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.05 | -0.13 | -0.16 | -0.10 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
16 | 0.45 | 0.42 | 0.47 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.05 | -0.13 | -0.16 | -0.10 | 0.49 | 0.51 | 0.48 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
17 | 0.44 | 0.41 | 0.46 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.05 | -0.12 | -0.15 | -0.10 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
18 | 0.43 | 0.40 | 0.45 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.05 | -0.12 | -0.15 | -0.09 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.07 |
19 | 0.42 | 0.39 | 0.44 | -0.06 | -0.07 | -0.05 | -0.11 | -0.14 | -0.09 | 0.47 | 0.48 | 0.46 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.07 |
20 | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.43 | -0.06 | -0.07 | -0.04 | -0.11 | -0.14 | -0.09 | 0.46 | 0.47 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.07 |
Figure 9: Increase in
Technology in Workhorse Model (Alternative Calibration: and
)
Data for Figure 9
Quarter | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly Closed | Output: High Openness | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Benchmark | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: Nearly Closed | 1 yr. Real Interest Rate: High Openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly Closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High Openness | Product Real Wage: Benchmark | Product Real Wage: Nearly Closed | Product Real Wage: High Openness | Output Gap: Benchmark | Output Gap: Nearly Closed | Output Gap: High Openness | Real Export Share of Output: Benchmark | Real Export Share of Output: Nearly Closed | Real Export Share of Output: High Openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.82 | 0.58 | 0.92 | -0.17 | -0.27 | -0.13 | -0.35 | -0.46 | -0.30 | 0.14 | 0.17 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.17 | 0.23 | 0.05 | 0.22 |
2 | 0.81 | 0.57 | 0.92 | -0.20 | -0.30 | -0.15 | -0.42 | -0.58 | -0.36 | 0.33 | 0.39 | 0.30 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.19 | 0.23 | 0.05 | 0.22 |
3 | 0.75 | 0.53 | 0.85 | -0.16 | -0.25 | -0.12 | -0.35 | -0.50 | -0.28 | 0.49 | 0.57 | 0.45 | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.13 | 0.21 | 0.05 | 0.20 |
4 | 0.68 | 0.48 | 0.76 | -0.11 | -0.17 | -0.08 | -0.23 | -0.34 | -0.18 | 0.59 | 0.69 | 0.55 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.19 | 0.04 | 0.18 |
5 | 0.62 | 0.44 | 0.69 | -0.06 | -0.09 | -0.05 | -0.12 | -0.20 | -0.08 | 0.64 | 0.75 | 0.60 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.04 | 0.16 |
6 | 0.58 | 0.42 | 0.64 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.02 | -0.04 | -0.09 | -0.02 | 0.65 | 0.75 | 0.61 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.04 | 0.16 | 0.04 | 0.15 |
7 | 0.56 | 0.40 | 0.61 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.04 | 0.01 | 0.63 | 0.73 | 0.59 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.05 | 0.15 | 0.04 | 0.14 |
8 | 0.55 | 0.40 | 0.60 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.03 | 0.01 | 0.60 | 0.69 | 0.57 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.05 | 0.15 | 0.03 | 0.14 |
9 | 0.55 | 0.40 | 0.60 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.57 | 0.65 | 0.53 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.04 | 0.15 | 0.03 | 0.14 |
10 | 0.55 | 0.40 | 0.60 | -0.02 | -0.04 | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.07 | -0.02 | 0.54 | 0.62 | 0.51 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.15 | 0.03 | 0.14 |
11 | 0.54 | 0.39 | 0.60 | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.02 | -0.05 | -0.09 | -0.04 | 0.52 | 0.60 | 0.49 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.15 | 0.03 | 0.14 |
12 | 0.54 | 0.39 | 0.60 | -0.03 | -0.06 | -0.02 | -0.07 | -0.11 | -0.05 | 0.50 | 0.58 | 0.47 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.03 | 0.14 |
13 | 0.53 | 0.38 | 0.59 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.03 | -0.07 | -0.12 | -0.06 | 0.49 | 0.57 | 0.46 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.03 | 0.14 |
14 | 0.52 | 0.38 | 0.58 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.03 | -0.08 | -0.12 | -0.06 | 0.48 | 0.56 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.03 | 0.14 |
15 | 0.51 | 0.37 | 0.57 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.03 | -0.08 | -0.12 | -0.06 | 0.47 | 0.55 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.13 |
16 | 0.50 | 0.36 | 0.56 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.03 | -0.07 | -0.12 | -0.06 | 0.47 | 0.54 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.13 |
17 | 0.49 | 0.35 | 0.54 | -0.03 | -0.06 | -0.03 | -0.07 | -0.11 | -0.05 | 0.46 | 0.53 | 0.43 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.13 |
18 | 0.48 | 0.35 | 0.53 | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.03 | -0.07 | -0.11 | -0.05 | 0.45 | 0.52 | 0.42 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.03 | 0.12 |
19 | 0.47 | 0.34 | 0.52 | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.02 | -0.06 | -0.11 | -0.05 | 0.44 | 0.51 | 0.42 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.03 | 0.12 |
20 | 0.46 | 0.33 | 0.51 | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.02 | -0.06 | -0.10 | -0.05 | 0.43 | 0.50 | 0.41 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.03 | 0.12 |
Figure 10: Policy Tradeoff Frontier for Technology Shock: Benchmark Calibration
Data for Figure 10 - Inflation-Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff
Nearly Closed - Inflation-Output Gap (σg) | Nearly Closed - Inflation-Volatility (σπ) | Highly Open - Inflation-Output Gap (σg) | Highly Open - Inflation-Volatility (σπ) |
---|---|---|---|
0.07 |
1.05 |
0.07 |
1.04 |
0.14 |
0.93 |
0.13 |
0.92 |
0.25 |
0.77 |
0.24 |
0.76 |
0.40 |
0.58 |
0.40 |
0.57 |
0.59 |
0.40 |
0.59 |
0.38 |
0.79 |
0.24 |
0.78 |
0.23 |
0.97 |
0.13 |
0.94 |
0.12 |
1.09 |
0.06 |
1.05 |
0.06 |
1.17 |
0.03 |
1.12 |
0.03 |
1.21 |
0.01 |
1.16 |
0.01 |
1.23 |
0.01 |
1.18 |
0.00 |
1.24 |
0.00 |
1.18 |
0.00 |
1.24 |
0.00 |
1.19 |
0.00 |
1.25 |
0.00 |
1.19 |
0.00 |
1.25 |
0.00 |
1.19 |
0.00 |
1.25 |
0.00 |
1.19 |
0.00 |
1.25 |
0.00 |
1.19 |
0.00 |
1.25 |
0.00 |
1.19 |
0.00 |
1.25 |
0.00 |
1.20 |
0.00 |
1.26 |
0.00 |
1.20 |
0.00 |
Data for Figure 10 - Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate
Nearly Closed - relative weight on output (exp(N)) | Nearly Closed - Real Interest Rate Volatility (σrr) | Highly Open - relative weight on output (exp(N)) | Highly Open - Real Interest Rate Volatility (σrr) |
---|---|---|---|
-9.00 |
3.17 |
-9.00 |
1.64 |
-8.00 |
2.89 |
-8.00 |
1.50 |
-7.00 |
2.46 |
-7.00 |
1.28 |
-6.00 |
1.91 |
-6.00 |
1.00 |
-5.00 |
1.35 |
-5.00 |
0.72 |
-4.00 |
0.93 |
-4.00 |
0.51 |
-3.00 |
0.69 |
-3.00 |
0.40 |
-2.00 |
0.58 |
-2.00 |
0.35 |
-1.00 |
0.54 |
-1.00 |
0.33 |
0.00 |
0.53 |
0.00 |
0.33 |
1.00 |
0.52 |
1.00 |
0.32 |
2.00 |
0.52 |
2.00 |
0.32 |
3.00 |
0.52 |
3.00 |
0.32 |
4.00 |
0.52 |
4.00 |
0.32 |
5.00 |
0.52 |
5.00 |
0.32 |
6.00 |
0.52 |
6.00 |
0.32 |
7.00 |
0.52 |
7.00 |
0.32 |
8.00 |
0.52 |
8.00 |
0.32 |
9.00 |
0.52 |
9.00 |
0.32 |
10.00 |
0.52 |
10.00 |
0.32 |
Figure 11: Policy Tradeoff Frontier for Technology Shock: Alternative Calibration
Data for Figure 11 - Alternative 1: Flatter MRS than benchmark (χ=2, ηc=3, α=.35)
Inflation - Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff: Nearly closed - σg | Inflation - Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff: Nearly closed - σπ | Inflation - Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff: Highly Open - σg | Inflation - Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff: Highly Open - σπ | Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate: Nearly closed - relative weight on output (exp(N)) | Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate: Nearly closed - σrr | Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate: Highly Open - relative weight on output (exp(N)) | Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate: Highly Open - σrr |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1.01 |
0.07 |
0.99 |
0.07 |
-9.00 |
2.92 |
-9.00 |
0.98 |
0.89 |
0.14 |
0.87 |
0.13 |
-8.00 |
2.66 |
-8.00 |
0.89 |
0.74 |
0.24 |
0.71 |
0.23 |
-7.00 |
2.26 |
-7.00 |
0.77 |
0.56 |
0.39 |
0.53 |
0.38 |
-6.00 |
1.75 |
-6.00 |
0.61 |
0.38 |
0.57 |
0.35 |
0.55 |
-5.00 |
1.24 |
-5.00 |
0.45 |
0.24 |
0.76 |
0.21 |
0.73 |
-4.00 |
0.85 |
-4.00 |
0.33 |
0.13 |
0.93 |
0.11 |
0.87 |
-3.00 |
0.61 |
-3.00 |
0.27 |
0.07 |
1.05 |
0.05 |
0.97 |
-2.00 |
0.51 |
-2.00 |
0.25 |
0.03 |
1.13 |
0.02 |
1.03 |
-1.00 |
0.47 |
-1.00 |
0.24 |
0.01 |
1.18 |
0.01 |
1.06 |
0.00 |
0.45 |
0.00 |
0.23 |
0.01 |
1.20 |
0.00 |
1.07 |
1.00 |
0.45 |
1.00 |
0.23 |
0.00 |
1.21 |
0.00 |
1.08 |
2.00 |
0.45 |
2.00 |
0.23 |
0.00 |
1.22 |
0.00 |
1.08 |
3.00 |
0.45 |
3.00 |
0.23 |
0.00 |
1.22 |
0.00 |
1.08 |
4.00 |
0.45 |
4.00 |
0.23 |
0.00 |
1.22 |
0.00 |
1.09 |
5.00 |
0.45 |
5.00 |
0.23 |
0.00 |
1.22 |
0.00 |
1.09 |
6.00 |
0.45 |
6.00 |
0.23 |
0.00 |
1.23 |
0.00 |
1.09 |
7.00 |
0.45 |
7.00 |
0.23 |
0.00 |
1.23 |
0.00 |
1.09 |
8.00 |
0.45 |
8.00 |
0.23 |
0.00 |
1.23 |
0.00 |
1.09 |
9.00 |
0.45 |
9.00 |
0.23 |
Data for Figure 11 -Alternative 2: Very Flat MRS (χ=.05, ηc=6, α=.35)
Inflation - Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff: Nearly closed - σg | Inflation - Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff: Nearly closed - σπ | Inflation - Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff: Highly Open - σg | Inflation - Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff: Highly Open - σπ | Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate: Nearly closed - relative weight on output (exp(N)) | Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate: Nearly closed - σrr | Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate: Highly Open - relative weight on output (exp(N)) | Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate: Highly Open - σrr |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0.75 |
0.06 |
0.62 |
0.05 |
-9.00 |
1.92 |
-9.00 |
0.44 |
0.64 |
0.11 |
0.52 |
0.09 |
-8.00 |
1.73 |
-8.00 |
0.40 |
0.52 |
0.19 |
0.40 |
0.16 |
-7.00 |
1.47 |
-7.00 |
0.35 |
0.38 |
0.29 |
0.28 |
0.24 |
-6.00 |
1.16 |
-6.00 |
0.29 |
0.26 |
0.41 |
0.17 |
0.33 |
-5.00 |
0.84 |
-5.00 |
0.24 |
0.16 |
0.53 |
0.09 |
0.40 |
-4.00 |
0.59 |
-4.00 |
0.21 |
0.09 |
0.65 |
0.04 |
0.45 |
-3.00 |
0.44 |
-3.00 |
0.20 |
0.05 |
0.74 |
0.02 |
0.49 |
-2.00 |
0.36 |
-2.00 |
0.19 |
0.02 |
0.80 |
0.01 |
0.50 |
-1.00 |
0.33 |
-1.00 |
0.19 |
0.01 |
0.84 |
0.00 |
0.51 |
0.00 |
0.32 |
0.00 |
0.19 |
0.00 |
0.86 |
0.00 |
0.52 |
1.00 |
0.32 |
1.00 |
0.19 |
0.00 |
0.87 |
0.00 |
0.52 |
2.00 |
0.31 |
2.00 |
0.19 |
0.00 |
0.88 |
0.00 |
0.52 |
3.00 |
0.31 |
3.00 |
0.19 |
0.00 |
0.88 |
0.00 |
0.52 |
4.00 |
0.31 |
4.00 |
0.19 |
0.00 |
0.88 |
0.00 |
0.52 |
5.00 |
0.31 |
5.00 |
0.19 |
0.00 |
0.88 |
0.00 |
0.52 |
6.00 |
0.31 |
6.00 |
0.19 |
0.00 |
0.88 |
0.00 |
0.52 |
7.00 |
0.31 |
7.00 |
0.19 |
0.00 |
0.88 |
0.00 |
0.52 |
8.00 |
0.31 |
8.00 |
0.19 |
0.00 |
0.88 |
0.00 |
0.52 |
9.00 |
0.31 |
9.00 |
0.19 |
Data for Figure 11 -Alternative 3: Very Flat MRS and MPL (χ=.05, ηc=6, α=.05)
Inflation - Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff: Nearly closed - σg | Inflation - Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff: Nearly closed - σπ | Inflation - Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff: Highly Open - σg | Inflation - Output Gap Volatility Tradeoff: Highly Open - σπ | Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate: Nearly closed - relative weight on output (exp(N)) | Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate: Nearly closed - σrr | Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate: Highly Open - relative weight on output (exp(N)) | Implied Volatility of Real Interest Rate: Highly Open - σrr |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2.16 |
0.13 |
5.91 |
0.09 |
-13.00 |
4.88 |
-13.00 |
2.75 |
2.10 |
0.13 |
5.00 |
0.14 |
-12.00 |
4.79 |
-12.00 |
2.48 |
1.96 |
0.15 |
3.95 |
0.21 |
-11.00 |
4.58 |
-11.00 |
2.10 |
1.71 |
0.18 |
2.92 |
0.31 |
-10.00 |
4.19 |
-10.00 |
1.66 |
1.38 |
0.24 |
2.03 |
0.43 |
-9.00 |
3.61 |
-9.00 |
1.21 |
1.04 |
0.32 |
1.31 |
0.55 |
-8.00 |
2.90 |
-8.00 |
0.83 |
0.74 |
0.43 |
0.78 |
0.68 |
-7.00 |
2.16 |
-7.00 |
0.57 |
0.50 |
0.54 |
0.43 |
0.78 |
-6.00 |
1.51 |
-6.00 |
0.43 |
0.31 |
0.67 |
0.22 |
0.86 |
-5.00 |
1.00 |
-5.00 |
0.37 |
0.19 |
0.79 |
0.11 |
0.92 |
-4.00 |
0.68 |
-4.00 |
0.34 |
0.10 |
0.90 |
0.05 |
0.96 |
-3.00 |
0.51 |
-3.00 |
0.33 |
0.05 |
0.98 |
0.02 |
0.97 |
-2.00 |
0.44 |
-2.00 |
0.33 |
0.02 |
1.03 |
0.01 |
0.98 |
-1.00 |
0.41 |
-1.00 |
0.32 |
0.01 |
1.06 |
0.00 |
0.99 |
0.00 |
0.40 |
0.00 |
0.32 |
0.00 |
1.08 |
0.00 |
0.99 |
1.00 |
0.39 |
1.00 |
0.32 |
0.00 |
1.09 |
0.00 |
0.99 |
2.00 |
0.39 |
2.00 |
0.32 |
0.00 |
1.09 |
0.00 |
0.99 |
3.00 |
0.39 |
3.00 |
0.32 |
0.00 |
1.09 |
0.00 |
0.99 |
4.00 |
0.39 |
4.00 |
0.32 |
0.00 |
1.09 |
0.00 |
0.99 |
5.00 |
0.39 |
5.00 |
0.32 |
Figure 12: Persistent Increase in Technology: Complete vs. Incomplete Markets
Data for Figure 12 - Complete Markets
Quarters | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly closed | Output: High openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High openness | Consumption: Benchmark | Consumption: Nearly closed | Consumption: High openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.72 | 0.66 | 0.78 | -0.45 | -0.49 | -0.41 | 0.46 | 0.63 | 0.30 |
2 | 0.71 | 0.66 | 0.77 | -0.58 | -0.64 | -0.52 | 0.45 | 0.63 | 0.30 |
3 | 0.66 | 0.61 | 0.71 | -0.52 | -0.59 | -0.46 | 0.42 | 0.59 | 0.27 |
4 | 0.60 | 0.56 | 0.63 | -0.39 | -0.45 | -0.33 | 0.38 | 0.54 | 0.25 |
5 | 0.55 | 0.52 | 0.57 | -0.25 | -0.31 | -0.20 | 0.35 | 0.49 | 0.22 |
6 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.52 | -0.15 | -0.19 | -0.11 | 0.32 | 0.46 | 0.21 |
7 | 0.48 | 0.46 | 0.49 | -0.08 | -0.12 | -0.05 | 0.31 | 0.44 | 0.20 |
8 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.47 | -0.06 | -0.09 | -0.03 | 0.30 | 0.42 | 0.19 |
9 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.47 | -0.06 | -0.09 | -0.04 | 0.29 | 0.41 | 0.19 |
10 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.46 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.05 | 0.29 | 0.41 | 0.19 |
11 | 0.44 | 0.42 | 0.46 | -0.10 | -0.13 | -0.07 | 0.28 | 0.40 | 0.18 |
12 | 0.44 | 0.42 | 0.45 | -0.12 | -0.15 | -0.09 | 0.28 | 0.40 | 0.18 |
13 | 0.43 | 0.41 | 0.45 | -0.13 | -0.17 | -0.10 | 0.28 | 0.39 | 0.18 |
14 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.44 | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.11 | 0.27 | 0.38 | 0.17 |
15 | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.42 | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.11 | 0.26 | 0.37 | 0.17 |
16 | 0.40 | 0.38 | 0.41 | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.11 | 0.25 | 0.36 | 0.16 |
17 | 0.38 | 0.36 | 0.40 | -0.13 | -0.16 | -0.10 | 0.25 | 0.35 | 0.16 |
18 | 0.37 | 0.35 | 0.39 | -0.12 | -0.16 | -0.10 | 0.24 | 0.34 | 0.15 |
19 | 0.36 | 0.34 | 0.37 | -0.12 | -0.15 | -0.09 | 0.23 | 0.33 | 0.15 |
20 | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.36 | -0.11 | -0.15 | -0.09 | 0.22 | 0.32 | 0.14 |
Data for Figure 12 - Incomplete Markets
Quarters | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly closed | Output: High openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High openness | Consumption: Benchmark | Consumption: Nearly closed | Consumption: High openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.72 | 0.66 | 0.77 | -0.45 | -0.49 | -0.42 | 0.50 | 0.64 | 0.36 |
2 | 0.71 | 0.66 | 0.76 | -0.58 | -0.64 | -0.52 | 0.49 | 0.63 | 0.35 |
3 | 0.66 | 0.61 | 0.70 | -0.52 | -0.59 | -0.46 | 0.46 | 0.59 | 0.33 |
4 | 0.59 | 0.56 | 0.62 | -0.39 | -0.45 | -0.33 | 0.42 | 0.54 | 0.31 |
5 | 0.54 | 0.51 | 0.56 | -0.25 | -0.31 | -0.21 | 0.39 | 0.50 | 0.28 |
6 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.51 | -0.15 | -0.19 | -0.11 | 0.36 | 0.46 | 0.27 |
7 | 0.47 | 0.46 | 0.48 | -0.08 | -0.12 | -0.05 | 0.34 | 0.44 | 0.25 |
8 | 0.45 | 0.44 | 0.46 | -0.06 | -0.09 | -0.03 | 0.33 | 0.43 | 0.25 |
9 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.45 | -0.06 | -0.09 | -0.03 | 0.33 | 0.42 | 0.24 |
10 | 0.44 | 0.43 | 0.45 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.05 | 0.33 | 0.41 | 0.24 |
11 | 0.44 | 0.42 | 0.45 | -0.10 | -0.13 | -0.07 | 0.32 | 0.41 | 0.24 |
12 | 0.43 | 0.42 | 0.44 | -0.12 | -0.15 | -0.09 | 0.32 | 0.40 | 0.24 |
13 | 0.42 | 0.41 | 0.43 | -0.13 | -0.17 | -0.10 | 0.31 | 0.39 | 0.24 |
14 | 0.41 | 0.40 | 0.42 | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.11 | 0.31 | 0.38 | 0.23 |
15 | 0.40 | 0.39 | 0.41 | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.11 | 0.30 | 0.37 | 0.23 |
16 | 0.39 | 0.38 | 0.40 | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.11 | 0.29 | 0.36 | 0.22 |
17 | 0.38 | 0.36 | 0.39 | -0.13 | -0.16 | -0.10 | 0.28 | 0.35 | 0.22 |
18 | 0.36 | 0.35 | 0.37 | -0.13 | -0.16 | -0.10 | 0.27 | 0.34 | 0.21 |
19 | 0.35 | 0.34 | 0.36 | -0.12 | -0.15 | -0.10 | 0.27 | 0.33 | 0.21 |
20 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.35 | -0.11 | -0.15 | -0.09 | 0.26 | 0.32 | 0.20 |
Figure 13: The Effect on Output of a More Transitory Increase in Technology (Alternative Calibrations of Incomplete Markets Model)
Data for Figure 13
Quarters | η = 6 and χ = 5: Benchmark | η = 6 and χ = 5: Nearly closed | η = 6 and χ = 5: High openness | η = 6 and χ = 1: Benchmark | η = 6 and χ = 1: Nearly closed | η = 6 and χ = 1: High openness | η = 12 and χ = 0.1: Benchmark | η = 12 and χ = 0.1: Nearly closed | η = 12 and χ = 0.1: High openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.64 | 0.41 | 0.73 | 0.65 | 0.37 | 0.78 | 0.85 | 0.33 | 1.03 |
2 | 0.58 | 0.38 | 0.66 | 0.58 | 0.34 | 0.69 | 0.74 | 0.30 | 0.88 |
3 | 0.45 | 0.32 | 0.51 | 0.46 | 0.28 | 0.53 | 0.58 | 0.24 | 0.69 |
4 | 0.33 | 0.25 | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.22 | 0.38 | 0.43 | 0.18 | 0.51 |
5 | 0.22 | 0.19 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.16 | 0.26 | 0.32 | 0.14 | 0.38 |
6 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.13 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.11 | 0.28 |
7 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.22 |
8 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 0.08 | 0.17 |
9 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.13 |
10 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.10 |
11 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.08 |
12 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.06 |
13 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
14 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
15 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
16 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
17 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.01 |
18 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.02 |
19 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.02 |
20 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.03 |
Figure 14: Reduction in Inflation Target in Endogenous Investment Model
Data for Figure 14 - Alternative 1: (ηc=1.5 and φi = 0.2)
Quarters | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly closed | Output: High openness | Domestic Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Inflation: Nearly closed | Domestic Inflation: High openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | -0.34 | -0.33 | -0.36 | -0.38 | -0.39 | -0.38 |
2 | -0.31 | -0.32 | -0.29 | -0.65 | -0.65 | -0.63 |
3 | -0.24 | -0.25 | -0.22 | -0.80 | -0.81 | -0.78 |
4 | -0.17 | -0.18 | -0.16 | -0.89 | -0.90 | -0.87 |
5 | -0.12 | -0.12 | -0.11 | -0.93 | -0.94 | -0.92 |
6 | -0.08 | -0.08 | -0.08 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.94 |
7 | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.06 | -0.96 | -0.96 | -0.95 |
8 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.96 | -0.96 | -0.95 |
9 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.95 | -0.96 | -0.95 |
10 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.95 |
11 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.95 |
12 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.95 |
13 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.95 |
14 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.95 |
15 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.95 |
16 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.95 |
17 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.95 |
18 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.95 |
19 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.95 |
20 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.95 |
Data for Figure 14 - Alternative 2: (ηc=6 and φi = 0.2)
Quarters | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly closed | Output: High openness | Domestic Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Inflation: Nearly closed | Domestic Inflation: High openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | -0.44 | -0.34 | -0.55 | -0.42 | -0.39 | -0.44 |
2 | -0.33 | -0.32 | -0.34 | -0.67 | -0.66 | -0.69 |
3 | -0.23 | -0.25 | -0.21 | -0.82 | -0.81 | -0.83 |
4 | -0.16 | -0.17 | -0.14 | -0.90 | -0.90 | -0.90 |
5 | -0.11 | -0.12 | -0.10 | -0.93 | -0.94 | -0.93 |
6 | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.07 | -0.95 | -0.95 | -0.95 |
7 | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.96 | -0.96 | -0.96 |
8 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.96 | -0.96 | -0.96 |
9 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.96 | -0.96 | -0.97 |
10 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.97 |
11 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.97 |
12 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.97 |
13 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.97 |
14 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.97 |
15 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.97 |
16 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.97 |
17 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.97 |
18 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.97 |
19 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.97 |
20 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.96 | -0.95 | -0.97 |
Data for Figure 14 - Alternative 3: (ηc=1.5 and φi = 0.01)
Quarters | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly closed | Output: High openness | Domestic Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Inflation: Nearly closed | Domestic Inflation: High openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | -0.82 | -0.84 | -0.75 | -0.54 | -0.55 | -0.52 |
2 | -0.52 | -0.52 | -0.53 | -0.78 | -0.79 | -0.76 |
3 | -0.27 | -0.26 | -0.29 | -0.86 | -0.87 | -0.84 |
4 | -0.14 | -0.14 | -0.16 | -0.89 | -0.90 | -0.86 |
5 | -0.09 | -0.09 | -0.10 | -0.90 | -0.91 | -0.87 |
6 | -0.07 | -0.06 | -0.07 | -0.91 | -0.92 | -0.88 |
7 | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.91 | -0.92 | -0.89 |
8 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.92 | -0.93 | -0.90 |
9 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.92 | -0.93 | -0.91 |
10 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.92 | -0.93 | -0.91 |
11 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.92 | -0.93 | -0.92 |
12 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.92 | -0.93 | -0.92 |
13 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.92 | -0.93 | -0.92 |
14 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.92 | -0.93 | -0.92 |
15 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.93 | -0.93 | -0.93 |
16 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.93 | -0.93 | -0.93 |
17 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.93 | -0.93 | -0.93 |
18 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.93 | -0.93 | -0.94 |
19 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.93 | -0.93 | -0.94 |
20 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.93 | -0.93 | -0.94 |
Figure 15: Increase in Technology: Workhorse Model vs. Imported Materials Model
Data for Figure 15 - Benchmark: No Imported Materials
Quarters | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly closed | Output: High openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High openness | Consumption: Benchmark | Consumption: Nearly closed | Consumption: High openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 1.11 | 0.99 | 1.22 | -0.75 | -0.77 | -0.73 | 1.23 | 1.86 | 0.58 |
2 | 1.10 | 0.97 | 1.22 | -0.97 | -1.01 | -0.94 | 1.22 | 1.84 | 0.58 |
3 | 1.01 | 0.91 | 1.11 | -0.87 | -0.92 | -0.82 | 1.12 | 1.71 | 0.53 |
4 | 0.90 | 0.82 | 0.98 | -0.63 | -0.69 | -0.58 | 1.00 | 1.55 | 0.46 |
5 | 0.81 | 0.75 | 0.86 | -0.38 | -0.44 | -0.33 | 0.89 | 1.41 | 0.40 |
6 | 0.74 | 0.69 | 0.78 | -0.19 | -0.25 | -0.15 | 0.81 | 1.30 | 0.36 |
7 | 0.70 | 0.66 | 0.73 | -0.08 | -0.14 | -0.05 | 0.76 | 1.24 | 0.33 |
8 | 0.68 | 0.64 | 0.71 | -0.05 | -0.10 | -0.02 | 0.74 | 1.20 | 0.32 |
9 | 0.67 | 0.63 | 0.70 | -0.06 | -0.11 | -0.05 | 0.73 | 1.19 | 0.32 |
10 | 0.67 | 0.63 | 0.71 | -0.11 | -0.14 | -0.09 | 0.73 | 1.18 | 0.32 |
11 | 0.67 | 0.62 | 0.71 | -0.15 | -0.19 | -0.14 | 0.73 | 1.17 | 0.32 |
12 | 0.66 | 0.61 | 0.70 | -0.19 | -0.22 | -0.17 | 0.72 | 1.15 | 0.32 |
13 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.69 | -0.21 | -0.25 | -0.19 | 0.70 | 1.13 | 0.32 |
14 | 0.63 | 0.58 | 0.67 | -0.22 | -0.26 | -0.20 | 0.69 | 1.10 | 0.31 |
15 | 0.61 | 0.57 | 0.65 | -0.22 | -0.26 | -0.20 | 0.67 | 1.07 | 0.30 |
16 | 0.59 | 0.55 | 0.63 | -0.21 | -0.25 | -0.19 | 0.65 | 1.04 | 0.29 |
17 | 0.58 | 0.53 | 0.61 | -0.20 | -0.24 | -0.18 | 0.63 | 1.00 | 0.28 |
18 | 0.56 | 0.52 | 0.59 | -0.19 | -0.23 | -0.17 | 0.60 | 0.97 | 0.27 |
19 | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0.57 | -0.18 | -0.22 | -0.16 | 0.59 | 0.94 | 0.26 |
20 | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.55 | -0.17 | -0.21 | -0.16 | 0.57 | 0.91 | 0.25 |
Data for Figure 15 - Imported Materials
Quarters | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly closed | Output: High openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High openness | Consumption: Benchmark | Consumption: Nearly closed | Consumption: High openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 1.07 | 0.98 | 1.14 | -0.71 | -0.77 | -0.64 | 1.33 | 1.87 | 0.74 |
2 | 1.06 | 0.97 | 1.13 | -0.93 | -1.01 | -0.83 | 1.32 | 1.85 | 0.74 |
3 | 0.98 | 0.90 | 1.05 | -0.84 | -0.92 | -0.76 | 1.23 | 1.72 | 0.69 |
4 | 0.88 | 0.82 | 0.94 | -0.62 | -0.69 | -0.56 | 1.10 | 1.56 | 0.62 |
5 | 0.79 | 0.74 | 0.84 | -0.39 | -0.44 | -0.35 | 0.99 | 1.42 | 0.55 |
6 | 0.73 | 0.69 | 0.76 | -0.21 | -0.25 | -0.19 | 0.91 | 1.32 | 0.50 |
7 | 0.69 | 0.66 | 0.72 | -0.11 | -0.14 | -0.09 | 0.86 | 1.25 | 0.47 |
8 | 0.67 | 0.64 | 0.70 | -0.07 | -0.10 | -0.06 | 0.83 | 1.22 | 0.45 |
9 | 0.66 | 0.63 | 0.69 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.06 | 0.82 | 1.20 | 0.45 |
10 | 0.66 | 0.62 | 0.68 | -0.11 | -0.14 | -0.10 | 0.82 | 1.19 | 0.44 |
11 | 0.65 | 0.62 | 0.68 | -0.15 | -0.19 | -0.13 | 0.81 | 1.18 | 0.44 |
12 | 0.64 | 0.61 | 0.67 | -0.19 | -0.22 | -0.17 | 0.80 | 1.16 | 0.44 |
13 | 0.63 | 0.60 | 0.66 | -0.21 | -0.25 | -0.19 | 0.79 | 1.14 | 0.43 |
14 | 0.62 | 0.58 | 0.65 | -0.22 | -0.26 | -0.20 | 0.77 | 1.11 | 0.42 |
15 | 0.60 | 0.57 | 0.63 | -0.22 | -0.26 | -0.20 | 0.75 | 1.08 | 0.41 |
16 | 0.58 | 0.55 | 0.61 | -0.22 | -0.25 | -0.19 | 0.72 | 1.05 | 0.39 |
17 | 0.56 | 0.53 | 0.59 | -0.21 | -0.24 | -0.19 | 0.70 | 1.01 | 0.38 |
18 | 0.55 | 0.52 | 0.57 | -0.20 | -0.23 | -0.18 | 0.68 | 0.98 | 0.37 |
19 | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0.55 | -0.19 | -0.22 | -0.17 | 0.66 | 0.95 | 0.36 |
20 | 0.51 | 0.48 | 0.54 | -0.18 | -0.21 | -0.16 | 0.63 | 0.92 | 0.35 |
Figure 16: Increase in Technology: Workhorse Model vs. Variable Desired Markups Model
Data for Figure 16 - Benchmark: CES Demand
Quarters | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly closed | Output: High openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High openness | Relative Import Price (Pm/Pd): Benchmark | Relative Import Price (Pm/Pd): Nearly closed | Relative Import Price (Pm/Pd): High openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.72 | 0.66 | 0.78 | -0.45 | -0.49 | -0.41 | 0.94 | 1.27 | 0.67 |
2 | 0.71 | 0.66 | 0.77 | -0.58 | -0.64 | -0.52 | 0.93 | 1.25 | 0.67 |
3 | 0.66 | 0.61 | 0.71 | -0.52 | -0.59 | -0.46 | 0.86 | 1.17 | 0.61 |
4 | 0.60 | 0.56 | 0.63 | -0.39 | -0.45 | -0.33 | 0.78 | 1.07 | 0.54 |
5 | 0.55 | 0.52 | 0.57 | -0.25 | -0.31 | -0.20 | 0.70 | 0.98 | 0.48 |
6 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.52 | -0.15 | -0.19 | -0.11 | 0.65 | 0.91 | 0.44 |
7 | 0.48 | 0.46 | 0.49 | -0.08 | -0.12 | -0.05 | 0.61 | 0.87 | 0.41 |
8 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.47 | -0.06 | -0.09 | -0.03 | 0.59 | 0.84 | 0.40 |
9 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.47 | -0.06 | -0.09 | -0.04 | 0.58 | 0.83 | 0.39 |
10 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.46 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.05 | 0.58 | 0.82 | 0.39 |
11 | 0.44 | 0.42 | 0.46 | -0.10 | -0.13 | -0.07 | 0.57 | 0.81 | 0.39 |
12 | 0.44 | 0.42 | 0.45 | -0.12 | -0.15 | -0.09 | 0.56 | 0.80 | 0.38 |
13 | 0.43 | 0.41 | 0.45 | -0.13 | -0.17 | -0.10 | 0.55 | 0.78 | 0.38 |
14 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.44 | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.11 | 0.54 | 0.76 | 0.37 |
15 | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.42 | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.11 | 0.52 | 0.74 | 0.36 |
16 | 0.40 | 0.38 | 0.41 | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.11 | 0.51 | 0.72 | 0.35 |
17 | 0.38 | 0.36 | 0.40 | -0.13 | -0.16 | -0.10 | 0.49 | 0.69 | 0.34 |
18 | 0.37 | 0.35 | 0.39 | -0.12 | -0.16 | -0.10 | 0.48 | 0.67 | 0.33 |
19 | 0.36 | 0.34 | 0.37 | -0.12 | -0.15 | -0.09 | 0.46 | 0.65 | 0.32 |
20 | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.36 | -0.11 | -0.15 | -0.09 | 0.45 | 0.63 | 0.31 |
Data for Figure 16 - Variable Elasticity of Demand
Quarters | Output: Benchmark | Output: Nearly closed | Output: High openness | Domestic Price Inflation: Benchmark | Domestic Price Inflation: Nearly closed | Domestic Price Inflation: High openness | Relative Import Price (Pm/Pd): Benchmark | Relative Import Price (Pm/Pd): Nearly closed | Relative Import Price (Pm/Pd): High openness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.60 | 0.56 | 0.67 | -0.13 | -0.15 | -0.10 | 0.51 | 0.57 | 0.40 |
2 | 0.60 | 0.56 | 0.65 | -0.21 | -0.24 | -0.16 | 0.51 | 0.58 | 0.41 |
3 | 0.59 | 0.55 | 0.63 | -0.26 | -0.30 | -0.19 | 0.52 | 0.57 | 0.42 |
4 | 0.57 | 0.54 | 0.60 | -0.28 | -0.33 | -0.21 | 0.51 | 0.56 | 0.42 |
5 | 0.54 | 0.52 | 0.57 | -0.28 | -0.33 | -0.21 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.42 |
6 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.54 | -0.27 | -0.32 | -0.20 | 0.49 | 0.53 | 0.42 |
7 | 0.50 | 0.49 | 0.51 | -0.25 | -0.30 | -0.18 | 0.47 | 0.51 | 0.41 |
8 | 0.47 | 0.47 | 0.48 | -0.23 | -0.28 | -0.17 | 0.46 | 0.49 | 0.40 |
9 | 0.46 | 0.45 | 0.46 | -0.22 | -0.25 | -0.16 | 0.44 | 0.47 | 0.39 |
10 | 0.44 | 0.43 | 0.45 | -0.20 | -0.23 | -0.15 | 0.43 | 0.45 | 0.38 |
11 | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.44 | -0.19 | -0.21 | -0.14 | 0.41 | 0.44 | 0.36 |
12 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.42 | -0.18 | -0.20 | -0.13 | 0.40 | 0.42 | 0.35 |
13 | 0.40 | 0.39 | 0.41 | -0.17 | -0.19 | -0.13 | 0.39 | 0.41 | 0.34 |
14 | 0.39 | 0.38 | 0.41 | -0.17 | -0.18 | -0.13 | 0.38 | 0.40 | 0.33 |
15 | 0.38 | 0.37 | 0.40 | -0.16 | -0.18 | -0.13 | 0.37 | 0.39 | 0.32 |
16 | 0.37 | 0.37 | 0.39 | -0.16 | -0.18 | -0.13 | 0.36 | 0.38 | 0.31 |
17 | 0.37 | 0.36 | 0.38 | -0.16 | -0.18 | -0.13 | 0.35 | 0.37 | 0.30 |
18 | 0.36 | 0.35 | 0.37 | -0.16 | -0.18 | -0.13 | 0.34 | 0.36 | 0.30 |
19 | 0.35 | 0.34 | 0.36 | -0.16 | -0.18 | -0.13 | 0.33 | 0.35 | 0.29 |
20 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.35 | -0.16 | -0.18 | -0.13 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 0.28 |
* We thank Malin Adolfson (our discussant), Jordi Galí, Mark Gertler, Steve Kamin, Donald Kohn, Andrew Levin, and John Taylor for helpful comments and suggestions, and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Board, and at the June 2007 NBER Conference "International Dimensions of Monetary Policy." We also thank Hilary Croke for excellent research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System. Return to text
** Corresponding author: 20th and C Streets NW, Washington, DC 20051 USA; phone: 202-452-2575; fax: 202-872-4926. Email addresses: christopher.erceg@frb.gov, christopher.gust@frb.gov, david.lopez-salido@frb.gov. Return to text
1. Our approach follows the seminal work of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and a large subsequent literature that incorporates nominal rigidities into microfounded open-economy DSGE models. See Lane (2001) for a survey. Return to text
2. There is a burgeoning literature examining optimal monetary policy in an open-economy setting. Some notable examples include Benigno and Benigno (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), and Devereux and Engel (2003). Return to text
3. This extends the results of Galí and Monacelli (2005), who also showed that the effects of openness can be summarized in a single composite parameter. Return to text
4. An inclusive description of SIGMA is provided by Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2006) for the case in which product demand is characterized by a Dixit-Stiglitz CES aggregator, implying a constant desired markup. Gust and Sheets (2006) extend the model to allow for variable desired markups, as in the version used in this paper, though they abstract from capital accumulation and examine a smaller array of shocks. Return to text
5. Our specification of habit persistence in consumption and adjustment costs on investment follows Smets and Wouters (2003). Return to text
6. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), SIGMA incorporates dynamic indexation of both price and wage contracts, though the latter are indexed to past aggregate wage inflation. Return to text
7. In these experiments, we vary openness by changing the share parameter in the NCES aggregators used to produce consumption and investment from the home and foreign goods. Return to text
8. Given the presence of adjustment costs on the expenditure components, the interest-sensitivity depends on how persistent an effect the shock has on the real interest rate. For shocks that exert more persistent effects on real interest rates, exports show a relatively higher interest-sensitivity than private domestic demand, and the aggregate interest-sensitivity of the economy rises more substantially with openness. For example, the interest-sensitivity rises more with greater openness under an alternative model calibration that increases the duration of wage and price contracts (since the real interest rate response in that case is more persistent). Similarly, the government spending shock below has a more persistent impact on the real interest rate, with the implication that the economy becomes more interest-sensitive with greater openness. Return to text
9. The limited variation in the desired markup reflects that the real interest rate shows a fairly transient rise, and hence the real exchange rate does not appreciate much. Under an alternative model calibration implying a more persistent rise in real interest rates - derived by assuming longer contract durations - desired markups and hence inflation show more variation with openness. Return to text
10. Ball (1994) reached similar conclusions based on sacrifice ratios for a much larger set of episodes. Our approach differs insofar as we compare sacrifice ratios across countries over similar time periods (rather than pooling all episodes together) as a rough means of controlling for different levels of monetary policy credibility. Return to text
11. Government spending is modelled as an AR(1) process with an autocorrelation coefficient equal to 0.97. Return to text
12. Thus, even if the monetary rule were aggressive enough to close the output gap, the gap between the real wage and flexible price real wage would put upward pressure on marginal cost and inflation. We provide an extensive discussion of the implications of the "real wage gap" for marginal cost and inflation in Section 3.7. Return to text
13. The technology shock is an AR(1) process with an autocorrelation coefficient equal to 0.97. Return to text
14. As
discussed earlier in the household problem, we defined
to be the price in period
of a claim that pays one dollar if the
specified state occurs in period
. Thus, the
corresponding element of
equals
divided by the probability that
the specified state will occur. Return to text
15. For a discussion of the macro estimates and estimates after trade liberalizations, see Ruhl (2005). Return to text
16. See, for example, Attanasio and Weber (1995), Attanasio and Weber (1997), or Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997). Return to text
17. MacCurdy (1986) obtained a point estimate of 0.15 for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply for men, a finding largely confirmed in the literature (e.g., Altonji (1986), Card (1994), and more recently Pencavel (2002)). For an alternative view, see Mulligan (1998). Finally, there is more uncertainty regarding the labor supply elasticity for females. For this group, Pencavel (1998) obtained a point estimate of 0.21. Return to text
18. In closely related work,
Woodford (2007) examines how the monetary transmission mechanism
changes with the degree of trade openness in a sticky price model.
His model specification imposes a trade price elasticity of unity,
and he calibrates the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
to proxy for the high interest
rate sensitivity of investment. Accordingly, in his calibration, an
increase in openness lowers the interest rate sensitivity of the
economy. Return to text
19. The simulations are derived in the two country version of the model in which the home country constitutes 25 percent of world output. However, it makes little difference to our results if the relative size of the home country were set close to zero (even in the high openness case, we found that the sensitivity of the simulation results to the relative size of the home economy is quite small.) Return to text
20. Moreover, as suggested by our discussion above, differences in the MRS slope due to openness have little influence on the real wage response. Thus, with the potential real wage unaffected by the shock, the real wage gap in equation (38) behaves similarly irrespective of openness, so that marginal cost depends mainly on the response of the employment (or output) gap. Return to text
21. The variance tradeoff frontier is not very sensitive to the relative size of the home country. Hence, although we derive our results assuming that the home country constitutes 25 percent of world output, the tradeoff frontiers are not markedly different in the case in which the home country share of world output is close to zero. In the latter case, the policymaker tradeoff frontier can be derived by minimizing the loss function subject to the behavioral equations (31) - (36) that apply in the small open economy variant of our model. Return to text
22. Note that the vertical axis shows the standard deviation of inflation, and the horizontal axis the standard deviation of the output gap. Return to text
23. Note that Figures 10 and 11 depict the relative weight on the output gap using an exponential scale, so that e.g., the tick label -5 corresponds to a weight of unity on inflation, and exp(-5) on the output gap. Return to text
24. This intermediation cost is asymmetric, as foreign households do not face this cost; rather, they collect profits on the monopoly rents associated with the intermediation costs. Return to text
25. In the
model with material imports, we vary both
and
to alter the ratio of imports to
GDP in each scenario. As a result, the more open economy is
characterized by larger values of both
and
; however, the fraction of
material imports to overall imports is held fixed at 25 percent in
all cases. Finally, the simulations shown in Figure 15 restrict
, but otherwise adopt the values
used in our benchmark calibration. Return to text
26. For a survey of this literature, see Goldberg and Knetter (1997), and for more recent empirical evidence for the United States, see Marazzi, Sheets, and Vigfusson (2005). Return to text
27. See Bergin and Feenstra (2001) for a discussion of how the interaction of demand curves with non-constant elasticities with sticky prices can be helpful in accounting for exchange rate dynamics. Return to text
28. For
convenience, we assume that the value added function is linear in
labor (). Return to text
This version is optimized for use by screen readers. Descriptions for all mathematical expressions are provided in LaTex format. A printable pdf version is available. Return to text