Results for Banks under the Severely Adverse Scenario

This section contains the Federal Reserve's results for the 2023 stress test under the severely adverse scenario. The results are presented both in the aggregate and for individual banks.

The aggregate results incorporate the combined sensitivities of capital, losses, revenues, and expenses across all banks to the stressed economic and financial market conditions contained in the severely adverse scenario. The range of results across individual banks indicates differences in business focus, asset composition, revenue and expense sources, and portfolio risk characteristics. Boxes 2 through 4 contain additional information regarding key themes in this year's stress test. Box 2 contains additional insights about the results by placing them in context of results from recent years. A discussion of commercial real estate exposures in the 2023 test is highlighted in box 3. Box 4 contains a summary of the results and lessons learned from the additional, exploratory market shock applied to U.S. global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The comprehensive 2023 stress test results for individual banks are in appendix A.

Capital

Under the severely adverse scenario, the aggregate CET1 capital ratio is projected to decline from 12.4 percent at the start of the projection horizon to a minimum of 9.9 percent before rising to 10.5 percent at the end of nine quarters (see table 3). Tables 4 and 5 present post-stress minimum capital ratios for each bank, and the change from the start of the projection horizon varies considerably across banks (see figure 4). This variation is due to differences in banks' business lines, portfolio composition, and securities and loan risk characteristics, which drive changes in the magnitude and timing of loss, revenue, and expense projections.

Table 3. Aggregate capital ratios and risk-weighted assets, actual 2022:Q4 and projected 2023:Q1–2025:Q1**

Percent except as noted

Item Actual
2022:Q4
Projected
2025:Q1*
Projected
minimum*
Common equity tier 1 capital ratio 12.4 10.5 9.9
Tier 1 capital ratio 14.1 12.2 11.6
Total capital ratio 16.1 14.3 13.9
Tier 1 leverage ratio 7.5 6.4 6.1
Supplementary leverage ratio 6.3 5.5 5.1
Risk-weighted assets 1 (billions of dollars) 10,090.1 9,973.4  

Note: The capital ratios are calculated using the capital action assumptions provided within the supervisory stress testing rules. See 12 C.F.R. § 238.132(d); 12 C.F.R. § 252.44(c). These projections represent hypothetical estimates that involve an economic outcome that is more adverse than expected. The minimum capital ratios are for the period 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1. Supplementary leverage ratio projections only include estimates for banks subject to Category I, II, or III standards.

 1. For each quarter, risk-weighted assets are calculated under the Board's standardized approach to risk-based capital in 12 C.F.R. pt. 217, subpt. D. Return to table

*The data in the "Projected 2025:Q1" and "Projected minimum" columns were revised.

**Note: The Federal Reserve revised this report on July 27, 2023, due to two banks, Bank of America Corporation and The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, submitting incorrect data. The revisions from the incorrect submissions do not result in a change to either bank's stress capital buffer but do affect projected capital ratios. In its review of these banks' data, the Federal Reserve conducted reviews of the other banks that underwent the stress test and found no errors in their submissions.

Table 4. Projected minimum common equity tier 1 capital ratio under the severely adverse scenario, 2023:Q1–2025:Q1: 23 banks**

Percent

Bank Stressed ratios with
supervisory stress testing
capital action assumptions*
Bank of America 9.3
Bank of NY-Mellon 11.7
Barclays US 9.3
BMO 9.3
Capital One 8.0
Charles Schwab Corp 22.8
Citigroup 9.1
Citizens 6.4
Credit Suisse USA 20.5
DB USA 17.4
Goldman Sachs 10.1
JPMorgan Chase 11.1
M&T 7.0
Morgan Stanley 11.2
Northern Trust 11.4
PNC 7.9
RBC USA 10.8
State Street 13.8
TD Group 15.9
Truist 6.7
UBS Americas 8.0
US Bancorp 6.6
Wells Fargo 8.2

Note: The capital ratios are calculated using the capital action assumptions provided within the supervisory stress testing rules. See 12 C.F.R. §238.132(d); 12 C.F.R. §252.44(c). These projections represent hypothetical estimates that involve an economic outcome that is more adverse than expected. The minimum capital ratio presented is for the period 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1.

*The "Stressed ratios with supervisory stress testing capital action assumptions" column, the data for Bank of America and Bank of NY-Mellon were revised.

**Note: The Federal Reserve revised this report on July 27, 2023, due to two banks, Bank of America Corporation and The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, submitting incorrect data. The revisions from the incorrect submissions do not result in a change to either bank's stress capital buffer but do affect projected capital ratios. In its review of these banks' data, the Federal Reserve conducted reviews of the other banks that underwent the stress test and found no errors in their submissions.

Table 5. Capital ratios, actual 2022:Q4 and projected 2023:Q1–2025:Q1 under the severely adverse scenario: 23 banks**

Percent

Bank Common equity
tier 1 capital ratio
Tier 1 capital ratio Total capital ratio Tier 1 leverage ratio Supplementary
leverage ratio1
Actual
2022:
Q4
Ending Mini-
mum
Actual
2022:
Q4
Ending Mini-
mum
Actual
2022:
Q4
Ending Mini-
mum
Actual
2022:
Q4
Ending Mini-
mum
Actual
2022:
Q4
Ending Mini-
mum
Bank of America* 11.2 9.9 9.3 13.0 11.7 11.1 14.9 13.7 13.4 7.0 6.2 5.9 5.9 5.3 5.0
Bank of NY-Mellon* 11.3 14.9 11.7 14.4 17.9 14.7 15.3 18.9 15.8 5.8 7.2 5.9 6.8 8.5 7.0
Barclays US 13.5 10.2 9.3 15.1 11.8 11.0 16.9 13.8 13.0 8.2 6.3 5.8 5.8 4.4 4.1
BMO 12.6 9.3 9.3 13.5 10.2 10.2 15.0 12.2 12.2 9.9 7.4 7.4      
Capital One 12.5 8.0 8.0 13.9 9.3 9.3 15.8 11.3 11.3 11.1 7.5 7.5 9.5 6.3 6.3
Charles Schwab Corp 21.9 27.0 22.8 28.9 34.0 29.8 28.9 34.3 29.9 7.2 8.4 7.4 7.1 8.4 7.3
Citigroup 13.0 9.7 9.1 14.8 11.5 10.9 17.3 13.9 13.5 7.1 5.3 5.0 5.8 4.4 4.2
Citizens 10.0 6.4 6.4 11.1 7.5 7.5 12.8 9.6 9.6 9.3 6.3 6.3      
Credit Suisse USA 27.8 20.7 20.5 29.0 21.9 21.7 29.2 21.9 21.7 19.8 14.8 14.6 16.4 12.3 12.2
DB USA 26.1 17.5 17.4 34.4 26.7 26.6 34.4 27.0 26.9 10.4 7.4 7.3 9.5 6.7 6.7
Goldman Sachs 15.0 12.6 10.1 16.6 14.2 11.7 19.1 16.6 14.6 7.3 6.2 5.0 5.8 4.9 4.0
JPMorgan Chase 13.2 11.9 11.1 14.9 13.5 12.7 16.8 15.4 14.8 6.6 6.0 5.6 5.6 5.1 4.8
M&T 10.4 7.0 7.0 11.8 8.4 8.4 13.6 10.3 10.3 9.2 6.5 6.5      
Morgan Stanley 15.3 14.9 11.2 17.2 16.8 13.2 19.3 19.0 15.5 6.7 6.5 5.0 5.5 5.4 4.1
Northern Trust 10.8 12.2 11.4 11.8 13.2 12.3 13.9 16.0 15.0 7.1 7.9 7.4 7.9 8.8 8.3
PNC 9.1 8.0 7.9 10.4 9.4 9.2 12.3 11.1 11.1 8.2 7.4 7.3 6.9 6.2 6.1
RBC USA 15.0 10.8 10.8 15.0 10.8 10.8 15.6 12.0 12.0 9.9 7.0 7.0      
State Street 13.6 17.8 13.8 15.4 19.7 15.7 16.8 21.3 17.2 6.0 7.6 6.0 7.0 8.8 7.0
TD Group 17.4 15.9 15.9 17.4 15.9 15.9 18.6 16.9 16.9 9.2 8.4 8.4 8.1 7.4 7.4
Truist 9.0 6.7 6.7 10.5 8.2 8.2 12.4 10.8 10.8 8.5 6.6 6.6 7.3 5.7 5.7
UBS Americas 16.1 8.0 8.0 23.3 16.1 16.1 23.4 17.4 17.4 8.5 5.3 5.3 7.7 4.8 4.8
US Bancorp 8.4 6.9 6.6 9.8 8.4 8.1 11.9 10.5 10.3 7.9 6.7 6.4 6.4 5.4 5.2
Wells Fargo 10.6 8.4 8.2 12.1 9.9 9.7 14.8 12.7 12.6 8.3 6.7 6.6 6.9 5.6 5.4
23 banks 12.4 10.5 9.9 14.1 12.2 11.6 16.1 14.3 13.9 7.5 6.4 6.1 6.3 5.5 5.1

Note: The capital ratios are calculated using the capital action assumptions provided within the supervisory stress testing rules. See 12 C.F.R. §238.132(d); 12 C.F.R. §252.44(c). These projections represent hypothetical estimates that involve an economic outcome that is more adverse than expected. The minimum capital ratios are for the period 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1.

 1. Supplementary leverage ratio projections only include estimates for banks subject to Category I, II, or III standards. Return to table

*The data in the rows for Bank of America, Bank of NY-Mellon, and the 23 banks were revised.

**Note: The Federal Reserve revised this report on July 27, 2023, due to two banks, Bank of America Corporation and The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, submitting incorrect data. The revisions from the incorrect submissions do not result in a change to either bank's stress capital buffer but do affect projected capital ratios. In its review of these banks' data, the Federal Reserve conducted reviews of the other banks that underwent the stress test and found no errors in their submissions.

Figure 4. Change from 2022:Q4 to minimum common equity tier 1 capital ratio in the severely adverse scenario**
Figure 4. Change from 2022:Q4 to minimum common equity tier 1 capital ratio in the severely adverse scenario

Accessible Version | Return to text

Note: Estimates of minimum common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital as a percent of risk-weighted assets are for the nine-quarter period from 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1. Negative values indicate CET1 ratio increases.

*The data for Bank of America and Bank of NY-Mellon were revised.

**Note: The Federal Reserve revised this report on July 27, 2023, due to two banks, Bank of America Corporation and The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, submitting incorrect data. The revisions from the incorrect submissions do not result in a change to either bank's stress capital buffer but do affect projected capital ratios. In its review of these banks' data, the Federal Reserve conducted reviews of the other banks that underwent the stress test and found no errors in their submissions.

Box 2. Results Highlights from 2019 to 2023

The results of the 2023 stress test indicate large banks would experience substantial losses under the severely adverse scenario but would maintain capital ratios well above minimum risk-based requirements.

The aggregate CET1 capital ratio declines by 2.5* percentage points from the start of the projection horizon to its minimum in the 2023 stress test. This decline is smaller than the 2.7 percentage point decline in the 2022 stress test, but comparable to projected declines in recent years (see figure A). The smaller decline in this year's aggregate post-stress capital ratio is mostly due to the path of interest rates in the scenario.

Figure A. Aggregate maximum decline in stressed common equity tier 1 capital ratio, severely adverse scenario**
Figure A. Aggregate maximum decline in stressed common equity tier 1 capital ratio, severely adverse scenario

Accessible Version | Return to text

Note: The bar represents the aggregate maximum common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio decline of the banks in each exercise. The values for the 2019 stress test are estimates of the CET1 capital ratio decline had the stress capital buffer rule been in place at that time. For purposes of this figure, the 2019 stress test values assume (1) a constant level of assets over the projection horizon, (2) no common dividend payments, (3) no issuances or repurchases of common or preferred stock (except those related to business plan changes), and (4) fully phased-in capital deductions.

*The data point for the "2023 stress test" was revised.

**Note: The Federal Reserve revised this report on July 27, 2023, due to two banks, Bank of America Corporation and The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, submitting incorrect data. The revisions from the incorrect submissions do not result in a change to either bank's stress capital buffer but do affect projected capital ratios. In its review of these banks' data, the Federal Reserve conducted reviews of the other banks that underwent the stress test and found no errors in their submissions.

Interest rates fall more in the 2023 scenario than in scenarios from recent years because rates were higher at the start of the stress test. The significant decline aligns with the typical behavior of interest rates in a severe recession. For example, the 3-month Treasury rate declines by 390 basis points in this year's scenario. That rate did not decline in the December 2020, 2021, and 2022 scenarios, when interest rates were near zero at the start of the stress test (see figure B).

The decline in interest rates in this year's stress test has offsetting effects on bank capital: it increases the projected market value of securities and reduces projected net interest income. Banks entered the 2023 stress test with large unrealized losses on their available-for-sale (AFS) securities portfolios. Unrealized gains and losses on AFS securities are recognized in accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) and flow through to the regulatory capital ratios for the largest firms.1

Figure B. 3-month Treasury yield, severely adverse scenario
Figure B. 3-month Treasury yield, severely adverse scenario Accessible Version | Return to text

 

At the beginning of the 2023 stress test, most banks started with large unrealized losses because the market value of their securities fell as interest rates rose in 2022. However, under the hypothetical recession in the stress test, rates decline, the market values of most securities increase, and these unrealized losses decline. Figure C illustrates this relationship over the past few stress test cycles. In conjunction with the decline in interest rates during the projection horizon, interest earned on assets falls significantly, which somewhat offsets the projected improvement in securities values.

Figure C. Accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) in capital to risk-weighted assets, starting point and stressed minimum
Figure C. Accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) in capital to risk-weighted assets, starting point and stressed minimum

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Note: Only firms subject to Category I or II standards or firms that opt in are required to include unrealized gains and losses on securities in the calculation of capital. Category III and IV firms are not required to include unrealized gains and losses on securities in the calculation of capital.

 *The data point for "2023 stress test," "Minimum quarter AOCI in capital," was revised

**Note: The Federal Reserve revised this report on July 27, 2023, due to two banks, Bank of America Corporation and The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, submitting incorrect data. The revisions from the incorrect submissions do not result in a change to either bank's stress capital buffer but do affect projected capital ratios. In its review of these banks' data, the Federal Reserve conducted reviews of the other banks that underwent the stress test and found no errors in their submissions.

In contrast to the improvement in forecasted unrealized losses on securities, projected net income in the stress test is roughly similar to prior years. The forecasted loss rates on consumer loans increased this year, driven by the larger shocks to the unemployment rate and house prices in this year's scenario.2

Meanwhile, the loss rates on wholesale loans, such as loans to businesses, decreased because the credit quality of these loans has improved since last year (see figure D). In the aggregate, these effects roughly offset.

Figure D. Cumulative consumer and wholesale loss rate through stressed minimum, severely adverse scenario
Figure D. Consumer loss rate and wholesale loss rate, severely adverse scenario

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Note: Consumer loss rate includes losses on domestic and foreign first-lien mortgages, domestic and foreign junior-lien mortgages and home equity lines of credit, credit cards, automobile loans, student loans, and all other consumer loans. Wholesale loss rates includes losses on domestic and foreign commercial real estate and commercial and industrial loans. Losses are cumulative through the projection quarter at which the aggregate capital ratio is the lowest for each stress test.

1. Only firms subject to Category I or II standards or firms that opt in are required to include unrealized gains and losses on securities in the calculation of capital. Category III and IV firms are not required to include unrealized gains and losses on securities in the calculation of capital. Return to text

2. The relatively more severe unemployment and house price paths in this year's scenario are consistent with the approach outlined in the Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing (see 12 C.F.R. pt. 252, appendix A), which calls for the unemployment rate to increase to a level of 10 percent and house prices to fall such that the ratio of house prices to per capita disposable income reaches the trough experienced in the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis. These features of the scenario design framework are intended to limit procyclicality in the financial system by increasing the severity of the scenario during economic expansions and thereby increasing the resilience of the banking system to building risks. Return to text

Pre-tax Net Income

Projections of pre-tax net income are the largest component of post-stress changes in capital.7 Over the nine quarters of the projection horizon, aggregate cumulative pre-tax net income is projected to be negative $190 billion, which equals negative 1 percent of average total assets (see table 6). As a percent of average assets, projected cumulative pre-tax net income is negative for 20 out of 23 banks and varies considerably across banks, ranging from negative 5.7 percent to positive 1.9 percent (see figure 5 and table 7). This range illustrates differences in the sensitivity of the various components of pre-tax net income to the economic and financial market conditions in the severely adverse scenario. These components include cumulative projections of losses and pre-provision net revenue (PPNR), which are discussed in further detail below.

Table 6. Projected aggregate losses, revenue, and net income before taxes through 2025:Q1 under the severely adverse scenario**
Item Billions of dollars* Percent of average assets* 1
Pre-provision net revenue 349.0 1.8
equals
Net interest income 791.6 4.1
Noninterest income 710.8 3.7
less
Noninterest expense2 1,153.4 6.0
Other revenue3 0.0  
less
Provisions for loan and lease losses 421.9  
Credit losses on investment securities (AFS/HTM)4 5.4  
Trading and counterparty losses5 94.0  
Other losses/gains6 18.1  
equals
Net income before taxes −190.4 −1.0
Memo items    
Other comprehensive income*7 36.9  
Other effects on capital Actual 2022:Q4 2025:Q1
AOCI included in capital (billions of dollars) −98.0 −61.1

 1. Average assets is the nine-quarter average of total assets. Return to table

 2. Noninterest expense includes losses from operational-risk events and other real estate owned (OREO) costs. Return to table

 3. Other revenue includes one-time income and (expense) items not included in pre-provision net revenue. Return to table

 4. For banks that have adopted ASU 2016-13, the Federal Reserve incorporated its projection of expected credit losses on securities in the allowance for credit losses. AFS/HTM (available-for-sale/held-to-maturity). Return to table

 5. Trading and counterparty losses include mark-to-market and credit valuation adjustment (CVA) losses and losses arising from the counterparty default scenario component applied to derivatives, securities lending, and repurchase agreement activities. Return to table

 6. Other losses/gains include projected change in fair value of loans held for sale or held for investment and measured under the fair-value option, losses/gains on hedges on loans measured at fair value or amortized cost, and goodwill impairment losses. Return to table

 7. Other comprehensive income is only calculated for banks subject to Category I or II standards or banks that opt in to including accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) in their calculation of capital. Return to table

*The data in the "Billions of dollars" column, "Other comprehensive income" row, and in the "Percent of average assets" column, "AOCI included in capital (billions of dollars)" row, were revised

**Note: The Federal Reserve revised this report on July 27, 2023, due to two banks, Bank of America Corporation and The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, submitting incorrect data. The revisions from the incorrect submissions do not result in a change to either bank's stress capital buffer but do affect projected capital ratios. In its review of these banks' data, the Federal Reserve conducted reviews of the other banks that underwent the stress test and found no errors in their submissions.

Figure 5. Pre-tax net income rates in the severely adverse scenario
Figure 5. Pre-tax net income rates in the severely adverse scenario

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Note: Estimates are for the nine-quarter period from 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1 as a percent of average assets.

Table 7. Projected losses, revenue, and net income before taxes through 2025:Q1 under the severely adverse scenario: 23 banks**

Billions of dollars

Bank Sum of revenues Minus sum of provisions and losses Equals Memo
items*
Other effects on capital*
Pre-provision net revenue1 Other
revenue2
Provisions for loan and lease losses Credit losses
on investment
securities
(AFS/HTM)3
Trading and counterparty losses4 Other
losses/
gains 5
Net income
before
taxes
Other
compre-
hensive
income 6
AOCI
included
in capital
(2025:Q1)
Bank of America 43.2 0.0 54.7 0.2 8.9 2.3 −23.0 4.5 −4.8
Bank of NY-Mellon 8.5 0.0 1.8 0.3 1.3 0.0 5.1 2.1 -3.8
Barclays US 4.1 0.0 4.6 0.0 2.1 0.0 −2.6 0.0 0.0
BMO 2.8 0.0 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 −4.4 0.0 0.0
Capital One 31.2 0.0 45.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 −14.5 0.0 0.0
Charles Schwab Corp 11.8 0.0 1.7 -0.2 0.0 0.0 10.3 0.0 0.0
Citigroup 22.0 0.0 42.0 0.6 13.3 1.0 −34.9 6.5 −38.0
Citizens 5.4 0.0 11.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 −6.6 0.0 0.0
Credit Suisse USA -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.2 −3.3 0.0 0.1
DB USA -0.4 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.9 0.2 −2.3 0.1 −0.2
Goldman Sachs 26.7 0.0 18.5 0.0 21.2 3.6 −16.6 2.0 −1.0
JPMorgan Chase 65.2 0.0 71.0 1.7 17.8 4.7 −30.1 9.4 −2.3
M&T 4.9 0.0 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 −4.9 0.0 0.0
Morgan Stanley 25.0 0.0 11.3 0.0 12.5 4.8 −3.7 3.4 −2.9
Northern Trust 3.6 0.0 3.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 −0.2 1.5 −0.1
PNC 14.0 0.0 17.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 −3.6 0.0 −0.1
RBC USA 2.5 0.0 6.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 −4.2 0.0 0.0
State Street 6.3 0.0 1.4 0.1 1.2 0.0 3.6 1.5 −1.8
TD Group 6.8 0.0 10.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 −3.9 0.0 0.0
Truist 11.8 0.0 20.3 0.9 0.0 0.1 −9.5 0.0 0.0
UBS Americas 1.1 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 −2.4 0.0 0.0
US Bancorp 17.9 0.0 23.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 −5.5 0.0 0.0
Wells Fargo 35.5 0.0 54.9 0.4 12.2 0.8 −32.9 6.0 −6.2
23 banks 349.0 0.0 421.9 5.4 94.0 18.1 −190.4 36.9 −61.1

Note: These projections represent hypothetical estimates that involve an economic outcome that is more adverse than expected. Values may not sum precisely because of rounding.

 1. Pre-provision net revenue includes losses from operational-risk events and other real estate owned (OREO) costs. Return to table

 2. Other revenue includes one-time income and (expense) items not included in pre-provision net revenue. Return to table

 3. For banks that have adopted ASU 2016-13, the Federal Reserve incorporated its projection of expected credit losses on securities in the allowance for credit losses. AFS/HTM (available-for-sale/held-to-maturity). Return to table

 4. Trading and counterparty losses include mark-to-market and credit valuation adjustment (CVA) losses and losses arising from the counterparty default scenario component applied to derivatives, securities lending, and repurchase agreement activities. Return to table

 5. Other losses/gains include projected change in fair value of loans held for sale or held for investment and measured under the fair-value option, losses/gains on hedges on loans measured at fair value or amortized cost, and goodwill impairment losses. Return to table

 6. Other comprehensive income is only calculated for banks subject to Category I or II standards or banks that opt in to including accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) in their calculation of capital. Return to table

*The data in the "Memo items, Other comprehensive income" and the "Other effects on capital, AOCI included in capital (2025:Q1)" columns were revised for Bank of America, Bank of NY-Mellon, and the 23 banks.

**Note: The Federal Reserve revised this report on July 27, 2023, due to two banks, Bank of America Corporation and The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, submitting incorrect data. The revisions from the incorrect submissions do not result in a change to either bank's stress capital buffer but do affect projected capital ratios. In its review of these banks' data, the Federal Reserve conducted reviews of the other banks that underwent the stress test and found no errors in their submissions.

Losses

Over the projection horizon, aggregate losses on loans and other positions are projected to be $541 billion. These losses comprise

  • $424 billion in loan losses, accounting for 78 percent of total losses;
  • $18 billion in additional losses from items such as loans booked under the fair-value option (see table 6), accounting for 3 percent of total losses;
  • $94 billion in trading and counterparty losses at the 11 banks with substantial trading, processing, or custodial operations, accounting for 17 percent of total losses; and
  • $5 billion in securities losses, accounting for 1 percent of total losses (see figure 6).8
Figure 6. Projected losses in the severely adverse scenario
Figure 6. Projected losses in the severely adverse scenario

Accessible Version | Return to text

Note: Percent of total losses may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

For loans measured at amortized cost, projected aggregate losses are $424 billion, with the loan loss rate at 6.4 percent (see table 8).9 These loan losses flow into pre-tax net income through the projection of provisions for loan and lease losses, which is $422 billion in aggregate and takes into account banks' established allowances for credit losses at the start of the projection horizon.10

Table 8. Projected aggregate loan losses, by type of loan, under the severely adverse scenario, 2023:Q1–2025:Q1
Loan type Billions of dollars Portfolio loss rates (percent)1
Loan losses 424.0 6.4
First-lien mortgages, domestic 33.8 2.7
Junior liens and HELOCs,2domestic 7.0 4.9
Commercial and industrial3 99.3 6.7
Commercial real estate, domestic 64.9 8.8
Credit cards 119.7 17.4
Other consumer4 35.1 5.4
Other loans5 64.2 3.8

 1. Average loan balances used to calculate portfolio loss rates exclude loans held for sale, loans held for investment under the fair-value option, and Paycheck Protection Program loans and are calculated over nine quarters. Return to table

 2. HELOCs (home equity lines of credit). Return to table

 3. Commercial and industrial loans include small- and medium-enterprise loans and corporate cards. Return to table

 4. Other consumer loans include student loans and automobile loans. Return to table

 5. Other loans include international real estate loans. Return to table

Projected consumer loan losses represent a smaller share (35 percent) of total losses than commercial loan losses (42 percent). The loan portfolio that constitutes the largest amount of losses is credit cards, representing 22 percent of total losses.

Total loan loss rates vary significantly across banks, ranging between 1.3 percent and 14.7 percent (see table 9). This range results from differences in loan portfolio composition, which materially affects losses because projected loss rates vary significantly for different types of loans. For example, aggregate loan loss rates range from 2.7 percent on domestic first-lien mortgages to 17.4 percent on credit cards, due to the sensitivity and historical performance of these loans. Some loan portfolios are sensitive to home prices or unemployment rates and may experience high stressed loss rates due to the considerable stress on these factors in the severely adverse scenario.11

Loan loss rates also reflect differences in the characteristics of loans within each portfolio. For example, the median projected loss rate on commercial and industrial (C&I) loans across all banks is 6.3 percent. The loss rate on C&I loans among individual firms ranges from 2.5 percent to 16.6 percent. For credit cards, the range of projected loss rates among banks is 15.5 percent to 24.7 percent, and the median is 17.8 percent.

For loans measured at fair value, losses enter pre-tax net income through the other loans loss category (see table 7). Loans measured at amortized cost and those measured at fair value generally have similar risk factors, but the latter are exposed to risk from the effects of market fluctuations, which can lead to more severe market value losses in periods of high market volatility or asset illiquidity.

Aggregate trading and counterparty losses, which also flow into pre-tax net income, are $94 billion for the 11 banks subject to the global market shock component and/or the largest counterparty default component of the severely adverse scenario. Individual bank losses range from $1 billion to $21 billion, resulting from the specific risk characteristics of each bank's trading positions and counterparty exposures, inclusive of hedges (see table 7). Importantly, these projected losses are based on the trading positions and counterparty exposures held by banks on the same as-of date (October 14, 2022) and could have varied if they had been based on a different date.

Aggregate credit losses on investment securities are $5 billion (see table 6). In addition, unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale (AFS) debt securities are reflected in accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI).12 Other comprehensive income (OCI) is projected to be $37 billion* in aggregate.

Table 9. Projected loan losses by type of loan for 2023:Q1–2025:Q1 under the severely adverse scenario: 23 banks

Percent of average loan balances

Bank Loan
losses1
First-lien
mortgages,
domestic
Junior liens
and HELOCs,2
domestic
Commercial
and
industrial3
Commercial
real estate,
domestic
Credit cards Other
consumer4
Other loans 5
Bank of America 5.1 2.3 4.0 5.2 9.4 15.9 2.3 3.1
Bank of NY-Mellon 2.5 2.8 9.8 4.6 9.3 0.0 0.6 1.7
Barclays US 10.0 0.0 0.0 16.6 3.4 16.4 16.7 0.7
BMO 6.2 2.7 4.3 6.2 8.3 16.3 5.7 6.2
Capital One 14.7 3.2 7.8 11.2 9.9 22.2 10.4 4.9
Charles Schwab Corp 1.3 1.9 6.5 10.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8
Citigroup 7.2 3.7 19.1 4.6 9.3 15.6 18.3 2.8
Citizens 7.1 3.1 5.4 5.6 12.4 18.7 7.8 6.3
Credit Suisse USA 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.4 0.0 16.7 0.6
DB USA 5.0 3.4 9.9 2.5 11.2 0.0 4.5 1.9
Goldman Sachs 9.0 3.7 5.0 14.0 16.0 24.7 9.3 4.9
JPMorgan Chase 6.4 2.8 4.2 10.0 3.9 15.5 3.3 4.1
M&T 7.1 3.1 4.7 6.5 8.8 17.8 9.2 8.2
Morgan Stanley 4.2 2.8 5.0 11.7 13.7 0.0 1.3 3.9
Northern Trust 7.1 2.8 10.1 6.2 11.5 0.0 16.7 7.0
PNC 5.5 2.5 3.4 5.8 10.0 18.8 4.6 2.8
RBC USA 6.9 4.4 6.5 9.6 10.3 17.8 14.8 3.6
State Street 3.6 0.0 0.0 7.7 4.1 0.0 0.6 3.0
TD Group 5.9 2.7 5.5 6.2 7.5 21.4 2.9 3.5
Truist 5.9 2.4 3.8 5.3 9.6 16.3 8.3 3.6
UBS Americas 2.9 3.4 0.0 3.1 4.1 17.8 0.7 8.9
US Bancorp 6.3 3.0 6.0 6.6 9.5 16.5 5.5 4.0
Wells Fargo 5.7 2.1 2.8 6.4 9.7 17.8 5.1 4.5
23 banks 6.4 2.7 4.9 6.7 8.8 17.4 5.4 3.8

Note: These projections represent hypothetical estimates that involve an economic outcome that is more adverse than expected. Values may not sum precisely because of rounding.

 1. Average loan balances used to calculate portfolio loss rates exclude loans held for sale, loans held for investment under the fair-value option, and Paycheck Protection Program loans and are calculated over nine quarters. Return to table

 2. HELOCs (home equity lines of credit). Return to table

 3. Commercial and industrial loans include small- and medium-enterprise loans and corporate cards. Return to table

 4. Other consumer loans include student loans and automobile loans. Return to table

 5. Other loans include international real estate loans. Return to table

Box 3. Commercial Real Estate in Supervisory Stress Test

The May 2023 Financial Stability Report highlights the elevated prices on commercial real estate (CRE) and the possibility of a large correction in property values that could lead to substantial losses for banks.1 The demand for offices, downtown retail, and hotels has seen dramatic and countervailing changes over the past several years due largely to the pandemic and resulting changes. While many bank CRE loans are held by smaller banks not subject to the supervisory stress test, the banks subject to the stress test hold approximately 20 percent of office and downtown retail CRE loans. The 2023 stress test results demonstrate that large banks continue to have sufficient capital to withstand a severe CRE downturn.

The 2023 severely adverse scenario featured heightened stress in the CRE market, including a 40 percent decline in CRE prices. The scenario noted that declines in CRE prices should be assumed to be concentrated in properties most at risk of a sustained drop in income and asset values: offices that may be affected by remote work or hospitality sectors that continue to be affected by reduced business travel.

Conditions of CRE sectors have moved in different directions over the past several years. Office vacancies are elevated relative to pre-pandemic levels and increasing, while hotel vacancies peaked during the pandemic in 2020 and have been falling since that time (see figure A).

Figure A. Vacancy rate by property type
Figure A. Vacancy rate by property type

Accessible Version | Return to text

Note: Vacancy rate for each year uses the fourth quarter data only.

Source: CBRE Econometric Advisors.

In the severely adverse scenario, banks are projected to lose $64.9 billion on CRE exposures, or 8.8 percent of average balances. Overall projected CRE loss rates have fallen since 2020 as the hospitality sector recovered from the acute pandemic-related stress, but they remain elevated. Projected loss rates in the office sector continue to increase because of the high level of current stress in office market fundamentals and projected further deterioration in the scenario (see figure B). For example, the office loss rate under this year's scenario was around 20 percent. The projected office loss rates in the last few stress test cycles are higher than the peak loss rate observed during the 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis. Despite the severe losses, each bank has sufficient capital to continue to operate above regulatory capital requirements. To ensure the banking system remains sound and resilient, Federal Reserve supervisors have increased efforts to evaluate banks' credit risk exposure with particular attention on CRE lending.

Figure B. Office loss rate, cumulative 9-quarter
Figure B. Office loss rate, cumulative 9-quarter

Accessible Version | Return to text

Note: The 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis loss rate is based on office CMBS loans that became delinquent over the 9-quarter window in which eventual realized losses were highest. Stress test loss rates are calculated based on firms subject to the stress test each year and do not include owner occupied properties.

Source: Morningstar.

1. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Stability Report, May 2023. https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20230508.pdf. Return to text

Pre-provision Net Revenue

Pre-tax net income also includes projections of post-stress income and expenses captured in PPNR. Over the projection horizon, banks are projected to generate an aggregate of $349 billion in PPNR, which is equal to 1.8 percent of their combined average assets (see table 6).

PPNR projections are generally driven by the shape of the yield curve, the path of asset prices, equity market volatility, and measures of economic activity in the severely adverse scenario. In addition, PPNR incorporates expenses stemming from operational-risk events, such as fraud, employee lawsuits, litigation-related expenses, or computer system or other operating disruptions.13 In the aggregate, operational-risk losses are $185 billion.

The ratio of PPNR to average assets varies across banks (see figure 7), primarily because of differences in business focus. For instance, the ratio of PPNR to assets tends to be higher at banks focusing on credit card lending, since credit cards generally produce higher net interest income relative to other forms of lending.14 Additionally, lower ratios of PPNR to assets do not necessarily imply lower pre-tax net income, because the same business focus and risk characteristics determining differences in PPNR across banks could also result in offsetting projected losses.

Figure 7. Pre-provision net revenue rates in the severely adverse scenario
Figure 7. Pre-provision net revenue rates in the severely adverse scenario

Accessible Version | Return to text

Note: Estimates are for the nine-quarter period from 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1 as a percent of average assets.

Box 4. Exploratory Market Shock—Testing Inflationary Pressures

In February 2023, for the first time, the Federal Reserve published an additional, exploratory market shock component that applied only to U.S. G-SIBs.1 The purpose of the stress test is to understand a firm's resilience to a range of severe but plausible events, and the exploratory component furthers that purpose by posing a different set of risks than is probed by this year's global market shock component.

In contrast to this year's global market shock component, which was characterized by a severe recession with fading inflation expectations, the exploratory market shock is characterized by a less severe recession with greater inflationary pressures induced by higher inflation expectations, increases in interest rates, an appreciation of the U.S. dollar, and increases in commodity prices.2 Consistent with the nature of an exploratory exercise, the exploratory market shock does not contribute to the capital requirements set by this year's stress test.

Results

Both the global and exploratory market shocks affect banks through losses associated with their trading positions and counterparty exposures. Under the exploratory market shock, we see that the impact differs for firms relative to the severely adverse scenario. Full results are shown in table A. Most banks experience smaller trading and counterparty losses in the exploratory market shock, while one bank experiences larger losses. In aggregate, the trading and counterparty losses for the U.S. G-SIBs decline from about 1.3 percent of risk-weighted assets in the global market shock component to 1.1 percent of risk-weighted assets in the exploratory market shock.

Table A. Projected trading and counterparty losses through 2025:Q1 under the exploratory market shock component: U.S. G-SIBs

Billions of dollars

Bank Global market shock
component
Exploratory market
shock component
Bank of America 8.9 8.5
Bank of NY-Mellon 1.3 0.8
Citigroup 13.3 11.3
Goldman Sachs 21.2 18.1
JPMorgan Chase 17.8 15.7
Morgan Stanley 12.5 10.7
State Street 1.2 0.7
Wells Fargo 12.2 12.4

What Did We Learn?

The purpose of the exploratory market shock was to assess the potential of multiple scenarios to capture a wider array of risks. While the total loss projections from these two sets of shocks were similar, the underlying composition of losses varied significantly. For example, the exploratory market shock losses resulted in different counterparty concentrations relative to the global market shock. The changes were large enough to result in many banks' largest counterparty switching. Similarly, the profile of trading profit and loss was altered, providing further evidence that the use of more than one scenario can expand the Federal Reserve's view of risk exposures.

1. The U.S. G-SIBs are Bank of America Corporation, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, Citigroup Inc., The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation, and Wells Fargo & Company. As in the supervisory stress test, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and State Street Corporation were required only to incorporate an additional counterparty default component into their exploratory market shock. The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and State Street Corporation were not required to apply the exploratory market shock to calculate mark-to-market losses on their trading or credit valuation adjustments exposures. Return to text

2. The full description of the exploratory market shock is available here: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 2023 Stress Test Scenarios (Washington: Board of Governors, February 2023), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20230209a1.pdf. Return to text

 

References

 

 7. For risk-based capital ratios, the numerator is capital, which is primarily impacted from pre-tax net income and gains/losses on AFS. The denominator for risk-based capital ratios is risk-weighted assets. Risk-weighted assets change minimally throughout the projection horizon as the result of an assumption that a bank's assets generally remain unchanged. Return to text

 8. For banks that have adopted ASU 2016-13, the Federal Reserve incorporated its projection of expected credit losses on securities in the allowance for credit losses, in accordance with Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), "Financial Instruments–Credit Losses (Topic 326)," FASB ASU 2016-13 (Norwalk, CT: FASB, June 2016). Prior to the adoption of ASU 2016-13, securities credit losses were realized through other-than-temporary impairment. Return to text

 9. The loss rate is calculated as total projected loan losses over the nine quarters of the projection horizon divided by average loan balances over the horizon. Return to text

 10. Provisions for loan and lease losses equal projected loan losses plus the amount needed for the allowance to be at an appropriate level at the end of each quarter. Return to text

 11. In addition, losses are calculated based on the exposure at default, which includes both outstanding balances and any additional drawdown of the credit line that occurs prior to default, while loss rates are calculated as a percentage of average outstanding balances over the projection horizon. Return to text

 12. Only firms subject to Category I or II standards or firms that opt in are required to include unrealized gains and losses on securities in the calculation of capital. Category III and IV firms are not required to include unrealized gains and losses on securities in the calculation of capital. Return to text

 13. These operational-risk expenses are not a supervisory estimate of banks' current or expected legal liability, as they are conditional on the severely adverse scenario and conservative assumptions, and they also incorporate the potential for substantial losses that do not involve litigation or legal exposure. Return to text

 14. Credit card lending also tends to generate relatively high loss rates, suggesting that the higher PPNR rates at these banks do not necessarily indicate higher profitability. Return to text

*The data point was revised.

**Note:The Federal Reserve revised this report on July 27, 2023, due to two banks, Bank of America Corporation and The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, submitting incorrect data. The revisions from the incorrect submissions do not result in a change to either bank's stress capital buffer but do affect projected capital ratios. In its review of these banks' data, the Federal Reserve conducted reviews of the other banks that underwent the stress test and found no errors in their submissions.

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Last Update: July 31, 2023