Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test 2013: Supervisory Stress Test
Methodology and Results
- Executive Summary
- Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing
- Severely Adverse Scenario
Executive Summary
The Federal Reserve expects large, complex bank holding companies (BHCs) to hold sufficient capital to continue lending to support real economic activity, even under adverse economic conditions. Stress testing is one tool that helps bank supervisors measure whether a BHC has enough capital to support its operations throughout periods of stress. The Federal Reserve previously highlighted the use of stress tests as a means of assessing capital sufficiency under stress during the 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) and the 2011 and 2012 Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) exercises.1
In the wake of the financial crisis, the Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 2 which requires the Federal Reserve to conduct an annual stress test of large BHCs and all nonbank financial companies designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) for Federal Reserve supervision to evaluate whether they have sufficient capital to absorb losses resulting from adverse economic conditions. The Dodd-Frank Act also requires BHCs and other financial companies supervised by the Federal Reserve to conduct their own stress tests. The Federal Reserve adopted rules implementing these requirements in October 2012. Under the rules, 18 BHCs are part of the Dodd-Frank Act supervisory stress tests this year (DFAST 2013).3
This report describes the hypothetical, severely adverse scenario designed by the Federal Reserve; provides an overview of the analytical framework and methods used to generate the projections of revenues, expenses, losses, and the resulting post-stress capital ratios for each of the 18 BHCs; and discloses the results of the 2013 Dodd-Frank Act supervisory stress test. The Federal Reserve believes that disclosure of stress test results provides valuable information to market participants and the public, enhances transparency, and promotes market discipline. The projections provide a unique perspective on the robustness of the capital positions of these firms because they incorporate detailed information about the risk characteristics and business activities of each BHC and because they are estimated using a consistent approach across all the BHCs, providing comparable results across firms. The Federal Reserve also believes that providing information about the methodology used to produce the results will offer useful context to interpret those results.
The projections were calculated using input data provided by the 18 BHCs and a set of models developed or selected by the Federal Reserve, 4 based on a hypothetical, severely adverse macroeconomic and financial market scenario developed by the Federal Reserve. The severely adverse scenario features a deep recession in the United States, Europe, and Japan, significant declines in asset prices and increases in risk premia, and a marked economic slowdown in developing Asia. The Federal Reserve also applied a separate global market shock to six BHCs with large trading, private equity, and counterparty exposures from derivatives and financing transactions.5
The models project revenues, expenses, losses, and the resulting post-stress capital ratios for each BHC over a nine-quarter planning horizon extending through the end of 2014. The Federal Reserve's projections should not be interpreted as expected or likely outcomes for these firms, but rather as possible results under hypothetical, severely adverse conditions. These projections incorporate a number of conservative modeling assumptions, but do not make explicit behavioral assumptions about the possible actions of a BHC's creditors and counterparties in the scenario, except through the severely adverse scenario's characterizations of financial asset prices and economic activity.
To make the projections of post-stress capital ratios more comparable across BHCs, the projections reflect assumptions about capital distributions prescribed in the Dodd-Frank Act stress test rule. Over the nine-quarter planning horizon, each BHC maintains its common stock dividend payments at the same level as the previous year, but repurchases and issuance of common stock is assumed to be zero except for common stock issuance associated with expensed employee compensation.6
The results of these projections suggest that, in the aggregate, the 18 BHCs would experience substantial losses under the severely adverse scenario. Over the nine quarters of the planning horizon, losses at the 18 BHCs under the severely adverse scenario are projected to be $462 billion, including losses across loan portfolios, losses on securities held in the BHCs' investment portfolios, trading and counterparty credit losses from the global market shock, and other losses. Projected net revenue before provisions for loan and lease losses (pre-provision net revenue, or PPNR) at the 18 BHCs over the nine quarters of the planning horizon under the severely adverse scenario is $268 billion, which is net of losses related to operational-risk events and mortgage repurchases, as well as expenses related to disposition of owned real estate of $101 billion. Taken together, the high projected losses and low projected PPNR at the 18 BHCs results in projected net income before taxes of -$194 billion.
These net income projections result in substantial projected declines in regulatory capital ratios for nearly all of the BHCs under the severely adverse scenario. As illustrated in figure 1, the aggregate tier 1 common ratio would fall from an actual 11.1 percent in the third quarter of 2012 to a post-stress level of 7.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014, including assumed capital actions for the 18 BHCs.
Note: Aggregate capital ratios for 18 participating bank holding companies (BHCs). Post-stress estimates are supervisory estimates under the severely adverse scenario.
The tier 1 common ratio in the fourth quarter of 2008 includes the tier 1 common capital and risk-weighted assets for Ally Financial Inc. as of the first quarter of 2009, as Ally was not a Y-9C filer in the fourth quarter of 2008.
Errata
The Federal Reserve revised this paper on March 14, 2013, to reflect corrected data received from one bank holding company. The revisions are listed below.
Under "Stressed Regulatory Capital Ratios," the numbers in the third sentence have been revised from 2.0 to 3.9 to 2.1 and 4.0, respectively.
Under Table 1.A:
Tier 1 capital ratio (%), Stressed capital ratios, Q4 2014 has been revised from 9.2 to 9.1.
Tier 1 capital ratio (%), Stressed capital ratios,Minimum has been revised from 9.0 to 8.9.
Total risk-based capital ratio (%), Stressed capital ratios, Q4 2014 has been revised from 11.8 to 11.7.
Total risk-based capital ratio (%), Stressed capital ratios,Minimum has been revised from 11.7 to 11.6.
Tier 1 leverage ratio (%), Stressed capital ratios, Q4 2014 has been revised from 6.0 to 5.9.
Tier 1 leverage ratio (%), Stressed capital ratios,Minimum has been revised from 6.0 to 5.9.
Under Table 2:
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Tier 1 capital ratio (%), Projected Q4 2014 has been revised from 10.8 to 9.8.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Tier 1 capital ratio (%), Projected minimum has been revised from 8.4 to 7.5.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Total risk-based capital ratio (%), Projected Q4 2014, has been revised from 13.8 to
12.8.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Total risk-based capital ratio (%), Projected minimum has been revised from 11.3 to
10.4.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Tier 1 leverage ratio (%), Projected Q4 2014 has been revised from 6.2 to 5.6.
18 participating bank holding companies, Tier 1 capital ratio (%), Projected Q4 2014 has been revised from 9.2 to 9.1.
18 participating bank holding companies, Tier 1 capital ratio (%), Projected minimum has been revised from 9.0 to 8.9.
18 participating bank holding companies, Total risk-based capital ratio (%), Projected Q4 2014 has been revised from 11.8
to 11.7.
18 participating bank holding companies, Total risk-based capital ratio (%), Projected minimum has been revised from
11.7 to 11.6.
18 participating bank holding companies, Tier 1 leverage ratio (%), Projected Q4 2014 has been revised from 6.0 to 5.9.
18 participating bank holding companies, Tier 1 leverage ratio (%), Projected minimum has been revised from 6.0 to 5.9.
Under Table C.9:
Tier 1 capital ratio (%), Stressed capital ratios, Q4 2014 has been revised from 10.8 to 9.8.
Tier 1 capital ratio (%), Stressed capital ratios,Minimum has been revised from 8.4 to 7.5.
Total risk-based capital ratio (%), Stressed capital ratios, Q4 2014 has been revised from 13.8 to 12.8.
Total risk-based capital ratio (%), Stressed capital ratios,Minimum has been revised from 11.3 to 10.4.
Tier 1 leverage ratio (%), Stressed capital ratios, Q4 2014 has been revised from 6.2 to 5.6.
References
1. The CCAR is an annual exercise by the Federal Reserve to ensure that institutions have robust, forward-looking capital planning processes that account for their unique risks and sufficient capital to continue operations throughout times of economic and financial stress. As part of the CCAR, the Federal Reserve evaluates institutions' capital adequacy, internal capital adequacy assessment processes, and their plans to make capital distributions, such as dividend payments or stock repurchases, and other actions that affect capital. Return to text
2. See 12 USC 5365(i)(1). Return to text
3. The 18 BHCs that participated in the 2013 Dodd-Frank Act stress test are Ally Financial Inc.; American Express Company; Bank of America Corporation; The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation; BB&T Corporation; Capital One Financial Corporation; Citigroup, Inc.; Fifth Third Bancorp; The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; KeyCorp; Morgan Stanley; The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.; Regions Financial Corporation; State Street Corporation; SunTrust Banks, Inc.; U.S. Bancorp; and Wells Fargo & Company. Although MetLife, Inc. had participated in the 2009 SCAP and previous CCAR exercises, it did not participate in the 2013 Dodd-Frank Act stress test because it was in the process of deregistering as a bank holding company when the exercise began and has now completed that process. Return to text
4. A list of providers of the proprietary models and data used by the Federal Reserve in connection with DFAST 2013 is available in appendix B. Return to text
5. The six BHCs subject to the global market shock are Bank of America Corporation; Citigroup, Inc.; The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Morgan Stanley; and Wells Fargo & Company. See 12 CFR 252.134(b); see also 12 CFR 252.144(b)(2)(i). Return to text
6. See 12 CFR 252.146(b)(2). Return to text